Daily Papers

Advances in 3D reconstruction and novel view synthesis have enabled efficient and photorealistic rendering. However, images for reconstruction are still either largely manual or constrained by simple preplanned trajectories. To address this issue, recent works propose generalizable next-best-view planners that do not require online learning. Nevertheless, robustness and performance remain limited across various shapes. Hence, this study introduces Voxel-Face-Aware Hierarchical Next-Best-View Acquisition for Efficient 3D Reconstruction (Hestia), which addresses the shortcomings of the reinforcement learning-based generalizable approaches for five-degree-of-freedom viewpoint prediction. Hestia systematically improves the planners through four components: a more diverse dataset to promote robustness, a hierarchical structure to manage the high-dimensional continuous action search space, a close-greedy strategy to mitigate spurious correlations, and a face-aware design to avoid overlooking geometry. Experimental results show that Hestia achieves non-marginal improvements, with at least a 4% gain in coverage ratio, while reducing Chamfer Distance by 50% and maintaining real-time inference. In addition, Hestia outperforms prior methods by at least 12% in coverage ratio with a 5-image budget and remains robust to object placement variations. Finally, we demonstrate that Hestia, as a next-best-view planner, is feasible for the real-world application. Our project page is https://johnnylu305.github.io/hestia web.

The performance of acquisition functions for Bayesian optimisation to locate the global optimum of continuous functions is investigated in terms of the Pareto front between exploration and exploitation. We show that Expected Improvement (EI) and the Upper Confidence Bound (UCB) always select solutions to be expensively evaluated on the Pareto front, but Probability of Improvement is not guaranteed to do so and Weighted Expected Improvement does so only for a restricted range of weights. We introduce two novel epsilon-greedy acquisition functions. Extensive empirical evaluation of these together with random search, purely exploratory, and purely exploitative search on 10 benchmark problems in 1 to 10 dimensions shows that epsilon-greedy algorithms are generally at least as effective as conventional acquisition functions (e.g., EI and UCB), particularly with a limited budget. In higher dimensions epsilon-greedy approaches are shown to have improved performance over conventional approaches. These results are borne out on a real world computational fluid dynamics optimisation problem and a robotics active learning problem. Our analysis and experiments suggest that the most effective strategy, particularly in higher dimensions, is to be mostly greedy, occasionally selecting a random exploratory solution.

We demonstrate that from an algorithm guaranteeing an approximation factor for the ratio of submodular (RS) optimization problem, we can build another algorithm having a different kind of approximation guarantee -- weaker than the classical one -- for the difference of submodular (DS) optimization problem, and vice versa. We also illustrate the link between these two problems by analyzing a Greedy algorithm which approximately maximizes objective functions of the form Ψ(f,g), where f,g are two non-negative, monotone, submodular functions and Ψ is a {quasiconvex} 2-variables function, which is non decreasing with respect to the first variable. For the choice Ψ(f,g)triangleq f/g, we recover RS, and for the choice Ψ(f,g)triangleq f-g, we recover DS. To the best of our knowledge, this greedy approach is new for DS optimization. For RS optimization, it reduces to the standard GreedRatio algorithm that has already been analyzed previously. However, our analysis is novel for this case.

After the recent groundbreaking results of AlphaGo and AlphaZero, we have seen strong interests in deep reinforcement learning and artificial general intelligence (AGI) in game playing. However, deep learning is resource-intensive and the theory is not yet well developed. For small games, simple classical table-based Q-learning might still be the algorithm of choice. General Game Playing (GGP) provides a good testbed for reinforcement learning to research AGI. Q-learning is one of the canonical reinforcement learning methods, and has been used by (Banerjee & Stone, IJCAI 2007) in GGP. In this paper we implement Q-learning in GGP for three small-board games (Tic-Tac-Toe, Connect Four, Hex)source code: https://github.com/wh1992v/ggp-rl, to allow comparison to Banerjee et al.. We find that Q-learning converges to a high win rate in GGP. For the ε-greedy strategy, we propose a first enhancement, the dynamic ε algorithm. In addition, inspired by (Gelly & Silver, ICML 2007) we combine online search (Monte Carlo Search) to enhance offline learning, and propose QM-learning for GGP. Both enhancements improve the performance of classical Q-learning. In this work, GGP allows us to show, if augmented by appropriate enhancements, that classical table-based Q-learning can perform well in small games.

Influence maximization (IM) aims to identify a small number of influential individuals to maximize the information spread and finds applications in various fields. It was first introduced in the context of viral marketing, where a company pays a few influencers to promote the product. However, apart from the cost factor, the capacity of individuals to consume content poses challenges for implementing IM in real-world scenarios. For example, players on online gaming platforms can only interact with a limited number of friends. In addition, we observe that in these scenarios, (i) the initial adopters of promotion are likely to be the friends of influencers rather than the influencers themselves, and (ii) existing IM solutions produce sub-par results with high computational demands. Motivated by these observations, we propose a new IM variant called capacity constrained influence maximization (CIM), which aims to select a limited number of influential friends for each initial adopter such that the promotion can reach more users. To solve CIM effectively, we design two greedy algorithms, MG-Greedy and RR-Greedy, ensuring the 1/2-approximation ratio. To improve the efficiency, we devise the scalable implementation named RR-OPIM+ with (1/2-epsilon)-approximation and near-linear running time. We extensively evaluate the performance of 9 approaches on 6 real-world networks, and our solutions outperform all competitors in terms of result quality and running time. Additionally, we deploy RR-OPIM+ to online game scenarios, which improves the baseline considerably.

Stochastic optimization is one of the central problems in Machine Learning and Theoretical Computer Science. In the standard model, the algorithm is given a fixed distribution known in advance. In practice though, one may acquire at a cost extra information to make better decisions. In this paper, we study how to buy information for stochastic optimization and formulate this question as an online learning problem. Assuming the learner has an oracle for the original optimization problem, we design a 2-competitive deterministic algorithm and a e/(e-1)-competitive randomized algorithm for buying information. We show that this ratio is tight as the problem is equivalent to a robust generalization of the ski-rental problem, which we call super-martingale stopping. We also consider an adaptive setting where the learner can choose to buy information after taking some actions for the underlying optimization problem. We focus on the classic optimization problem, Min-Sum Set Cover, where the goal is to quickly find an action that covers a given request drawn from a known distribution. We provide an 8-competitive algorithm running in polynomial time that chooses actions and decides when to buy information about the underlying request.

Many important optimization problems, such as the minimum spanning tree and minimum-cost flow, can be solved optimally by a greedy method. In this work, we study a learning variant of these problems, where the model of the problem is unknown and has to be learned by interacting repeatedly with the environment in the bandit setting. We formalize our learning problem quite generally, as learning how to maximize an unknown modular function on a known polymatroid. We propose a computationally efficient algorithm for solving our problem and bound its expected cumulative regret. Our gap-dependent upper bound is tight up to a constant and our gap-free upper bound is tight up to polylogarithmic factors. Finally, we evaluate our method on three problems and demonstrate that it is practical.

We consider strategy proof mechanisms for facility location which maximize equitability between agents. As is common in the literature, we measure equitability with the Gini index. We first prove a simple but fundamental impossibility result that no strategy proof mechanism can bound the approximation ratio of the optimal Gini index of utilities for one or more facilities. We propose instead computing approximation ratios of the complemented Gini index of utilities, and consider how well both deterministic and randomized mechanisms approximate this. In addition, as Nash welfare is often put forwards as an equitable compromise between egalitarian and utilitarian outcomes, we consider how well mechanisms approximate the Nash welfare.

We study the problem of designing mechanisms for information acquisition scenarios. This setting models strategic interactions between an uniformed receiver and a set of informed senders. In our model the senders receive information about the underlying state of nature and communicate their observation (either truthfully or not) to the receiver, which, based on this information, selects an action. Our goal is to design mechanisms maximizing the receiver's utility while incentivizing the senders to report truthfully their information. First, we provide an algorithm that efficiently computes an optimal incentive compatible (IC) mechanism. Then, we focus on the online problem in which the receiver sequentially interacts in an unknown game, with the objective of minimizing the cumulative regret w.r.t. the optimal IC mechanism, and the cumulative violation of the incentive compatibility constraints. We investigate two different online scenarios, i.e., the full and bandit feedback settings. For the full feedback problem, we propose an algorithm that guarantees mathcal O(sqrt T) regret and violation, while for the bandit feedback setting we present an algorithm that attains mathcal O(T^{alpha}) regret and mathcal O(T^{1-alpha/2}) violation for any alphain[1/2, 1]. Finally, we complement our results providing a tight lower bound.

Offline learning of strategies takes data efficiency to its extreme by restricting algorithms to a fixed dataset of state-action trajectories. We consider the problem in a mixed-motive multiagent setting, where the goal is to solve a game under the offline learning constraint. We first frame this problem in terms of selecting among candidate equilibria. Since datasets may inform only a small fraction of game dynamics, it is generally infeasible in offline game-solving to even verify a proposed solution is a true equilibrium. Therefore, we consider the relative probability of low regret (i.e., closeness to equilibrium) across candidates based on the information available. Specifically, we extend Policy Space Response Oracles (PSRO), an online game-solving approach, by quantifying game dynamics uncertainty and modifying the RL objective to skew towards solutions more likely to have low regret in the true game. We further propose a novel meta-strategy solver, tailored for the offline setting, to guide strategy exploration in PSRO. Our incorporation of Conservatism principles from Offline reinforcement learning approaches for strategy Exploration gives our approach its name: COffeE-PSRO. Experiments demonstrate COffeE-PSRO's ability to extract lower-regret solutions than state-of-the-art offline approaches and reveal relationships between algorithmic components empirical game fidelity, and overall performance.

We consider the problem of locating a facility to serve a set of agents located along a line. The Nash welfare objective function, defined as the product of the agents' utilities, is known to provide a compromise between fairness and efficiency in resource allocation problems. We apply this welfare notion to the facility location problem, converting individual costs to utilities and analyzing the facility placement that maximizes the Nash welfare. We give a polynomial-time approximation algorithm to compute this facility location, and prove results suggesting that it achieves a good balance of fairness and efficiency. Finally, we take a mechanism design perspective and propose a strategy-proof mechanism with a bounded approximation ratio for Nash welfare.

In economy, markets are denoted as efficient when it is impossible to systematically generate profits which outperform the average. In the past years, the concept has been tested in other domains such as the growing sports betting market. Surprisingly, despite its large size and its level of maturity, sports betting shows traits of inefficiency. The anomalies indicate the existence of strategies which shift betting from a game of chance towards a game of skill. This article shows an example for an inefficiency detected in the German soccer betting TOTO 13er Wette, which is operated by state-run lottery agencies. Gamblers have to guess the outcome (win, draw, loss) of 13 soccer matches listed on a lottery tip. Applying stochastic methods, a recipe is presented to determine hit rates for single match outcomes. More important, the recipe provides the number of lottery tips required to achieve a specific number of strikes (number of correct match forecasts per lottery tip) for any given level of safety. An approximation is derived to cope with large numbers in hypergeometric distributions, valid under certain constraints. Overall, the strategy does lead to returns exceeding the aggregated lottery fees, resulting in moderate, but consistent profits. It is briefly discussed if lessions learned from soccer betting can be transferred back to financial markets, because gamblers and retail investors face similar challenges and opportunities.

Batch Bayesian optimisation (BO) is a successful technique for the optimisation of expensive black-box functions. Asynchronous BO can reduce wallclock time by starting a new evaluation as soon as another finishes, thus maximising resource utilisation. To maximise resource allocation, we develop a novel asynchronous BO method, AEGiS (Asynchronous epsilon-Greedy Global Search) that combines greedy search, exploiting the surrogate's mean prediction, with Thompson sampling and random selection from the approximate Pareto set describing the trade-off between exploitation (surrogate mean prediction) and exploration (surrogate posterior variance). We demonstrate empirically the efficacy of AEGiS on synthetic benchmark problems, meta-surrogate hyperparameter tuning problems and real-world problems, showing that AEGiS generally outperforms existing methods for asynchronous BO. When a single worker is available performance is no worse than BO using expected improvement.

This paper presents a parallel random-search method for reducing additive complexity in fast matrix multiplication. The approach replaces expensive exact evaluation with fast heuristic scoring, including the new Greedy-Intersections strategy. The method runs many independent common subexpression elimination processes in parallel, exploring the search space through random pair substitutions and diverse selection strategies while sharing promising partial solutions. Tested on 164 ternary-coefficient schemes, the method achieves lower addition counts than the state-of-the-art Greedy-Potential on 103 schemes, matches it on 59, and is outperformed on 2. For most schemes, it gives equal or better results while being much faster, making it practical for algorithm exploration. All software and results are open source.

Competitions for shareable and limited resources have long been studied with strategic agents. In reality, agents often have to learn and maximize the rewards of the resources at the same time. To design an individualized competing policy, we model the competition between agents in a novel multi-player multi-armed bandit (MPMAB) setting where players are selfish and aim to maximize their own rewards. In addition, when several players pull the same arm, we assume that these players averagely share the arms' rewards by expectation. Under this setting, we first analyze the Nash equilibrium when arms' rewards are known. Subsequently, we propose a novel SelfishMPMAB with Averaging Allocation (SMAA) approach based on the equilibrium. We theoretically demonstrate that SMAA could achieve a good regret guarantee for each player when all players follow the algorithm. Additionally, we establish that no single selfish player can significantly increase their rewards through deviation, nor can they detrimentally affect other players' rewards without incurring substantial losses for themselves. We finally validate the effectiveness of the method in extensive synthetic experiments.

Test-time scaling evaluates reasoning LLMs by sampling multiple outputs per prompt, but ranking models in this regime remains underexplored. We formalize dense benchmark ranking under test-time scaling and introduce Scorio, a library that implements statistical ranking methods such as paired-comparison models, item response theory (IRT) models, voting rules, and graph- and spectral-based methods. Across 20 reasoning models on four Olympiad-style math benchmarks (AIME'24, AIME'25, HMMT'25, and BrUMO'25; up to N=80 trials), most full-trial rankings agree closely with the Bayesian gold standard Bayes_{U}@80 (mean Kendall's τ_b = 0.93--0.95), and 19--34 methods recover exactly the same ordering. In the single-trial regime, the best methods reach τ_b approx 0.86. Using greedy decoding as an empirical prior (Bayes_{R_0}@N) reduces variance at N=1 by 16--52%, but can bias rankings when greedy and stochastic sampling disagree. These results identify reliable ranking methods for both high- and low-budget test-time scaling. We release Scorio as an open-source library at https://github.com/mohsenhariri/scorio.

This paper investigates a novel lossy compression framework operating under logarithmic loss, designed to handle situations where the reconstruction distribution diverges from the source distribution. This framework is especially relevant for applications that require joint compression and retrieval, and in scenarios involving distributional shifts due to processing. We show that the proposed formulation extends the classical minimum entropy coupling framework by integrating a bottleneck, allowing for a controlled degree of stochasticity in the coupling. We explore the decomposition of the Minimum Entropy Coupling with Bottleneck (MEC-B) into two distinct optimization problems: Entropy-Bounded Information Maximization (EBIM) for the encoder, and Minimum Entropy Coupling (MEC) for the decoder. Through extensive analysis, we provide a greedy algorithm for EBIM with guaranteed performance, and characterize the optimal solution near functional mappings, yielding significant theoretical insights into the structural complexity of this problem. Furthermore, we illustrate the practical application of MEC-B through experiments in Markov Coding Games (MCGs) under rate limits. These games simulate a communication scenario within a Markov Decision Process, where an agent must transmit a compressed message from a sender to a receiver through its actions. Our experiments highlight the trade-offs between MDP rewards and receiver accuracy across various compression rates, showcasing the efficacy of our method compared to conventional compression baseline.

This paper investigates the problem of generalized linear bandits with heavy-tailed rewards, whose (1+epsilon)-th moment is bounded for some epsilonin (0,1]. Although there exist methods for generalized linear bandits, most of them focus on bounded or sub-Gaussian rewards and are not well-suited for many real-world scenarios, such as financial markets and web-advertising. To address this issue, we propose two novel algorithms based on truncation and mean of medians. These algorithms achieve an almost optimal regret bound of O(dT^{1{1+epsilon}}), where d is the dimension of contextual information and T is the time horizon. Our truncation-based algorithm supports online learning, distinguishing it from existing truncation-based approaches. Additionally, our mean-of-medians-based algorithm requires only O(log T) rewards and one estimator per epoch, making it more practical. Moreover, our algorithms improve the regret bounds by a logarithmic factor compared to existing algorithms when epsilon=1. Numerical experimental results confirm the merits of our algorithms.

Greedy search methods like Greedy Best-First Search (GBFS) and Enforced Hill-Climbing (EHC) often struggle when faced with Uninformed Heuristic Regions (UHRs) like heuristic local minima or plateaus. In this work, we theoretically and empirically compare two popular methods for escaping UHRs in breadth-first search (BrFS) and restarting random walks (RRWs). We first derive the expected runtime of escaping a UHR using BrFS and RRWs, based on properties of the UHR and the random walk procedure, and then use these results to identify when RRWs will be faster in expectation than BrFS. We then evaluate these methods for escaping UHRs by comparing standard EHC, which uses BrFS to escape UHRs, to variants of EHC called EHC-RRW, which use RRWs for that purpose. EHC-RRW is shown to have strong expected runtime guarantees in cases where EHC has previously been shown to be effective. We also run experiments with these approaches on PDDL planning benchmarks to better understand their relative effectiveness for escaping UHRs.

We study offline multi-agent reinforcement learning (RL) in Markov games, where the goal is to learn an approximate equilibrium -- such as Nash equilibrium and (Coarse) Correlated Equilibrium -- from an offline dataset pre-collected from the game. Existing works consider relatively restricted tabular or linear models and handle each equilibria separately. In this work, we provide the first framework for sample-efficient offline learning in Markov games under general function approximation, handling all 3 equilibria in a unified manner. By using Bellman-consistent pessimism, we obtain interval estimation for policies' returns, and use both the upper and the lower bounds to obtain a relaxation on the gap of a candidate policy, which becomes our optimization objective. Our results generalize prior works and provide several additional insights. Importantly, we require a data coverage condition that improves over the recently proposed "unilateral concentrability". Our condition allows selective coverage of deviation policies that optimally trade-off between their greediness (as approximate best responses) and coverage, and we show scenarios where this leads to significantly better guarantees. As a new connection, we also show how our algorithmic framework can subsume seemingly different solution concepts designed for the special case of two-player zero-sum games.

In this work, we take a fresh look at some old and new algorithms for off-policy, return-based reinforcement learning. Expressing these in a common form, we derive a novel algorithm, Retrace(λ), with three desired properties: (1) it has low variance; (2) it safely uses samples collected from any behaviour policy, whatever its degree of "off-policyness"; and (3) it is efficient as it makes the best use of samples collected from near on-policy behaviour policies. We analyze the contractive nature of the related operator under both off-policy policy evaluation and control settings and derive online sample-based algorithms. We believe this is the first return-based off-policy control algorithm converging a.s. to Q^* without the GLIE assumption (Greedy in the Limit with Infinite Exploration). As a corollary, we prove the convergence of Watkins' Q(λ), which was an open problem since 1989. We illustrate the benefits of Retrace(λ) on a standard suite of Atari 2600 games.

Card games are widely used to study sequential decision-making under uncertainty, with real-world analogues in negotiation, finance, and cybersecurity. These games typically fall into three categories based on the flow of control: strictly sequential (players alternate single actions), deterministic response (some actions trigger a fixed outcome), and unbounded reciprocal response (alternating counterplays are permitted). A less-explored but strategically rich structure is the bounded one-sided response, where a player's action briefly transfers control to the opponent, who must satisfy a fixed condition through one or more moves before the turn resolves. We term games featuring this mechanism Bounded One-Sided Response Games (BORGs). We introduce a modified version of Monopoly Deal as a benchmark environment that isolates this dynamic, where a Rent action forces the opponent to choose payment assets. The gold-standard algorithm, Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR), converges on effective strategies without novel algorithmic extensions. A lightweight full-stack research platform unifies the environment, a parallelized CFR runtime, and a human-playable web interface. The trained CFR agent and source code are available at https://monopolydeal.ai.

Evaluating modern machine learning models has become prohibitively expensive. Benchmarks such as LMMs-Eval and HELM demand thousands of GPU hours per model. Costly evaluation reduces inclusivity, slows the cycle of innovation, and worsens environmental impact. The typical approach follows two steps. First, select an anchor subset of data. Second, train a mapping from the accuracy on this subset to the final test result. The drawback is that anchor selection depends on clustering, which can be complex and sensitive to design choices. We argue that promoting diversity among samples is not essential; what matters is to select samples that maximise diversity in model responses. Our method, Diversifying Sample Condensation (DISCO), selects the top-k samples with the greatest model disagreements. This uses greedy, sample-wise statistics rather than global clustering. The approach is conceptually simpler. From a theoretical view, inter-model disagreement provides an information-theoretically optimal rule for such greedy selection. DISCO shows empirical gains over prior methods, achieving state-of-the-art results in performance prediction across MMLU, Hellaswag, Winogrande, and ARC. Code is available here: https://github.com/arubique/disco-public.

In many areas of medicine, security, and life sciences, we want to allocate limited resources to different sources in order to detect extreme values. In this paper, we study an efficient way to allocate these resources sequentially under limited feedback. While sequential design of experiments is well studied in bandit theory, the most commonly optimized property is the regret with respect to the maximum mean reward. However, in other problems such as network intrusion detection, we are interested in detecting the most extreme value output by the sources. Therefore, in our work we study extreme regret which measures the efficiency of an algorithm compared to the oracle policy selecting the source with the heaviest tail. We propose the ExtremeHunter algorithm, provide its analysis, and evaluate it empirically on synthetic and real-world experiments.

Multitask Reinforcement Learning (MTRL) approaches have gained increasing attention for its wide applications in many important Reinforcement Learning (RL) tasks. However, while recent advancements in MTRL theory have focused on the improved statistical efficiency by assuming a shared structure across tasks, exploration--a crucial aspect of RL--has been largely overlooked. This paper addresses this gap by showing that when an agent is trained on a sufficiently diverse set of tasks, a generic policy-sharing algorithm with myopic exploration design like epsilon-greedy that are inefficient in general can be sample-efficient for MTRL. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first theoretical demonstration of the "exploration benefits" of MTRL. It may also shed light on the enigmatic success of the wide applications of myopic exploration in practice. To validate the role of diversity, we conduct experiments on synthetic robotic control environments, where the diverse task set aligns with the task selection by automatic curriculum learning, which is empirically shown to improve sample-efficiency.

In Reinforcement Learning (RL), an agent acts in an unknown environment to maximize the expected cumulative discounted sum of an external reward signal, i.e., the expected return. In practice, in many tasks of interest, such as policy optimization, the agent usually spends its interaction budget by collecting episodes of fixed length within a simulator (i.e., Monte Carlo simulation). However, given the discounted nature of the RL objective, this data collection strategy might not be the best option. Indeed, the rewards taken in early simulation steps weigh exponentially more than future rewards. Taking a cue from this intuition, in this paper, we design an a-priori budget allocation strategy that leads to the collection of trajectories of different lengths, i.e., truncated. The proposed approach provably minimizes the width of the confidence intervals around the empirical estimates of the expected return of a policy. After discussing the theoretical properties of our method, we make use of our trajectory truncation mechanism to extend Policy Optimization via Importance Sampling (POIS, Metelli et al., 2018) algorithm. Finally, we conduct a numerical comparison between our algorithm and POIS: the results are consistent with our theory and show that an appropriate truncation of the trajectories can succeed in improving performance.

Some security-development settings require local models that map an objective to an ordered, checkable plan. We present a low-rank decomposition adapter and release a case-disjoint corpus with 24 authored decompositions and 83 derived next-step examples across 24 satellite-security cases. To prevent reference-plan leakage, prompts contain one objective and eight shuffled SPARTA candidates. The evaluation candidate sets are constructed with oracle inclusion of every reference technique, so this study measures selection from a controlled set, not retrieval. On six fixed cases and five decoding seeds, mean scores vary across adapters and prompted Qwen2.5 baselines; a separate greedy check over three adapter training seeds shows non-negligible training variance. A 24-fold greedy leave-one-case-out control at the two compact sizes likewise shows tradeoffs: at 1.5B, adapter precision is 0.583 against 0.480 for two-shot prompting, while recall is 0.586 against 0.660. Case-resampling intervals for adapter precision relative to the strongest prompted baseline cross zero at 1.5B and 7B. The adapter is also substantially more format-compliant, which prevents attributing all score differences to selection. Autoregressive next-step accuracy is 0.08, 0.06, and 0.29 at 0.5B, 1.5B, and 7B. We therefore offer the formulation, leakage-controlled dataset, reproducibility package, and descriptive analysis as a proof of concept, not evidence of a reliable stand-alone decomposition system or a general adapter advantage. A separate diagnostic tests contract reuse.

Budget management strategies in repeated auctions have received growing attention in online advertising markets. However, previous work on budget management in online bidding mainly focused on second-price auctions. The rapid shift from second-price auctions to first-price auctions for online ads in recent years has motivated the challenging question of how to bid in repeated first-price auctions while controlling budgets. In this work, we study the problem of learning in repeated first-price auctions with budgets. We design a dual-based algorithm that can achieve a near-optimal O(T) regret with full information feedback where the maximum competing bid is always revealed after each auction. We further consider the setting with one-sided information feedback where only the winning bid is revealed after each auction. We show that our modified algorithm can still achieve an O(T) regret with mild assumptions on the bidder's value distribution. Finally, we complement the theoretical results with numerical experiments to confirm the effectiveness of our budget management policy.

The Multi-armed bandit offer the advantage to learn and exploit the already learnt knowledge at the same time. This capability allows this approach to be applied in different domains, going from clinical trials where the goal is investigating the effects of different experimental treatments while minimizing patient losses, to adaptive routing where the goal is to minimize the delays in a network. This article provides a review of the recent results on applying bandit to real-life scenario and summarize the state of the art for each of these fields. Different techniques has been proposed to solve this problem setting, like epsilon-greedy, Upper confident bound (UCB) and Thompson Sampling (TS). We are showing here how this algorithms were adapted to solve the different problems of exploration exploitation.

We study the problem of learning minimax policies in zero-sum matrix games. Fiegel et al. (2025) recently showed that achieving last-iterate convergence in this setting is harder when the players are uncoupled, by proving a lower bound on the exploitability gap of Omega(t^{-1/4}). Some online mirror descent algorithms were proposed in the literature for this problem, but none have truly attained this rate yet. We show that the use of a log-barrier regularization, along with a dual-focused analysis, allows this O-tilde(t^{-1/4}) convergence with high-probability. We additionally extend our idea to the setting of extensive-form games, proving a bound with the same rate.

We study the polynomial-time approximability of the optimal online stochastic bipartite matching algorithm, initiated by Papadimitriou et al. (EC'21). Here, nodes on one side of the graph are given upfront, while at each time t, an online node and its edge weights are drawn from a time-dependent distribution. The optimal algorithm is PSPACE-hard to approximate within some universal constant. We refer to this optimal algorithm, which requires time to think (compute), as a philosopher, and refer to polynomial-time online approximations of the above as philosopher inequalities. The best known philosopher inequality for online matching yields a 0.652-approximation. In contrast, the best possible prophet inequality, or approximation of the optimum offline solution, is 0.5. Our main results are a 0.678-approximate algorithm and a 0.685-approximation for a vertex-weighted special case. Notably, both bounds exceed the 0.666-approximation of the offline optimum obtained by Tang, Wu, and Wu (STOC'22) for the vertex-weighted problem. Building on our algorithms and the recent black-box reduction of Banihashem et al. (SODA'24), we provide polytime (pricing-based) truthful mechanisms which 0.678-approximate the social welfare of the optimal online allocation for bipartite matching markets. Our online allocation algorithm relies on the classic pivotal sampling algorithm (Srinivasan FOCS'01, Gandhi et al. J.ACM'06), along with careful discarding to obtain negative correlations between offline nodes. Consequently, the analysis boils down to examining the distribution of a weighted sum X of negatively correlated Bernoulli variables, specifically lower bounding its mass below a threshold, E[min(1,X)], of possible independent interest. Interestingly, our bound relies on an imaginary invocation of pivotal sampling.

Sequence models are a critical component of modern NLP systems, but their predictions are difficult to explain. We consider model explanations though rationales, subsets of context that can explain individual model predictions. We find sequential rationales by solving a combinatorial optimization: the best rationale is the smallest subset of input tokens that would predict the same output as the full sequence. Enumerating all subsets is intractable, so we propose an efficient greedy algorithm to approximate this objective. The algorithm, which is called greedy rationalization, applies to any model. For this approach to be effective, the model should form compatible conditional distributions when making predictions on incomplete subsets of the context. This condition can be enforced with a short fine-tuning step. We study greedy rationalization on language modeling and machine translation. Compared to existing baselines, greedy rationalization is best at optimizing the combinatorial objective and provides the most faithful rationales. On a new dataset of annotated sequential rationales, greedy rationales are most similar to human rationales.

The bandits with knapsack (BwK) framework models online decision-making problems in which an agent makes a sequence of decisions subject to resource consumption constraints. The traditional model assumes that each action consumes a non-negative amount of resources and the process ends when the initial budgets are fully depleted. We study a natural generalization of the BwK framework which allows non-monotonic resource utilization, i.e., resources can be replenished by a positive amount. We propose a best-of-both-worlds primal-dual template that can handle any online learning problem with replenishment for which a suitable primal regret minimizer exists. In particular, we provide the first positive results for the case of adversarial inputs by showing that our framework guarantees a constant competitive ratio alpha when B=Omega(T) or when the possible per-round replenishment is a positive constant. Moreover, under a stochastic input model, our algorithm yields an instance-independent O(T^{1/2}) regret bound which complements existing instance-dependent bounds for the same setting. Finally, we provide applications of our framework to some economic problems of practical relevance.

There have been recent efforts for incorporating Graph Neural Network models for learning full-stack solvers for constraint satisfaction problems (CSP) and particularly Boolean satisfiability (SAT). Despite the unique representational power of these neural embedding models, it is not clear how the search strategy in the learned models actually works. On the other hand, by fixing the search strategy (e.g. greedy search), we would effectively deprive the neural models of learning better strategies than those given. In this paper, we propose a generic neural framework for learning CSP solvers that can be described in terms of probabilistic inference and yet learn search strategies beyond greedy search. Our framework is based on the idea of propagation, decimation and prediction (and hence the name PDP) in graphical models, and can be trained directly toward solving CSP in a fully unsupervised manner via energy minimization, as shown in the paper. Our experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of our framework for SAT solving compared to both neural and the state-of-the-art baselines.

In this paper, we investigate a problem of actively learning threshold in latent space, where the unknown reward g(gamma, v) depends on the proposed threshold gamma and latent value v and it can be only achieved if the threshold is lower than or equal to the unknown latent value. This problem has broad applications in practical scenarios, e.g., reserve price optimization in online auctions, online task assignments in crowdsourcing, setting recruiting bars in hiring, etc. We first characterize the query complexity of learning a threshold with the expected reward at most epsilon smaller than the optimum and prove that the number of queries needed can be infinitely large even when g(gamma, v) is monotone with respect to both gamma and v. On the positive side, we provide a tight query complexity Theta(1/epsilon^3) when g is monotone and the CDF of value distribution is Lipschitz. Moreover, we show a tight Theta(1/epsilon^3) query complexity can be achieved as long as g satisfies one-sided Lipschitzness, which provides a complete characterization for this problem. Finally, we extend this model to an online learning setting and demonstrate a tight Theta(T^{2/3}) regret bound using continuous-arm bandit techniques and the aforementioned query complexity results.

In reinforcement learning (RL), rewards of states are typically considered additive, and following the Markov assumption, they are independent of states visited previously. In many important applications, such as coverage control, experiment design and informative path planning, rewards naturally have diminishing returns, i.e., their value decreases in light of similar states visited previously. To tackle this, we propose submodular RL (SubRL), a paradigm which seeks to optimize more general, non-additive (and history-dependent) rewards modelled via submodular set functions which capture diminishing returns. Unfortunately, in general, even in tabular settings, we show that the resulting optimization problem is hard to approximate. On the other hand, motivated by the success of greedy algorithms in classical submodular optimization, we propose SubPO, a simple policy gradient-based algorithm for SubRL that handles non-additive rewards by greedily maximizing marginal gains. Indeed, under some assumptions on the underlying Markov Decision Process (MDP), SubPO recovers optimal constant factor approximations of submodular bandits. Moreover, we derive a natural policy gradient approach for locally optimizing SubRL instances even in large state- and action- spaces. We showcase the versatility of our approach by applying SubPO to several applications, such as biodiversity monitoring, Bayesian experiment design, informative path planning, and coverage maximization. Our results demonstrate sample efficiency, as well as scalability to high-dimensional state-action spaces.

Speculative decoding accelerates language model inference by using a fast drafter to propose candidate tokens that are then verified by a larger target model. Existing theory largely studies the stochastic, distribution-preserving setting, where the goal is to exactly sample from the target distribution. In contrast, many practical systems use greedy decoding, relaxed acceptance rules, or tree-based candidate sets, where success is governed by local ranking and threshold events rather than exact distributional equality. We develop a theory for these regimes. We identify that many common acceptance criteria have rejection regions that can be characterized as lower level sets of the target distribution. For these, we characterize the exact KL divergence required for rejection yielding exact certificates and sharp margin-based bounds for strict greedy decoding, additive and multiplicative relaxed acceptance, top-(m) relaxed criteria, and entropy-thresholded acceptance. We then extend the framework to greedy tree decoding, deriving exact and margin-only certificates for when the target greedy token remains covered by the drafter's top-(m) candidates. Finally, we evaluate the resulting certificates on Qwen3 models, showing that relaxed and tree-based criteria substantially enlarge the region of certified acceptance, especially on decoding steps with low target model distribution margin. These results complement existing distribution-preserving analyses of speculative decoding by characterizing the deterministic local acceptance events common in practical inference systems.

Motivated by the phenomenon of strategic agents gaming a recommender system to maximize the number of times they are recommended to users, we study a strategic variant of the linear contextual bandit problem, where the arms can strategically misreport privately observed contexts to the learner. We treat the algorithm design problem as one of mechanism design under uncertainty and propose the Optimistic Grim Trigger Mechanism (OptGTM) that incentivizes the agents (i.e., arms) to report their contexts truthfully while simultaneously minimizing regret. We also show that failing to account for the strategic nature of the agents results in linear regret. However, a trade-off between mechanism design and regret minimization appears to be unavoidable. More broadly, this work aims to provide insight into the intersection of online learning and mechanism design.

Bayesian optimisation is a popular, surrogate model-based approach for optimising expensive black-box functions. Given a surrogate model, the next location to expensively evaluate is chosen via maximisation of a cheap-to-query acquisition function. We present an epsilon-greedy procedure for Bayesian optimisation in batch settings in which the black-box function can be evaluated multiple times in parallel. Our epsilon-shotgun algorithm leverages the model's prediction, uncertainty, and the approximated rate of change of the landscape to determine the spread of batch solutions to be distributed around a putative location. The initial target location is selected either in an exploitative fashion on the mean prediction, or -- with probability epsilon -- from elsewhere in the design space. This results in locations that are more densely sampled in regions where the function is changing rapidly and in locations predicted to be good (i.e close to predicted optima), with more scattered samples in regions where the function is flatter and/or of poorer quality. We empirically evaluate the epsilon-shotgun methods on a range of synthetic functions and two real-world problems, finding that they perform at least as well as state-of-the-art batch methods and in many cases exceed their performance.

We study the problem of learning in zero-sum matrix games with repeated play and bandit feedback. Specifically, we focus on developing uncoupled algorithms that guarantee, without communication between players, the convergence of the last-iterate to a Nash equilibrium. Although the non-bandit case has been studied extensively, this setting has only been explored recently, with a bound of O(T^{-1/8}) on the exploitability gap. We show that, for uncoupled algorithms, guaranteeing convergence of the policy profiles to a Nash equilibrium is detrimental to the performance, with the best attainable rate being Ω(T^{-1/4}) in contrast to the usual Ω(T^{-1/2}) rate for convergence of the average iterates. We then propose two algorithms that achieve this optimal rate up to constant and logarithmic factors. The first algorithm leverages a straightforward trade-off between exploration and exploitation, while the second employs a regularization technique based on a two-step mirror descent approach.

This paper investigates the problem of ensembling multiple strategies for sequential portfolios to outperform individual strategies in terms of long-term wealth. Due to the uncertainty of strategies' performances in the future market, which are often based on specific models and statistical assumptions, investors often mitigate risk and enhance robustness by combining multiple strategies, akin to common approaches in collective learning prediction. However, the absence of a distribution-free and consistent preference framework complicates decisions of combination due to the ambiguous objective. To address this gap, we introduce a novel framework for decision-making in combining strategies, irrespective of market conditions, by establishing the investor's preference between decisions and then forming a clear objective. Through this framework, we propose a combinatorial strategy construction, free from statistical assumptions, for any scale of component strategies, even infinite, such that it meets the determined criterion. Finally, we test the proposed strategy along with its accelerated variant and some other multi-strategies. The numerical experiments show results in favor of the proposed strategies, albeit with small tradeoffs in their Sharpe ratios, in which their cumulative wealths eventually exceed those of the best component strategies while the accelerated strategy significantly improves performance.

We consider the obnoxious facility location problem (in which agents prefer the facility location to be far from them) and propose a hierarchy of distance-based proportional fairness concepts for the problem. These fairness axioms ensure that groups of agents at the same location are guaranteed to be a distance from the facility proportional to their group size. We consider deterministic and randomized mechanisms, and compute tight bounds on the price of proportional fairness. In the deterministic setting, we show that our proportional fairness axioms are incompatible with strategyproofness, and prove asymptotically tight epsilon-price of anarchy and stability bounds for proportionally fair welfare-optimal mechanisms. In the randomized setting, we identify proportionally fair and strategyproof mechanisms that give an expected welfare within a constant factor of the optimal welfare. Finally, we prove existence results for two extensions to our model.

Multi-armed bandit problems are the predominant theoretical model of exploration-exploitation tradeoffs in learning, and they have countless applications ranging from medical trials, to communication networks, to Web search and advertising. In many of these application domains the learner may be constrained by one or more supply (or budget) limits, in addition to the customary limitation on the time horizon. The literature lacks a general model encompassing these sorts of problems. We introduce such a model, called "bandits with knapsacks", that combines aspects of stochastic integer programming with online learning. A distinctive feature of our problem, in comparison to the existing regret-minimization literature, is that the optimal policy for a given latent distribution may significantly outperform the policy that plays the optimal fixed arm. Consequently, achieving sublinear regret in the bandits-with-knapsacks problem is significantly more challenging than in conventional bandit problems. We present two algorithms whose reward is close to the information-theoretic optimum: one is based on a novel "balanced exploration" paradigm, while the other is a primal-dual algorithm that uses multiplicative updates. Further, we prove that the regret achieved by both algorithms is optimal up to polylogarithmic factors. We illustrate the generality of the problem by presenting applications in a number of different domains including electronic commerce, routing, and scheduling. As one example of a concrete application, we consider the problem of dynamic posted pricing with limited supply and obtain the first algorithm whose regret, with respect to the optimal dynamic policy, is sublinear in the supply.

An agent holds a position in a perpetual contract with payoff function ψ and attempts to liquidate the position while managing transaction costs, inventory risk, and funding rate payments. By solving the agent's stochastic control problem we obtain a closed-form expression for the optimal trading strategy when the payoff function is given by ψ(s) = s. When the payoff function is non-linear we provide approximations to the optimal strategy which apply when the funding rate parameter is small or when the length of the trading interval is small. We further prove that when ψ is non-linear, the short time approximation can be written in terms of the closed-form trading strategy corresponding to the case of the identity payoff function.

We study the Levine hat problem, a classic combinatorial puzzle introduced by Lionel Levine in 2010. This problem involves a game in which n geq 2 players, each seeing an infinite stack of hats on each of their teammates' heads but not on their own, must simultaneously guess the index of a black hat on their own stack. If one of the players fails to do so, the team loses collectively. The players must therefore come up with a good strategy before the game starts. While the optimal winning probability V_{n} remains unknown even for n=2, we make three key advances. First, we develop a novel geometric framework for representing strategies through measurable functions, providing a new expression of V_{n} and a unified treatment of the game for finite and for infinite stacks via integral formulations. Secondly, we construct a new strategy K_{5} that reaches the conjectured optimal probability of victory : 0.35. We also show that K_{5} is part of a larger class of strategies that allow us to improve current bounds and resolve conjectured inequalities. Finally, we introduce and entirely solve a continuous generalization of the problem, demonstrating that extending to uncountable hat stacks increases the optimal winning probability to exactly 1/2. This generalization naturally leads to a broader and smoother strategic framework, within which we also describe how to compute optimal responses to a range of strategies.

We study an online learning problem in general-sum Stackelberg games, where players act in a decentralized and strategic manner. We study two settings depending on the type of information for the follower: (1) the limited information setting where the follower only observes its own reward, and (2) the side information setting where the follower has extra side information about the leader's reward. We show that for the follower, myopically best responding to the leader's action is the best strategy for the limited information setting, but not necessarily so for the side information setting -- the follower can manipulate the leader's reward signals with strategic actions, and hence induce the leader's strategy to converge to an equilibrium that is better off for itself. Based on these insights, we study decentralized online learning for both players in the two settings. Our main contribution is to derive last-iterate convergence and sample complexity results in both settings. Notably, we design a new manipulation strategy for the follower in the latter setting, and show that it has an intrinsic advantage against the best response strategy. Our theories are also supported by empirical results.

Finding the optimal Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) configuration for a given use case can be complex and expensive. Motivated by this challenge, frameworks for RAG hyper-parameter optimization (HPO) have recently emerged, yet their effectiveness has not been rigorously benchmarked. To address this gap, we present a comprehensive study involving 5 HPO algorithms over 5 datasets from diverse domains, including a new one collected for this work on real-world product documentation. Our study explores the largest HPO search space considered to date, with two optimized evaluation metrics. Analysis of the results shows that RAG HPO can be done efficiently, either greedily or with iterative random search, and that it significantly boosts RAG performance for all datasets. For greedy HPO approaches, we show that optimizing models first is preferable to the prevalent practice of optimizing sequentially according to the RAG pipeline order.

We introduce and analyze distance preservation games (DPGs). In DPGs, agents express ideal distances to other agents and need to choose locations in the unit interval while preserving their ideal distances as closely as possible. We analyze the existence and computation of location profiles that are jump stable (i.e., no agent can benefit by moving to another location) or welfare optimal for DPGs, respectively. Specifically, we prove that there are DPGs without jump stable location profiles and identify important cases where such outcomes always exist and can be computed efficiently. Similarly, we show that finding welfare optimal location profiles is NP-complete and present approximation algorithms for finding solutions with social welfare close to optimal. Finally, we prove that DPGs have a price of anarchy of at most 2.

We give a very general and simple framework to incorporate predictions on requests for online covering problems in a rigorous and black-box manner. Our framework turns any online algorithm with competitive ratio ρ(k, cdot) depending on k, the number of arriving requests, into an algorithm with competitive ratio of ρ(η, cdot), where η is the prediction error. With accurate enough prediction, the resulting competitive ratio breaks through the corresponding worst-case online lower bounds, and smoothly degrades as the prediction error grows. This framework directly applies to a wide range of well-studied online covering problems such as facility location, Steiner problems, set cover, parking permit, etc., and yields improved and novel bounds.

Learning-augmented paging has been extensively studied in recent years. A key advantage over naive ML-based approaches is bounded robustness, which guarantees worst-case performance even when predictions are inaccurate, making these algorithms valuable for real-world systems. Prior work achieves robustness bounds of 2H_k + O(1) in the randomized setting, leaving a gap to the optimal competitive ratio H_k. In this paper, we study how to close this gap. We begin by reviewing online optimality and proving a new property of the latest H_k-competitive algorithm, which facilitates our analysis in the learning-augmented setting. Then, we review existing learning-augmented paging algorithms and introduce a unifying primitive, the relative prediction budget, which captures the essence of establishing robustness and reveals that prior algorithms either overuse or underutilize predictions. Guided by the above analysis, we develop a new framework that achieves the best-possible robustness up to an additive constant for learning-augmented paging: H_k + O(1). Experiments further demonstrate strong practical performance.

In a recent work, Laforgue et al. introduce the model of last switch dependent (LSD) bandits, in an attempt to capture nonstationary phenomena induced by the interaction between the player and the environment. Examples include satiation, where consecutive plays of the same action lead to decreased performance, or deprivation, where the payoff of an action increases after an interval of inactivity. In this work, we take a step towards understanding the approximability of planning LSD bandits, namely, the (NP-hard) problem of computing an optimal arm-pulling strategy under complete knowledge of the model. In particular, we design the first efficient constant approximation algorithm for the problem and show that, under a natural monotonicity assumption on the payoffs, its approximation guarantee (almost) matches the state-of-the-art for the special and well-studied class of recharging bandits (also known as delay-dependent). In this attempt, we develop new tools and insights for this class of problems, including a novel higher-dimensional relaxation and the technique of mirroring the evolution of virtual states. We believe that these novel elements could potentially be used for approaching richer classes of action-induced nonstationary bandits (e.g., special instances of restless bandits). In the case where the model parameters are initially unknown, we develop an online learning adaptation of our algorithm for which we provide sublinear regret guarantees against its full-information counterpart.

We propose a class of greedy algorithms for weighted sparse recovery by considering new loss function-based generalizations of Orthogonal Matching Pursuit (OMP). Given a (regularized) loss function, the proposed algorithms alternate the iterative construction of the signal support via greedy index selection and a signal update based on solving a local data-fitting problem restricted to the current support. We show that greedy selection rules associated with popular weighted sparsity-promoting loss functions admit explicitly computable and simple formulas. Specifically, we consider ell^0 - and ell^1 -based versions of the weighted LASSO (Least Absolute Shrinkage and Selection Operator), the Square-Root LASSO (SR-LASSO) and the Least Absolute Deviations LASSO (LAD-LASSO). Through numerical experiments on Gaussian compressive sensing and high-dimensional function approximation, we demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed algorithms and empirically show that they inherit desirable characteristics from the corresponding loss functions, such as SR-LASSO's noise-blind optimal parameter tuning and LAD-LASSO's fault tolerance. In doing so, our study sheds new light on the connection between greedy sparse recovery and convex relaxation.

We study a strategic variant of the multi-armed bandit problem, which we coin the strategic click-bandit. This model is motivated by applications in online recommendation where the choice of recommended items depends on both the click-through rates and the post-click rewards. Like in classical bandits, rewards follow a fixed unknown distribution. However, we assume that the click-rate of each arm is chosen strategically by the arm (e.g., a host on Airbnb) in order to maximize the number of times it gets clicked. The algorithm designer does not know the post-click rewards nor the arms' actions (i.e., strategically chosen click-rates) in advance, and must learn both values over time. To solve this problem, we design an incentive-aware learning algorithm, UCB-S, which achieves two goals simultaneously: (a) incentivizing desirable arm behavior under uncertainty; (b) minimizing regret by learning unknown parameters. We characterize all approximate Nash equilibria among arms under UCB-S and show a mathcal{O} (KT) regret bound uniformly in every equilibrium. We also show that incentive-unaware algorithms generally fail to achieve low regret in the strategic click-bandit. Finally, we support our theoretical results by simulations of strategic arm behavior which confirm the effectiveness and robustness of our proposed incentive design.

On-policy distillation (OPD) provides dense teacher supervision on student-generated trajectories, but standard reverse-KL training can assign insufficient probability to other plausible continuations. Teacher entropy alone does not reveal whether uncertainty is concentrated among a few plausible next tokens or dispersed over a long probability tail, nor whether the student already represents those candidates well. Moreover, local teacher probabilities may not predict downstream success. We introduce Sparse Probing and Outcome-calibrated Targets OPD (SPOT), which addresses two coupled decisions, where to probe and what to distill, through an acquisition--exploration--exploitation procedure. During acquisition, a position-level score combines normalized teacher entropy, the probability mass captured by a small top-k candidate set, and student--teacher mismatch to allocate a limited probing budget. During exploration, SPOT evaluates teacher-proposed candidates through verifier-scored student continuations. During exploitation, these outcomes produce a closed-form, KL-regularized target that favors candidates with better downstream outcomes while remaining anchored to the teacher distribution. Extensive experiments across multiple student models and reasoning benchmarks demonstrate the effectiveness of SPOT in improving reasoning performance while balancing solution quality and coverage.

Network routers that enforce Quality-of-Service (QoS) guarantees must decide, at every clock cycle, which expiring packet of information to transmit, even when the value of the packet is unknown until it is processed. We frame this problem as the Online Packet Scheduling with Deadlines (OPSD) problem under Partial Feedback: packets arrive at every clock cycle, with different deadlines, but the weights are only observed after execution. Under a stochastic assumption on the unknown weights, we explore different variants of the OPSD problem with bandit feedback. We establish a connection between our setting and the sleeping bandits problem, and set our learning goal to α-regret minimization. We provide algorithms with provable α-regret guarantees under different spans of slackness, distinguishing systems allowing for randomization and systems that do not. In every scenario, our algorithms achieve an α-regret upper bound of mathcal{O}left(KTright), matching the lower bound for the standard bandit setting. In the practically relevant case of 2-bounded deadline instances, where the deadline is set at most one clock cycle away from the arrival, our deterministic algorithm achieves the provably tightest possible competitive ratio. Remarkably, when the number of distinct packet types Kge 2 is finite, it is possible to break the well-established Φ= 1+sqrt{5}{2} competitive ratio barrier and attain a tighter competitive ratio θ_K ranging in [2, Φ).

Contextual multi-armed bandit (MAB) achieves cutting-edge performance on a variety of problems. When it comes to real-world scenarios such as recommendation system and online advertising, however, it is essential to consider the resource consumption of exploration. In practice, there is typically non-zero cost associated with executing a recommendation (arm) in the environment, and hence, the policy should be learned with a fixed exploration cost constraint. It is challenging to learn a global optimal policy directly, since it is a NP-hard problem and significantly complicates the exploration and exploitation trade-off of bandit algorithms. Existing approaches focus on solving the problems by adopting the greedy policy which estimates the expected rewards and costs and uses a greedy selection based on each arm's expected reward/cost ratio using historical observation until the exploration resource is exhausted. However, existing methods are hard to extend to infinite time horizon, since the learning process will be terminated when there is no more resource. In this paper, we propose a hierarchical adaptive contextual bandit method (HATCH) to conduct the policy learning of contextual bandits with a budget constraint. HATCH adopts an adaptive method to allocate the exploration resource based on the remaining resource/time and the estimation of reward distribution among different user contexts. In addition, we utilize full of contextual feature information to find the best personalized recommendation. Finally, in order to prove the theoretical guarantee, we present a regret bound analysis and prove that HATCH achieves a regret bound as low as O(T). The experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed method on both synthetic data sets and the real-world applications.

We introduce a generic strategy for provably efficient multi-goal exploration. It relies on AdaGoal, a novel goal selection scheme that leverages a measure of uncertainty in reaching states to adaptively target goals that are neither too difficult nor too easy. We show how AdaGoal can be used to tackle the objective of learning an ε-optimal goal-conditioned policy for the (initially unknown) set of goal states that are reachable within L steps in expectation from a reference state s_0 in a reward-free Markov decision process. In the tabular case with S states and A actions, our algorithm requires O(L^3 S A ε^{-2}) exploration steps, which is nearly minimax optimal. We also readily instantiate AdaGoal in linear mixture Markov decision processes, yielding the first goal-oriented PAC guarantee with linear function approximation. Beyond its strong theoretical guarantees, we anchor AdaGoal in goal-conditioned deep reinforcement learning, both conceptually and empirically, by connecting its idea of selecting "uncertain" goals to maximizing value ensemble disagreement.

LLM-powered coding agents, which operate in iterative loops (turns) to solve software engineering tasks, are becoming increasingly powerful. However, their practical deployment is hindered by significant and unpredictable costs. This challenge arises from a combination of factors: quadratically growing token counts with each turn, the high price of models, the large number of turns required for real-world tasks, and the tendency of agents to take inefficient or unnecessary actions. While existing research focuses on optimizing individual turns, the strategic control of the total number of turns remains an underexplored area for managing agent performance and cost. To address this gap, we conduct a comprehensive empirical study on SWE-bench using three state-of-the-art models and evaluate the impact of three distinct turn-control strategies: an unrestricted baseline, a fixed-turn limit with reminders, and a novel dynamic-turn strategy that grants extensions on-demand. Our findings first reveal a fundamental trade-off in the unrestricted setting, where no single model excels across performance, cost, and turn efficiency. We then show that a fixed-turn limit, specifically at the 75th percentile of the baseline, serves as a "sweet spot", substantially reducing costs (by 24%-68%) with minimal impact on solve rates. Most significantly, the dynamic-turn strategy consistently outperforms fixed-limit approaches, achieving comparable or better solve rates while further reducing costs by an additional 12%-24% by intelligently allocating resources only to tasks that need them. This work provides the first systematic analysis of turn-control strategies, offering simple yet effective guidelines for developers to balance cost and efficacy. We demonstrate that dynamic resource allocation is a superior, easy-to-implement approach for deploying powerful yet economically viable coding agents.

For a two-player imperfect-information extensive-form game (IIEFG) with K time steps and a player action space of size U, the game tree complexity is U^{2K}, causing existing IIEFG solvers to struggle with large or infinite (U,K), e.g., differential games with continuous action spaces. To partially address this scalability challenge, we focus on an important class of 2p0s games where the informed player (P1) knows the payoff while the uninformed player (P2) only has a belief over the set of I possible payoffs. Such games encompass a wide range of scenarios in sports, defense, cybersecurity, and finance. We prove that under mild conditions, P1's (resp. P2's) equilibrium strategy at any infostate concentrates on at most I (resp. I+1) action prototypes. When Ill U, this equilibrium structure causes the game tree complexity to collapse to I^K for P1 when P2 plays pure best responses, and (I+1)^K for P2 in a dual game where P1 plays pure best responses. We then show that exploiting this structure in standard learning modes, i.e., model-free multiagent reinforcement learning and model predictive control, is straightforward, leading to significant improvements in learning accuracy and efficiency from SOTA IIEFG solvers. Our demonstration solves a 22-player football game (K=10, U=infty) where the attacking team has to strategically conceal their intention until a critical moment in order to exploit information advantage. Code is available at https://github.com/ghimiremukesh/cams/tree/iclr

In budget-limited multi-armed bandit (MAB) problems, the learner's actions are costly and constrained by a fixed budget. Consequently, an optimal exploitation policy may not be to pull the optimal arm repeatedly, as is the case in other variants of MAB, but rather to pull the sequence of different arms that maximises the agent's total reward within the budget. This difference from existing MABs means that new approaches to maximising the total reward are required. Given this, we develop two pulling policies, namely: (i) KUBE; and (ii) fractional KUBE. Whereas the former provides better performance up to 40% in our experimental settings, the latter is computationally less expensive. We also prove logarithmic upper bounds for the regret of both policies, and show that these bounds are asymptotically optimal (i.e. they only differ from the best possible regret by a constant factor).

We consider the problem of fairly allocating a sequence of indivisible items that arrive online in an arbitrary order to a group of n agents with additive normalized valuation functions. We consider both the allocation of goods and chores and propose algorithms for approximating maximin share (MMS) allocations. When agents have identical valuation functions the problem coincides with the semi-online machine covering problem (when items are goods) and load balancing problem (when items are chores), for both of which optimal competitive ratios have been achieved. In this paper, we consider the case when agents have general additive valuation functions. For the allocation of goods, we show that no competitive algorithm exists even when there are only three agents and propose an optimal 0.5-competitive algorithm for the case of two agents. For the allocation of chores, we propose a (2-1/n)-competitive algorithm for n>=3 agents and a square root of 2 (approximately 1.414)-competitive algorithm for two agents. Additionally, we show that no algorithm can do better than 15/11 (approximately 1.364)-competitive for two agents.

We focus on a simple, one-dimensional collective decision problem (often referred to as the facility location problem) and explore issues of strategyproofness and proportionality-based fairness. We introduce and analyze a hierarchy of proportionality-based fairness axioms of varying strength: Individual Fair Share (IFS), Unanimous Fair Share (UFS), Proportionality (as in Freeman et al, 2021), and Proportional Fairness (PF). For each axiom, we characterize the family of mechanisms that satisfy the axiom and strategyproofness. We show that imposing strategyproofness renders many of the axioms to be equivalent: the family of mechanisms that satisfy proportionality, unanimity, and strategyproofness is equivalent to the family of mechanisms that satisfy UFS and strategyproofness, which, in turn, is equivalent to the family of mechanisms that satisfy PF and strategyproofness. Furthermore, there is a unique such mechanism: the Uniform Phantom mechanism, which is studied in Freeman et al. (2021). We also characterize the outcomes of the Uniform Phantom mechanism as the unique (pure) equilibrium outcome for any mechanism that satisfies continuity, strict monotonicity, and UFS. Finally, we analyze the approximation guarantees, in terms of optimal social welfare and minimum total cost, obtained by mechanisms that are strategyproof and satisfy each proportionality-based fairness axiom. We show that the Uniform Phantom mechanism provides the best approximation of the optimal social welfare (and also minimum total cost) among all mechanisms that satisfy UFS.

Off-policy multi-step reinforcement learning algorithms consist of conservative and non-conservative algorithms: the former actively cut traces, whereas the latter do not. Recently, Munos et al. (2016) proved the convergence of conservative algorithms to an optimal Q-function. In contrast, non-conservative algorithms are thought to be unsafe and have a limited or no theoretical guarantee. Nonetheless, recent studies have shown that non-conservative algorithms empirically outperform conservative ones. Motivated by the empirical results and the lack of theory, we carry out theoretical analyses of Peng's Q(λ), a representative example of non-conservative algorithms. We prove that it also converges to an optimal policy provided that the behavior policy slowly tracks a greedy policy in a way similar to conservative policy iteration. Such a result has been conjectured to be true but has not been proven. We also experiment with Peng's Q(λ) in complex continuous control tasks, confirming that Peng's Q(λ) often outperforms conservative algorithms despite its simplicity. These results indicate that Peng's Q(λ), which was thought to be unsafe, is a theoretically-sound and practically effective algorithm.

We consider the problem of decentralized multi-agent reinforcement learning in Markov games. A fundamental question is whether there exist algorithms that, when adopted by all agents and run independently in a decentralized fashion, lead to no-regret for each player, analogous to celebrated convergence results in normal-form games. While recent work has shown that such algorithms exist for restricted settings (notably, when regret is defined with respect to deviations to Markovian policies), the question of whether independent no-regret learning can be achieved in the standard Markov game framework was open. We provide a decisive negative resolution this problem, both from a computational and statistical perspective. We show that: - Under the widely-believed assumption that PPAD-hard problems cannot be solved in polynomial time, there is no polynomial-time algorithm that attains no-regret in general-sum Markov games when executed independently by all players, even when the game is known to the algorithm designer and the number of players is a small constant. - When the game is unknown, no algorithm, regardless of computational efficiency, can achieve no-regret without observing a number of episodes that is exponential in the number of players. Perhaps surprisingly, our lower bounds hold even for seemingly easier setting in which all agents are controlled by a a centralized algorithm. They are proven via lower bounds for a simpler problem we refer to as SparseCCE, in which the goal is to compute a coarse correlated equilibrium that is sparse in the sense that it can be represented as a mixture of a small number of product policies. The crux of our approach is a novel application of aggregation techniques from online learning, whereby we show that any algorithm for the SparseCCE problem can be used to compute approximate Nash equilibria for non-zero sum normal-form games.

We consider an extension to the classic position auctions in which sponsored creatives can be added within AI generated content rather than shown in predefined slots. New challenges arise from the natural requirement that sponsored creatives should smoothly fit into the context. With the help of advanced LLM technologies, it becomes viable to accurately estimate the benefits of adding each individual sponsored creatives into each potential positions within the AI generated content by properly taking the context into account. Therefore, we assume one click-through rate estimation for each position-creative pair, rather than one uniform estimation for each sponsored creative across all positions in classic settings. As a result, the underlying optimization becomes a general matching problem, thus the substitution effects should be treated more carefully compared to standard position auction settings, where the slots are independent with each other. In this work, we formalize a concrete mathematical model of the extended position auction problem and study the welfare-maximization and revenue-maximization mechanism design problem. Formally, we consider two different user behavior models and solve the mechanism design problems therein respectively. For the Multinomial Logit (MNL) model, which is order-insensitive, we can efficiently implement the optimal mechanisms. For the cascade model, which is order-sensitive, we provide approximately optimal solutions.

This paper proposes a novel reinforcement learning (RL) framework for credit underwriting that tackles ungeneralizable contextual challenges. We adapt RL principles for credit scoring, incorporating action space renewal and multi-choice actions. Our work demonstrates that the traditional underwriting approach aligns with the RL greedy strategy. We introduce two new RL-based credit underwriting algorithms to enable more informed decision-making. Simulations show these new approaches outperform the traditional method in scenarios where the data aligns with the model. However, complex situations highlight model limitations, emphasizing the importance of powerful machine learning models for optimal performance. Future research directions include exploring more sophisticated models alongside efficient exploration mechanisms.

The Prophet Inequality and Pandora's Box problems are fundamental stochastic problem with applications in Mechanism Design, Online Algorithms, Stochastic Optimization, Optimal Stopping, and Operations Research. A usual assumption in these works is that the probability distributions of the n underlying random variables are given as input to the algorithm. Since in practice these distributions need to be learned, we initiate the study of such stochastic problems in the Multi-Armed Bandits model. In the Multi-Armed Bandits model we interact with n unknown distributions over T rounds: in round t we play a policy x^{(t)} and receive a partial (bandit) feedback on the performance of x^{(t)}. The goal is to minimize the regret, which is the difference over T rounds in the total value of the optimal algorithm that knows the distributions vs. the total value of our algorithm that learns the distributions from the partial feedback. Our main results give near-optimal O(poly(n)T) total regret algorithms for both Prophet Inequality and Pandora's Box. Our proofs proceed by maintaining confidence intervals on the unknown indices of the optimal policy. The exploration-exploitation tradeoff prevents us from directly refining these confidence intervals, so the main technique is to design a regret upper bound that is learnable while playing low-regret Bandit policies.

Ensembles of independently trained neural networks are a state-of-the-art approach to estimate predictive uncertainty in Deep Learning, and can be interpreted as an approximation of the posterior distribution via a mixture of delta functions. The training of ensembles relies on non-convexity of the loss landscape and random initialization of their individual members, making the resulting posterior approximation uncontrolled. This paper proposes a novel and principled method to tackle this limitation, minimizing an f-divergence between the true posterior and a kernel density estimator (KDE) in a function space. We analyze this objective from a combinatorial point of view, and show that it is submodular with respect to mixture components for any f. Subsequently, we consider the problem of greedy ensemble construction. From the marginal gain on the negative f-divergence, which quantifies an improvement in posterior approximation yielded by adding a new component into the KDE, we derive a novel diversity term for ensemble methods. The performance of our approach is demonstrated on computer vision out-of-distribution detection benchmarks in a range of architectures trained on multiple datasets. The source code of our method is made publicly available at https://github.com/Oulu-IMEDS/greedy_ensembles_training.

Pruning is a standard technique for reducing the computational cost of deep networks. Many advances in pruning leverage concepts from the Lottery Ticket Hypothesis (LTH). LTH reveals that inside a trained dense network exists sparse subnetworks (tickets) able to achieve similar accuracy (i.e., win the lottery - winning tickets). Pruning at initialization focuses on finding winning tickets without training a dense network. Studies on these concepts share the trend that subnetworks come from weight or filter pruning. In this work, we investigate LTH and pruning at initialization from the lens of layer pruning. First, we confirm the existence of winning tickets when the pruning process removes layers. Leveraged by this observation, we propose to discover these winning tickets at initialization, eliminating the requirement of heavy computational resources for training the initial (over-parameterized) dense network. Extensive experiments show that our winning tickets notably speed up the training phase and reduce up to 51% of carbon emission, an important step towards democratization and green Artificial Intelligence. Beyond computational benefits, our winning tickets exhibit robustness against adversarial and out-of-distribution examples. Finally, we show that our subnetworks easily win the lottery at initialization while tickets from filter removal (the standard structured LTH) hardly become winning tickets.

Recent research suggests that tree search algorithms (e.g. Monte Carlo Tree Search) can dramatically boost LLM performance on complex mathematical reasoning tasks. However, they often require more than 10 times the computational resources of greedy decoding due to wasteful search strategies, making them difficult to be deployed in practical applications. This study introduces a novel guided tree search algorithm with dynamic node selection and node-level exploration budget (maximum number of children) calculation to tackle this issue. By considering the search progress towards the final answer (history) and the guidance from a value network (future) trained without any step-wise annotations, our algorithm iteratively selects the most promising tree node before expanding it within the boundaries of the allocated computational budget. Experiments conducted on the GSM8K and TabMWP datasets demonstrate that our approach not only offers competitive performance but also enjoys significantly lower computational costs compared to baseline methods.

We study the incentivized information acquisition problem, where a principal hires an agent to gather information on her behalf. Such a problem is modeled as a Stackelberg game between the principal and the agent, where the principal announces a scoring rule that specifies the payment, and then the agent then chooses an effort level that maximizes her own profit and reports the information. We study the online setting of such a problem from the principal's perspective, i.e., designing the optimal scoring rule by repeatedly interacting with the strategic agent. We design a provably sample efficient algorithm that tailors the UCB algorithm (Auer et al., 2002) to our model, which achieves a sublinear T^{2/3}-regret after T iterations. Our algorithm features a delicate estimation procedure for the optimal profit of the principal, and a conservative correction scheme that ensures the desired agent's actions are incentivized. Furthermore, a key feature of our regret bound is that it is independent of the number of states of the environment.

Provably efficient Model-Based Reinforcement Learning (MBRL) based on optimism or posterior sampling (PSRL) is ensured to attain the global optimality asymptotically by introducing the complexity measure of the model. However, the complexity might grow exponentially for the simplest nonlinear models, where global convergence is impossible within finite iterations. When the model suffers a large generalization error, which is quantitatively measured by the model complexity, the uncertainty can be large. The sampled model that current policy is greedily optimized upon will thus be unsettled, resulting in aggressive policy updates and over-exploration. In this work, we propose Conservative Dual Policy Optimization (CDPO) that involves a Referential Update and a Conservative Update. The policy is first optimized under a reference model, which imitates the mechanism of PSRL while offering more stability. A conservative range of randomness is guaranteed by maximizing the expectation of model value. Without harmful sampling procedures, CDPO can still achieve the same regret as PSRL. More importantly, CDPO enjoys monotonic policy improvement and global optimality simultaneously. Empirical results also validate the exploration efficiency of CDPO.

Ensuring sufficient exploration is a central challenge when training meta-reinforcement learning (meta-RL) agents to solve novel environments. Conventional solutions to the exploration-exploitation dilemma inject explicit incentives such as randomization, uncertainty bonuses, or intrinsic rewards to encourage exploration. In this work, we hypothesize that an agent trained solely to maximize a greedy (exploitation-only) objective can nonetheless exhibit emergent exploratory behavior, provided three conditions are met: (1) Recurring Environmental Structure, where the environment features repeatable regularities that allow past experience to inform future choices; (2) Agent Memory, enabling the agent to retain and utilize historical interaction data; and (3) Long-Horizon Credit Assignment, where learning propagates returns over a time frame sufficient for the delayed benefits of exploration to inform current decisions. Through experiments in stochastic multi-armed bandits and temporally extended gridworlds, we observe that, when both structure and memory are present, a policy trained on a strictly greedy objective exhibits information-seeking exploratory behavior. We further demonstrate, through controlled ablations, that emergent exploration vanishes if either environmental structure or agent memory is absent (Conditions 1 & 2). Surprisingly, removing long-horizon credit assignment (Condition 3) does not always prevent emergent exploration-a result we attribute to the pseudo-Thompson Sampling effect. These findings suggest that, under the right prerequisites, exploration and exploitation need not be treated as orthogonal objectives but can emerge from a unified reward-maximization process.

We compare the (1,lambda)-EA and the (1 + lambda)-EA on the recently introduced benchmark DisOM, which is the OneMax function with randomly planted local optima. Previous work showed that if all local optima have the same relative height, then the plus strategy never loses more than a factor O(nlog n) compared to the comma strategy. Here we show that even small random fluctuations in the heights of the local optima have a devastating effect for the plus strategy and lead to super-polynomial runtimes. On the other hand, due to their ability to escape local optima, comma strategies are unaffected by the height of the local optima and remain efficient. Our results hold for a broad class of possible distortions and show that the plus strategy, but not the comma strategy, is generally deceived by sparse unstructured fluctuations of a smooth landscape.

Proportionality is an attractive fairness concept that has been applied to a range of problems including the facility location problem, a classic problem in social choice. In our work, we propose a concept called Strong Proportionality, which ensures that when there are two groups of agents at different locations, both groups incur the same total cost. We show that although Strong Proportionality is a well-motivated and basic axiom, there is no deterministic strategyproof mechanism satisfying the property. We then identify a randomized mechanism called Random Rank (which uniformly selects a number k between 1 to n and locates the facility at the k'th highest agent location) which satisfies Strong Proportionality in expectation. Our main theorem characterizes Random Rank as the unique mechanism that achieves universal truthfulness, universal anonymity, and Strong Proportionality in expectation among all randomized mechanisms. Finally, we show via the AverageOrRandomRank mechanism that even stronger ex-post fairness guarantees can be achieved by weakening universal truthfulness to strategyproofness in expectation.

Most learning algorithms with formal regret guarantees assume that no mistake is irreparable and essentially rely on trying all possible behaviors. This approach is problematic when some mistakes are catastrophic, i.e., irreparable. We propose an online learning problem where the goal is to minimize the chance of catastrophe. Specifically, we assume that the payoff in each round represents the chance of avoiding catastrophe that round and aim to maximize the product of payoffs (the overall chance of avoiding catastrophe) while allowing a limited number of queries to a mentor. We first show that in general, any algorithm either constantly queries the mentor or is nearly guaranteed to cause catastrophe. However, in settings where the mentor policy class is learnable in the standard online learning model, we provide an algorithm whose regret and rate of querying the mentor both approach 0 as the time horizon grows. Conceptually, if a policy class is learnable in the absence of catastrophic risk, it is learnable in the presence of catastrophic risk if the agent can ask for help.

Network pruning is an effective approach to reduce network complexity with acceptable performance compromise. Existing studies achieve the sparsity of neural networks via time-consuming weight training or complex searching on networks with expanded width, which greatly limits the applications of network pruning. In this paper, we show that high-performing and sparse sub-networks without the involvement of weight training, termed "lottery jackpots", exist in pre-trained models with unexpanded width. Furthermore, we improve the efficiency for searching lottery jackpots from two perspectives. Firstly, we observe that the sparse masks derived from many existing pruning criteria have a high overlap with the searched mask of our lottery jackpot, among which, the magnitude-based pruning results in the most similar mask with ours. Consequently, our searched lottery jackpot removes 90% weights in ResNet-50, while it easily obtains more than 70% top-1 accuracy using only 5 searching epochs on ImageNet. In compliance with this insight, we initialize our sparse mask using the magnitude-based pruning, resulting in at least 3x cost reduction on the lottery jackpot searching while achieving comparable or even better performance. Secondly, we conduct an in-depth analysis of the searching process for lottery jackpots. Our theoretical result suggests that the decrease in training loss during weight searching can be disturbed by the dependency between weights in modern networks. To mitigate this, we propose a novel short restriction method to restrict change of masks that may have potential negative impacts on the training loss. Our code is available at https://github.com/zyxxmu/lottery-jackpots.

Trader-facing dynamic fees are increasingly proposed for automated market makers (AMMs), but historical data do not identify how order flow would respond: trader-facing fees do not vary, trader types are latent, and a replayed tape is not a sequential decision environment. We therefore construct a minimal closed-loop simulator in which the missing signal exists by construction: two constant-product pools repriced by an equilibrium-inspired dynamic-fee rule, fee-sensitive noise flow, and closed-form CEX--AMM arbitrage. Equilibrium is used as a closure principle, not as an object the trader learns. Against a tuned benchmark ladder of schedule, planning, lookahead, and tabular policies, a small DQN is the only evaluated valid policy whose paired improvement over tuned one-step routing excludes zero. On a reserved final block of 1{,}000 seeds with completion forced to 1.0 for every policy, it reduces implementation shortfall under every tested intra-step ordering, by 13.3bps of order notional under the pre-specified agent-last ordering, and the edge is concentrated in, and learned from, dynamic-fee environments: under constant fees the paired difference is indistinguishable from zero. The result is model-conditioned counterfactual evidence about execution control in AMMs, not evidence about historical traders, equilibrium play, or deployable profit.

Top-k decoding is a widely used method for sampling from LLMs: at each token, only the largest k next-token-probabilities are kept, and the next token is sampled after re-normalizing them to sum to unity. Top-k and other sampling methods are motivated by the intuition that true next-token distributions are sparse, and the noisy LLM probabilities need to be truncated. However, to our knowledge, a precise theoretical motivation for the use of top-k decoding is missing. In this work, we develop a theoretical framework that both explains and generalizes top-k decoding. We view decoding at a fixed token as the recovery of a sparse probability distribution. We consider Bregman decoders obtained by minimizing a separable Bregman divergence (for both the primal and dual cases) with a sparsity-inducing ell_0 regularization. Despite the combinatorial nature of the objective, we show how to optimize it efficiently for a large class of divergences. We show that the optimal decoding strategies are greedy, and further that the loss function is discretely convex in k, so that binary search provably and efficiently finds the optimal k. We show that top-k decoding arises as a special case for the KL divergence, and identify new decoding strategies that have distinct behaviors (e.g., non-linearly up-weighting larger probabilities after re-normalization).

AI agents will be predictable in certain ways that traditional agents are not. Where and how can we leverage this predictability in order to improve social welfare? We study this question in a game-theoretic setting where one agent can pay a fixed cost to simulate the other in order to learn its mixed strategy. As a negative result, we prove that, in contrast to prior work on pure-strategy simulation, enabling mixed-strategy simulation may no longer lead to improved outcomes for both players in all so-called "generalised trust games". In fact, mixed-strategy simulation does not help in any game where the simulatee's action can depend on that of the simulator. We also show that, in general, deciding whether simulation introduces Pareto-improving Nash equilibria in a given game is NP-hard. As positive results, we establish that mixed-strategy simulation can improve social welfare if the simulator has the option to scale their level of trust, if the players face challenges with both trust and coordination, or if maintaining some level of privacy is essential for enabling cooperation.

Feature selection helps reduce data acquisition costs in ML, but the standard approach is to train models with static feature subsets. Here, we consider the dynamic feature selection (DFS) problem where a model sequentially queries features based on the presently available information. DFS is often addressed with reinforcement learning, but we explore a simpler approach of greedily selecting features based on their conditional mutual information. This method is theoretically appealing but requires oracle access to the data distribution, so we develop a learning approach based on amortized optimization. The proposed method is shown to recover the greedy policy when trained to optimality, and it outperforms numerous existing feature selection methods in our experiments, thus validating it as a simple but powerful approach for this problem.

In this work, from a theoretical lens, we aim to understand why large language model (LLM) empowered agents are able to solve decision-making problems in the physical world. To this end, consider a hierarchical reinforcement learning (RL) model where the LLM Planner and the Actor perform high-level task planning and low-level execution, respectively. Under this model, the LLM Planner navigates a partially observable Markov decision process (POMDP) by iteratively generating language-based subgoals via prompting. Under proper assumptions on the pretraining data, we prove that the pretrained LLM Planner effectively performs Bayesian aggregated imitation learning (BAIL) through in-context learning. Additionally, we highlight the necessity for exploration beyond the subgoals derived from BAIL by proving that naively executing the subgoals returned by LLM leads to a linear regret. As a remedy, we introduce an ε-greedy exploration strategy to BAIL, which is proven to incur sublinear regret when the pretraining error is small. Finally, we extend our theoretical framework to include scenarios where the LLM Planner serves as a world model for inferring the transition model of the environment and to multi-agent settings, enabling coordination among multiple Actors.

We consider a resource-aware variant of the classical multi-armed bandit problem: In each round, the learner selects an arm and determines a resource limit. It then observes a corresponding (random) reward, provided the (random) amount of consumed resources remains below the limit. Otherwise, the observation is censored, i.e., no reward is obtained. For this problem setting, we introduce a measure of regret, which incorporates the actual amount of allocated resources of each learning round as well as the optimality of realizable rewards. Thus, to minimize regret, the learner needs to set a resource limit and choose an arm in such a way that the chance to realize a high reward within the predefined resource limit is high, while the resource limit itself should be kept as low as possible. We propose a UCB-inspired online learning algorithm, which we analyze theoretically in terms of its regret upper bound. In a simulation study, we show that our learning algorithm outperforms straightforward extensions of standard multi-armed bandit algorithms.

We improve the efficiency of algorithms for stochastic combinatorial semi-bandits. In most interesting problems, state-of-the-art algorithms take advantage of structural properties of rewards, such as independence. However, while being optimal in terms of asymptotic regret, these algorithms are inefficient. In our paper, we first reduce their implementation to a specific submodular maximization. Then, in case of matroid constraints, we design adapted approximation routines, thereby providing the first efficient algorithms that rely on reward structure to improve regret bound. In particular, we improve the state-of-the-art efficient gap-free regret bound by a factor m/log m, where m is the maximum action size. Finally, we show how our improvement translates to more general budgeted combinatorial semi-bandits.

We investigate the mechanism design problem faced by a principal who hires multiple agents to gather and report costly information. Then, the principal exploits the information to make an informed decision. We model this problem as a game, where the principal announces a mechanism consisting in action recommendations and a payment function, a.k.a. scoring rule. Then, each agent chooses an effort level and receives partial information about an underlying state of nature based on the effort. Finally, the agents report the information (possibly non-truthfully), the principal takes a decision based on this information, and the agents are paid according to the scoring rule. While previous work focuses on single-agent problems, we consider multi-agents settings. This poses the challenge of coordinating the agents' efforts and aggregating correlated information. Indeed, we show that optimal mechanisms must correlate agents' efforts, which introduces externalities among the agents, and hence complex incentive compatibility constraints and equilibrium selection problems. First, we design a polynomial-time algorithm to find an optimal incentive compatible mechanism. Then, we study an online problem, where the principal repeatedly interacts with a group of unknown agents. We design a no-regret algorithm that provides mathcal{O}(T^{2/3}) regret with respect to an optimal mechanism, matching the state-of-the-art bound for single-agent settings.

We consider the problem of ranking n experts based on their performances on d tasks. We make a monotonicity assumption stating that for each pair of experts, one outperforms the other on all tasks. We consider the sequential setting where in each round, the learner has access to noisy evaluations of actively chosen pair of expert-task, given the information available up to the actual round. Given a confidence parameter delta in (0, 1), we provide strategies allowing to recover the correct ranking of experts and develop a bound on the total number of queries made by our algorithm that hold with probability at least 1 -- delta. We show that our strategy is adaptive to the complexity of the problem (our bounds are instance dependent), and develop matching lower bounds up to a poly-logarithmic factor. Finally, we adapt our strategy to the relaxed problem of best expert identification and provide numerical simulation consistent with our theoretical results.

We study the discrete Bertrand pricing game with a non-increasing demand function. The game has n ge 2 players who simultaneously choose prices from the set {1/k, 2/k, ldots, 1}, where kinN. The player who sets the lowest price captures the entire demand; if multiple players tie for the lowest price, they split the demand equally. We study the Bertrand paradox, where classical theory predicts low prices, yet real markets often sustain high prices. To understand this gap, we analyze a repeated-game model in which firms set prices using no-regret learners. Our goal is to characterize the equilibrium outcomes that can arise under different no-regret learning guarantees. We are particularly interested in questions such as whether no-external-regret learners can converge to undesirable high-price outcomes, and how stronger guarantees such as no-swap regret shape the emergence of competitive low-price behavior. We address these and related questions through a theoretical analysis, complemented by experiments that support the theory and reveal surprising phenomena for no-swap regret learners.

Machine learning approaches relying on such criteria as adversarial robustness or multi-agent settings have raised the need for solving game-theoretic equilibrium problems. Of particular relevance to these applications are methods targeting finite-sum structure, which generically arises in empirical variants of learning problems in these contexts. Further, methods with computable approximation errors are highly desirable, as they provide verifiable exit criteria. Motivated by these applications, we study finite-sum monotone inclusion problems, which model broad classes of equilibrium problems. Our main contributions are variants of the classical Halpern iteration that employ variance reduction to obtain improved complexity guarantees in which n component operators in the finite sum are ``on average'' either cocoercive or Lipschitz continuous and monotone, with parameter L. The resulting oracle complexity of our methods, which provide guarantees for the last iterate and for a (computable) operator norm residual, is mathcal{O}( n + nLvarepsilon^{-1}), which improves upon existing methods by a factor up to n. This constitutes the first variance reduction-type result for general finite-sum monotone inclusions and for more specific problems such as convex-concave optimization when operator norm residual is the optimality measure. We further argue that, up to poly-logarithmic factors, this complexity is unimprovable in the monotone Lipschitz setting; i.e., the provided result is near-optimal.

Many problems, such as online ad display, can be formulated as online bipartite matching. The crucial challenge lies in the nature of sequentially-revealed online item information, based on which we make irreversible matching decisions at each step. While numerous expert online algorithms have been proposed with bounded worst-case competitive ratios, they may not offer satisfactory performance in average cases. On the other hand, reinforcement learning (RL) has been applied to improve the average performance, but it lacks robustness and can perform arbitrarily poorly. In this paper, we propose a novel RL-based approach to edge-weighted online bipartite matching with robustness guarantees (LOMAR), achieving both good average-case and worst-case performance. The key novelty of LOMAR is a new online switching operation which, based on a judicious condition to hedge against future uncertainties, decides whether to follow the expert's decision or the RL decision for each online item. We prove that for any rhoin[0,1], LOMAR is rho-competitive against any given expert online algorithm. To improve the average performance, we train the RL policy by explicitly considering the online switching operation. Finally, we run empirical experiments to demonstrate the advantages of LOMAR compared to existing baselines. Our code is available at: https://github.com/Ren-Research/LOMAR

Affine Maximizer Auctions (AMAs), a generalized mechanism family from VCG, are widely used in automated mechanism design due to their inherent dominant-strategy incentive compatibility (DSIC) and individual rationality (IR). However, as the payment form is fixed, AMA's expressiveness is restricted, especially in distributions where bidders' valuations are correlated. In this paper, we propose Correlation-Aware AMA (CA-AMA), a novel framework that augments AMA with a new correlation-aware payment. We show that any CA-AMA preserves the DSIC property and formalize finding optimal CA-AMA as a constraint optimization problem subject to the IR constraint. Then, we theoretically characterize scenarios where classic AMAs can perform arbitrarily poorly compared to the optimal revenue, while the CA-AMA can reach the optimal revenue. For optimizing CA-AMA, we design a practical two-stage training algorithm. We derive that the target function's continuity and the generalization bound on the degree of deviation from strict IR. Finally, extensive experiments showcase that our algorithm can find an approximate optimal CA-AMA in various distributions with improved revenue and a low degree of violation of IR.

We consider the task of identifying the Copeland winner(s) in a dueling bandits problem with ternary feedback. This is an underexplored but practically relevant variant of the conventional dueling bandits problem, in which, in addition to strict preference between two arms, one may observe feedback in the form of an indifference. We provide a lower bound on the sample complexity for any learning algorithm finding the Copeland winner(s) with a fixed error probability. Moreover, we propose POCOWISTA, an algorithm with a sample complexity that almost matches this lower bound, and which shows excellent empirical performance, even for the conventional dueling bandits problem. For the case where the preference probabilities satisfy a specific type of stochastic transitivity, we provide a refined version with an improved worst case sample complexity.

Implementing a reward function that perfectly captures a complex task in the real world is impractical. As a result, it is often appropriate to think of the reward function as a proxy for the true objective rather than as its definition. We study this phenomenon through the lens of Goodhart's law, which predicts that increasing optimisation of an imperfect proxy beyond some critical point decreases performance on the true objective. First, we propose a way to quantify the magnitude of this effect and show empirically that optimising an imperfect proxy reward often leads to the behaviour predicted by Goodhart's law for a wide range of environments and reward functions. We then provide a geometric explanation for why Goodhart's law occurs in Markov decision processes. We use these theoretical insights to propose an optimal early stopping method that provably avoids the aforementioned pitfall and derive theoretical regret bounds for this method. Moreover, we derive a training method that maximises worst-case reward, for the setting where there is uncertainty about the true reward function. Finally, we evaluate our early stopping method experimentally. Our results support a foundation for a theoretically-principled study of reinforcement learning under reward misspecification.

In this paper, we consider the problem of Iterative Machine Teaching (IMT), where the teacher provides examples to the learner iteratively such that the learner can achieve fast convergence to a target model. However, existing IMT algorithms are solely based on parameterized families of target models. They mainly focus on convergence in the parameter space, resulting in difficulty when the target models are defined to be functions without dependency on parameters. To address such a limitation, we study a more general task -- Nonparametric Iterative Machine Teaching (NIMT), which aims to teach nonparametric target models to learners in an iterative fashion. Unlike parametric IMT that merely operates in the parameter space, we cast NIMT as a functional optimization problem in the function space. To solve it, we propose both random and greedy functional teaching algorithms. We obtain the iterative teaching dimension (ITD) of the random teaching algorithm under proper assumptions, which serves as a uniform upper bound of ITD in NIMT. Further, the greedy teaching algorithm has a significantly lower ITD, which reaches a tighter upper bound of ITD in NIMT. Finally, we verify the correctness of our theoretical findings with extensive experiments in nonparametric scenarios.

We study the design of loss functions for click-through rates (CTR) to optimize (social) welfare in advertising auctions. Existing works either only focus on CTR predictions without consideration of business objectives (e.g., welfare) in auctions or assume that the distribution over the participants' expected cost-per-impression (eCPM) is known a priori, then use various additional assumptions on the parametric form of the distribution to derive loss functions for predicting CTRs. In this work, we bring back the welfare objectives of ad auctions into CTR predictions and propose a novel weighted rankloss to train the CTR model. Compared to existing literature, our approach provides a provable guarantee on welfare but without assumptions on the eCPMs' distribution while also avoiding the intractability of naively applying existing learning-to-rank methods. Further, we propose a theoretically justifiable technique for calibrating the losses using labels generated from a teacher network, only assuming that the teacher network has bounded ell_2 generalization error. Finally, we demonstrate the advantages of the proposed loss on synthetic and real-world data.

The success of Large Language Models (LLMs) has sparked interest in various agentic applications. A key hypothesis is that LLMs, leveraging common sense and Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning, can effectively explore and efficiently solve complex domains. However, LLM agents have been found to suffer from sub-optimal exploration and the knowing-doing gap, the inability to effectively act on knowledge present in the model. In this work, we systematically study why LLMs perform sub-optimally in decision-making scenarios. In particular, we closely examine three prevalent failure modes: greediness, frequency bias, and the knowing-doing gap. We propose mitigation of these shortcomings by fine-tuning via Reinforcement Learning (RL) on self-generated CoT rationales. Our experiments across multi-armed bandits, contextual bandits, and Tic-tac-toe, demonstrate that RL fine-tuning enhances the decision-making abilities of LLMs by increasing exploration and narrowing the knowing-doing gap. Finally, we study both classic exploration mechanisms, such as epsilon-greedy, and LLM-specific approaches, such as self-correction and self-consistency, to enable more effective fine-tuning of LLMs for decision-making.

Neural network pruning is widely used to reduce model size and computational cost. Yet, most existing methods treat sparsity as an externally imposed constraint, enforced through heuristic importance scores or training-time regularization. In this work, we propose a fundamentally different perspective: pruning as an equilibrium outcome of strategic interaction among model components. We model parameter groups such as weights, neurons, or filters as players in a continuous non-cooperative game, where each player selects its level of participation in the network to balance contribution against redundancy and competition. Within this formulation, sparsity emerges naturally when continued participation becomes a dominated strategy at equilibrium. We analyze the resulting game and show that dominated players collapse to zero participation under mild conditions, providing a principled explanation for pruning behavior. Building on this insight, we derive a simple equilibrium-driven pruning algorithm that jointly updates network parameters and participation variables without relying on explicit importance scores. This work focuses on establishing a principled formulation and empirical validation of pruning as an equilibrium phenomenon, rather than exhaustive architectural or large-scale benchmarking. Experiments on standard benchmarks demonstrate that the proposed approach achieves competitive sparsity-accuracy trade-offs while offering an interpretable, theory-grounded alternative to existing pruning methods.

We consider multi-draft speculative sampling, where the proposal sequences are sampled independently from different draft models. At each step, a token-level draft selection scheme takes a list of valid tokens as input and produces an output token whose distribution matches that of the target model. Previous works have demonstrated that the optimal scheme (which maximizes the probability of accepting one of the input tokens) can be cast as a solution to a linear program. In this work we show that the optimal scheme can be decomposed into a two-step solution: in the first step an importance sampling (IS) type scheme is used to select one intermediate token; in the second step (single-draft) speculative sampling is applied to generate the output token. For the case of two identical draft models we further 1) establish a necessary and sufficient condition on the distributions of the target and draft models for the acceptance probability to equal one and 2) provide an explicit expression for the optimal acceptance probability. Our theoretical analysis also motives a new class of token-level selection scheme based on weighted importance sampling. Our experimental results demonstrate consistent improvements in the achievable block efficiency and token rates over baseline schemes in a number of scenarios.

Aligning large language models with human objectives is paramount, yet common approaches including RLHF suffer from unstable and resource-intensive training. In response to this challenge, we introduce ARGS, Alignment as Reward-Guided Search, a novel framework that integrates alignment into the decoding process, eliminating the need for expensive RL training. By adjusting the model's probabilistic predictions using a reward signal, ARGS generates texts with semantic diversity while being aligned with human preferences, offering a promising and flexible solution for aligning language models. Notably, ARGS demonstrates consistent enhancements in average reward compared to baselines across diverse alignment tasks and various model dimensions. For example, under the same greedy-based decoding strategy, our method improves the average reward by 19.56% relative to the baseline and secures a preference or tie score of 64.33% in GPT-4 evaluation. We believe that our framework, emphasizing decoding-time alignment, paves the way for more responsive language models in the future. Code is publicly available at: https://github.com/deeplearning-wisc/args.

Thompson Sampling is one of the most widely used and studied bandit algorithms, known for its simple structure, low regret performance, and solid theoretical guarantees. Yet, in stark contrast to most other families of bandit algorithms, the exact mechanism through which posterior sampling (as introduced by Thompson) is able to "properly" balance exploration and exploitation, remains a mystery. In this paper, we show that the core insight to address this question stems from recasting Thompson Sampling as an online optimization algorithm. To distill this, we introduce a suitable time invariant notion of regret that leads to a stationarized bandit problem, and a stationary Bellman-optimal policy. We then show that Thompson Sampling admits an online optimization form that mimics the structure of the aforementioned Bellman-optimal policy, where "greediness" is regularized by a measure of residual uncertainty. This new lens of online optimization allows both a better understanding of Thompson Sampling dynamics, as well as a principled manner for policy improvement that mimics the Bellman-optimal benchmark.

The online knapsack problem is a classic problem in the field of online algorithms. Its canonical version asks how to pack items of different values and weights arriving online into a capacity-limited knapsack so as to maximize the total value of the admitted items. Although optimal competitive algorithms are known for this problem, they may be fundamentally unfair, i.e., individual items may be treated inequitably in different ways. We formalize a practically-relevant notion of time fairness which effectively models a trade off between static and dynamic pricing in a motivating application such as cloud resource allocation, and show that existing algorithms perform poorly under this metric. We propose a parameterized deterministic algorithm where the parameter precisely captures the Pareto-optimal trade-off between fairness (static pricing) and competitiveness (dynamic pricing). We show that randomization is theoretically powerful enough to be simultaneously competitive and fair; however, it does not work well in experiments. To further improve the trade-off between fairness and competitiveness, we develop a nearly-optimal learning-augmented algorithm which is fair, consistent, and robust (competitive), showing substantial performance improvements in numerical experiments.

By routing input tokens to only a few split experts, Sparse Mixture-of-Experts has enabled efficient training of large language models. Recent findings suggest that fixing the routers can achieve competitive performance by alleviating the collapsing problem, where all experts eventually learn similar representations. However, this strategy has two key limitations: (i) the policy derived from random routers might be sub-optimal, and (ii) it requires extensive resources during training and evaluation, leading to limited efficiency gains. This work introduces \HyperRout, which dynamically generates the router's parameters through a fixed hypernetwork and trainable embeddings to achieve a balance between training the routers and freezing them to learn an improved routing policy. Extensive experiments across a wide range of tasks demonstrate the superior performance and efficiency gains of \HyperRouter compared to existing routing methods. Our implementation is publicly available at {{https://github.com/giangdip2410/HyperRouter}}.

Reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards has significantly advanced the reasoning capabilities of large language models, yet how to explicitly steer training toward exploration or exploitation remains an open problem. We introduce Token Hidden Reward (THR), a token-level metric that quantifies each token's influence on the likelihood of correct responses under Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO). We find that training dynamics are dominated by a small subset of tokens with high absolute THR values. Most interestingly, tokens with positive THR strengthen confidence in correct outputs, thus favoring exploitation, while tokens with negative THR preserve probability mass for alternative outputs, enabling exploration. This insight suggests a natural intervention: a THR-guided reweighting algorithm that modulates GRPO's learning signals to explicitly bias training toward exploitation or exploration. We validate the efficacy of this algorithm on diverse math reasoning benchmarks. By amplifying tokens with positive THR value and weakening negative ones, our algorithm improves greedy-decoding accuracy, favoring exploitation. The reverse strategy yields consistent gains in Pass@K accuracy, favoring exploration. We further demonstrate that our algorithm integrates seamlessly with other RL objectives such as GSPO and generalizes across architectures including Llama. These findings establish THR as a principled and fine-grained mechanism for dynamically controlling exploration and exploitation in RL-tuned LLMs, providing new tools for targeted fine-tuning in reasoning-intensive applications.

In deep metric learning, the Triplet Loss has emerged as a popular method to learn many computer vision and natural language processing tasks such as facial recognition, object detection, and visual-semantic embeddings. One issue that plagues the Triplet Loss is network collapse, an undesirable phenomenon where the network projects the embeddings of all data onto a single point. Researchers predominately solve this problem by using triplet mining strategies. While hard negative mining is the most effective of these strategies, existing formulations lack strong theoretical justification for their empirical success. In this paper, we utilize the mathematical theory of isometric approximation to show an equivalence between the Triplet Loss sampled by hard negative mining and an optimization problem that minimizes a Hausdorff-like distance between the neural network and its ideal counterpart function. This provides the theoretical justifications for hard negative mining's empirical efficacy. In addition, our novel application of the isometric approximation theorem provides the groundwork for future forms of hard negative mining that avoid network collapse. Our theory can also be extended to analyze other Euclidean space-based metric learning methods like Ladder Loss or Contrastive Learning.

We study the non-stationary dueling bandits problem with K arms, where the time horizon T consists of M stationary segments, each of which is associated with its own preference matrix. The learner repeatedly selects a pair of arms and observes a binary preference between them as feedback. To minimize the accumulated regret, the learner needs to pick the Condorcet winner of each stationary segment as often as possible, despite preference matrices and segment lengths being unknown. We propose the Beat, the, Winner, Reset algorithm and prove a bound on its expected binary weak regret in the stationary case, which tightens the bound of current state-of-art algorithms. We also show a regret bound for the non-stationary case, without requiring knowledge of M or T. We further propose and analyze two meta-algorithms, DETECT for weak regret and Monitored, Dueling, Bandits for strong regret, both based on a detection-window approach that can incorporate any dueling bandit algorithm as a black-box algorithm. Finally, we prove a worst-case lower bound for expected weak regret in the non-stationary case.

We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods among a set of agents. Our focus is on the existence of allocations that give each agent their maximin fair share--the value they are guaranteed if they divide the goods into as many bundles as there are agents, and receive their lowest valued bundle. An MMS allocation is one where every agent receives at least their maximin fair share. We examine the existence of such allocations when agents have cost utilities. In this setting, each item has an associated cost, and an agent's valuation for an item is the cost of the item if it is useful to them, and zero otherwise. Our main results indicate that cost utilities are a promising restriction for achieving MMS. We show that for the case of three agents with cost utilities, an MMS allocation always exists. We also show that when preferences are restricted slightly further--to what we call laminar set approvals--we can guarantee MMS allocations for any number of agents. Finally, we explore if it is possible to guarantee each agent their maximin fair share while using a strategyproof mechanism.

Digital services face a fundamental trade-off in content selection: they must balance the immediate revenue gained from high-reward content against the long-term benefits of maintaining user engagement. Traditional multi-armed bandit models assume that users remain perpetually engaged, failing to capture the possibility that users may disengage when dissatisfied, thereby reducing future revenue potential. In this work, we introduce a model for the content selection problem that explicitly accounts for variable user engagement and disengagement. In our framework, content that maximizes immediate reward is not necessarily optimal in terms of fostering sustained user engagement. Our contributions are twofold. First, we develop computational and statistical methods for offline optimization and online learning of content selection policies. For users whose engagement patterns are defined by k distinct levels, we design a dynamic programming algorithm that computes the exact optimal policy in O(k^2) time. Moreover, we derive no-regret learning guarantees for an online learning setting in which the platform serves a series of users with unknown and potentially adversarial engagement patterns. Second, we introduce the concept of modified demand elasticity which captures how small changes in a user's overall satisfaction affect the platform's ability to secure long-term revenue. This notion generalizes classical demand elasticity by incorporating the dynamics of user re-engagement, thereby revealing key insights into the interplay between engagement and revenue. Notably, our analysis uncovers a counterintuitive phenomenon: although higher friction (i.e., a reduced likelihood of re-engagement) typically lowers overall revenue, it can simultaneously lead to higher user engagement under optimal content selection policies.

While Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) can enhance LLM reasoning, its training process poses a critical risk: entropy collapse. This phenomenon is a rapid loss of policy diversity, stemming from the exploration-exploitation imbalance and leading to a lack of generalization. Recent entropy-intervention methods aim to prevent entropy collapse, yet their underlying mechanisms remain unclear. In this paper, we conduct a quantitative analysis to reveal token-level entropy changes and how existing entropy intervention methods help avoid entropy collapse. Our findings point out a fundamental limitation of existing methods: they attempt to control entropy dynamics indirectly. By only affecting related factors, such as the advantage signal and generation probability, their effectiveness is inherently limited and could potentially fail. To address this limitation, we introduce an entropy-change-aware reweighting scheme, namely Stabilizing Token-level Entropy-changE via Reweighting (STEER), that adaptively stabilizes entropy dynamics through fine-grained token-level adjustments. Our approach mitigates over-exploitation while fostering robust exploration. Extensive experiments demonstrate that STEER significantly mitigates entropy collapse, stabilizes entropy dynamics, and achieves stronger downstream performance across various mathematical reasoning benchmarks \footnote{Our code is available at https://github.com/zz-haooo/STEER.

In the context of multi-step reasoning, language models (LMs) probabilities are often miscalibrated -- solutions with high probabilities are not always correct. Therefore, greedy decoding, which is the standard decoding method for reasoning tasks, often yields incorrect solutions. In addition, methods such as self-consistency and verifiers rely on sampling from the LM distribution and do not tackle the underlying issue. To address this, we introduce Guiding Multi-step ReAsoning with a CorrectnEss Discriminator (GRACE), a stepwise decoding approach that nudges the model towards producing correct reasoning steps. GRACE employs a discriminator model, which is trained to differentiate correct steps from invalid ones, to adjust decoding preferences based on the correctness of each reasoning step. Importantly, GRACE does not require fine-tuning or re-training the LMs. When compared with conventional decoding strategies over four popular math reasoning benchmarks, GRACE exhibits significant improvements in both final answer accuracy and step correctness, outperforming both greedy decoding and self-consistency.Our code can be found at \url{https://github.com/mukhal/grace.}

In this paper, we introduce a novel predict-and-optimize method for profit-driven churn prevention. We frame the task of targeting customers for a retention campaign as a regret minimization problem. The main objective is to leverage individual customer lifetime values (CLVs) to ensure that only the most valuable customers are targeted. In contrast, many profit-driven strategies focus on churn probabilities while considering average CLVs. This often results in significant information loss due to data aggregation. Our proposed model aligns with the guidelines of Predict-and-Optimize (PnO) frameworks and can be efficiently solved using stochastic gradient descent methods. Results from 12 churn prediction datasets underscore the effectiveness of our approach, which achieves the best average performance compared to other well-established strategies in terms of average profit.

This work builds on the theoretical frameworks presented in "Liquidity pools as mean field games: A new framework" and "Liquidity pools as mean field games with transaction costs" by the same author, where the strategic interactions among traders in a constant-product market-making protocol were modelled using mean field games (MFG), first without transaction costs and then incorporating them. Here we present the formulation of a more complete model that integrates three types of agents: traders, liquidity providers (LPs), and arbitrageurs. While we do not establish existence results for this general model, the formulation identifies the main technical difficulties and lays the groundwork for future work. The LP acts as a dominating player in the sense of 'Mean field games with a dominating player' by Bensoussan, Chau, and Yam: its strategy influences the mean field distribution of the traders, and the equilibrium is sought as a solution to the coupled system of three problems that constitute a Major-Minor game. The arbitrageurs operate by solving the optimization problem presented in "An analysis of uniswap markets" by Angeris et al., and their impact on the LP is captured through the loss-versus-rebalancing of "Automated market making and loss-versus-rebalancing" by Milionis et al. The material in this article should be read as an open research proposal rather than a collection of closed results.

Despite significant advances in optimizers for training, most research works use common scheduler choices like Cosine or exponential decay. In this paper, we study GreedyLR, a novel scheduler that adaptively adjusts the learning rate during training based on the current loss. To validate the effectiveness of our proposed scheduler, we conduct experiments on several NLP, CV, and LLM tasks with up to 7B parameters, including both fine-tuning and pre-training experiments. The results show that our approach outperforms several state-of-the-art schedulers in terms of accuracy, speed, and convergence. We also provide a theoretical analysis of the GreedyLR algorithm, including a proof of convergence and derivation of the optimal scaling factor F that maximizes the convergence rate, along with experiments to show robustness of the algorithm to realistic noisy landscapes. Our scheduler is easy to implement, computationally efficient, and could be considered a good default scheduler for training.

On-policy distillation (OPD) has become a key paradigm in LLM post-training, yet its training dynamics remain poorly understood. We present a systematic study examining the role, pathologies, and regulations of OPD. We first clarify the role of OPD as an exploration catalyst: it steers the student toward correct reasoning paths via dense token-level guidance, without expanding capability ceiling. We confirm this by showing that prompt diversity matters more than per-problem sampling numbers, and critically, that the effectiveness of OPD hinges entirely on the quality of its guiding signal. This dependency exposes two pathologies that derail exploration. The Student-Teacher Mismatch occurs when a large teacher-student distributional gap causes the guiding signal to misalign with task correctness, steering exploration in counterproductive directions. Length Exploitation arises when the aggregated token-level objective creates length-dependent shortcuts, allowing the student to game the reward landscape through response truncation or redundant padding, exploring degenerate length modes rather than reasoning strategies. To tame these pathologies, we investigate lightweight signal regulations: advantage clipping and log-scale compression, ensuring exploration is guided by faithful signals. Experiments across seven benchmarks demonstrate that these regulations alleviate length exploitation and enable effective distillation, stably surpassing OPD variants and RLVR baselines, thereby confirming that well-regulated signal quality, rather than mere teacher scale, governs successful exploration in OPD.

There is a strong link between the general concept of intelligence and the ability to collect and use information. The theory of Bayes-adaptive exploration offers an attractive optimality framework for training machines to perform complex information gathering tasks. However, the computational complexity of the resulting optimal control problem has limited the diffusion of the theory to mainstream deep AI research. In this paper we exploit the inherent mathematical structure of Bayes-adaptive problems in order to dramatically simplify the problem by making the reward structure denser while simultaneously decoupling the learning of exploitation and exploration policies. The key to this simplification comes from the novel concept of cross-value (i.e. the value of being in an environment while acting optimally according to another), which we use to quantify the value of currently available information. This results in a new denser reward structure that "cashes in" all future rewards that can be predicted from the current information state. In a set of experiments we show that the approach makes it possible to learn challenging information gathering tasks without the use of shaping and heuristic bonuses in situations where the standard RL algorithms fail.

We consider the combinatorial bandits problem with semi-bandit feedback under finite sampling budget constraints, in which the learner can carry out its action only for a limited number of times specified by an overall budget. The action is to choose a set of arms, whereupon feedback for each arm in the chosen set is received. Unlike existing works, we study this problem in a non-stochastic setting with subset-dependent feedback, i.e., the semi-bandit feedback received could be generated by an oblivious adversary and also might depend on the chosen set of arms. In addition, we consider a general feedback scenario covering both the numerical-based as well as preference-based case and introduce a sound theoretical framework for this setting guaranteeing sensible notions of optimal arms, which a learner seeks to find. We suggest a generic algorithm suitable to cover the full spectrum of conceivable arm elimination strategies from aggressive to conservative. Theoretical questions about the sufficient and necessary budget of the algorithm to find the best arm are answered and complemented by deriving lower bounds for any learning algorithm for this problem scenario.

We study how to learn ε-optimal strategies in zero-sum imperfect information games (IIG) with trajectory feedback. In this setting, players update their policies sequentially based on their observations over a fixed number of episodes, denoted by T. Existing procedures suffer from high variance due to the use of importance sampling over sequences of actions (Steinberger et al., 2020; McAleer et al., 2022). To reduce this variance, we consider a fixed sampling approach, where players still update their policies over time, but with observations obtained through a given fixed sampling policy. Our approach is based on an adaptive Online Mirror Descent (OMD) algorithm that applies OMD locally to each information set, using individually decreasing learning rates and a regularized loss. We show that this approach guarantees a convergence rate of mathcal{O}(T^{-1/2}) with high probability and has a near-optimal dependence on the game parameters when applied with the best theoretical choices of learning rates and sampling policies. To achieve these results, we generalize the notion of OMD stabilization, allowing for time-varying regularization with convex increments.

We study principal-agent problems in which a principal commits to an outcome-dependent payment scheme -- called contract -- in order to induce an agent to take a costly, unobservable action leading to favorable outcomes. We consider a generalization of the classical (single-round) version of the problem in which the principal interacts with the agent by committing to contracts over multiple rounds. The principal has no information about the agent, and they have to learn an optimal contract by only observing the outcome realized at each round. We focus on settings in which the size of the agent's action space is small. We design an algorithm that learns an approximately-optimal contract with high probability in a number of rounds polynomial in the size of the outcome space, when the number of actions is constant. Our algorithm solves an open problem by Zhu et al.[2022]. Moreover, it can also be employed to provide a mathcal{O}(T^{4/5}) regret bound in the related online learning setting in which the principal aims at maximizing their cumulative utility, thus considerably improving previously-known regret bounds.

Regression trees are among the most interpretable yet expressive model classes in machine learning. Historically, greedy induction has been the dominant approach for constructing well-performing regression trees. While optimal methods based on dynamic programming and branch-and-bound exist, they are computationally prohibitive for general linear regression trees, despite often achieving substantially better performance than greedy approaches. Recent work has shown that specialized lookahead strategies can dramatically improve runtime while maintaining near-optimal performance, primarily in classification settings. In this work, we develop a novel algorithm for near-optimal, sparse, piecewise linear regression trees that combines a lookahead-style search strategy with efficient rank-one Cholesky updates of the Gram matrix. We demonstrate, both theoretically and empirically, that our method achieves a favorable trade-off between computational efficiency, predictive accuracy, and sparsity, and scales significantly better than the current state of the art.

Realistic environments often provide agents with very limited feedback. When the environment is initially unknown, the feedback, in the beginning, can be completely absent, and the agents may first choose to devote all their effort on exploring efficiently. The exploration remains a challenge while it has been addressed with many hand-tuned heuristics with different levels of generality on one side, and a few theoretically-backed exploration strategies on the other. Many of them are incarnated by intrinsic motivation and in particular explorations bonuses. A common rule of thumb for exploration bonuses is to use 1/n bonus that is added to the empirical estimates of the reward, where n is a number of times this particular state (or a state-action pair) was visited. We show that, surprisingly, for a pure-exploration objective of reward-free exploration, bonuses that scale with 1/n bring faster learning rates, improving the known upper bounds with respect to the dependence on the horizon H. Furthermore, we show that with an improved analysis of the stopping time, we can improve by a factor H the sample complexity in the best-policy identification setting, which is another pure-exploration objective, where the environment provides rewards but the agent is not penalized for its behavior during the exploration phase.

In this paper, we consider the problem of sleeping bandits with stochastic action sets and adversarial rewards. In this setting, in contrast to most work in bandits, the actions may not be available at all times. For instance, some products might be out of stock in item recommendation. The best existing efficient (i.e., polynomial-time) algorithms for this problem only guarantee an O(T^{2/3}) upper-bound on the regret. Yet, inefficient algorithms based on EXP4 can achieve O(T). In this paper, we provide a new computationally efficient algorithm inspired by EXP3 satisfying a regret of order O(T) when the availabilities of each action i in cA are independent. We then study the most general version of the problem where at each round available sets are generated from some unknown arbitrary distribution (i.e., without the independence assumption) and propose an efficient algorithm with O(2^K T) regret guarantee. Our theoretical results are corroborated with experimental evaluations.

Large language models have revolutionized natural language processing, yet their deployment remains hampered by the substantial memory and runtime overhead of the transformer's Key-Value cache. To mitigate this, recent methods employ a scoring-aggregation framework to evict unimportant cache entries, based on the stability assumption-that a fixed subset of entries remains consistently important during generation. However, prior work has largely focused on refining importance indicators for scoring, while defaulting to mean aggregation due to a faithful trust in the stability assumption. In this work, we argue that this underlying assumption is inherently fragile, making mean aggregation highly vulnerable in extreme cases. To counter this, we propose a simple yet elegant defensive aggregation strategy: a two-step, linear-time approach that controls worst-case risk, thereby defending against extreme cases with negligible computational overhead. Embodying this strategy, we propose a novel cache eviction method, DefensiveKV and its extension, Layer-DefensiveKV, which incorporates layer-wise budget allocation. Across seven task domains (18 datasets), our methods reduce generation quality loss by 2.3x and 4.3x respectively, versus the strongest baseline under a 20% cache size. These results set new performance benchmarks and pioneer a promising direction for optimizing cache eviction against underlying fragility through worst-case risk management. Our code is available at https://github.com/FFY0/DefensiveKV.