Daily Papers

In this work, we focus on improving the captions generated by image-caption generation systems. We propose a novel re-ranking approach that leverages visual-semantic measures to identify the ideal caption that maximally captures the visual information in the image. Our re-ranker utilizes the Belief Revision framework (Blok et al., 2003) to calibrate the original likelihood of the top-n captions by explicitly exploiting the semantic relatedness between the depicted caption and the visual context. Our experiments demonstrate the utility of our approach, where we observe that our re-ranker can enhance the performance of a typical image-captioning system without the necessity of any additional training or fine-tuning.

LLMs are increasingly used as long-running conversational agents, yet every major benchmark evaluating their memory treats user information as static facts to be stored and retrieved. That's the wrong model. People change their minds, and over extended interactions, phenomena like opinion drift, over-alignment, and confirmation bias start to matter a lot. BeliefShift introduces a longitudinal benchmark designed specifically to evaluate belief dynamics in multi-session LLM interactions. It covers three tracks: Temporal Belief Consistency, Contradiction Detection, and Evidence-Driven Revision. The dataset includes 2,400 human-annotated multi-session interaction trajectories spanning health, politics, personal values, and product preferences. We evaluate seven models including GPT-4o, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Gemini 1.5 Pro, LLaMA-3, and Mistral-Large under zero-shot and retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) settings. Results reveal a clear trade-off: models that personalize aggressively resist drift poorly, while factually grounded models miss legitimate belief updates. We further introduce four novel evaluation metrics: Belief Revision Accuracy (BRA), Drift Coherence Score (DCS), Contradiction Resolution Rate (CRR), and Evidence Sensitivity Index (ESI).

AI agents deployed as persistent assistants must maintain correct beliefs as their information environment evolves. In practice, evidence is scattered across heterogeneous sources that often contradict one another, new information can invalidate earlier conclusions, and user preferences surface through corrections rather than explicit instructions. Existing benchmarks largely assume static, single-authority settings and do not evaluate whether agents can keep up with this complexity. We introduce ClawArena, a benchmark for evaluating AI agents in evolving information environments. Each scenario maintains a complete hidden ground truth while exposing the agent only to noisy, partial, and sometimes contradictory traces across multi-channel sessions, workspace files, and staged updates. Evaluation is organized around three coupled challenges: multi-source conflict reasoning, dynamic belief revision, and implicit personalization, whose interactions yield a 14-category question taxonomy. Two question formats, multi-choice (set-selection) and shell-based executable checks, test both reasoning and workspace grounding. The current release contains 64 scenarios across 8 professional domains, totaling 1{,}879 evaluation rounds and 365 dynamic updates. Experiments on five agent frameworks and five language models show that both model capability (15.4% range) and framework design (9.2%) substantially affect performance, that self-evolving skill frameworks can partially close model-capability gaps, and that belief revision difficulty is determined by update design strategy rather than the mere presence of updates. Code is available at https://github.com/aiming-lab/ClawArena.

Large language model (LLM)-based systems are increasingly deployed to conduct scientific research autonomously, yet whether their reasoning adheres to the epistemic norms that make scientific inquiry self-correcting is poorly understood. Here, we evaluate LLM-based scientific agents across eight domains, spanning workflow execution to hypothesis-driven inquiry, through more than 25,000 agent runs and two complementary lenses: (i) a systematic performance analysis that decomposes the contributions of the base model and the agent scaffold, and (ii) a behavioral analysis of the epistemological structure of agent reasoning. We observe that the base model is the primary determinant of both performance and behavior, accounting for 41.4% of explained variance versus 1.5% for the scaffold. Across all configurations, evidence is ignored in 68% of traces, refutation-driven belief revision occurs in 26%, and convergent multi-test evidence is rare. The same reasoning pattern appears whether the agent executes a computational workflow or conducts hypothesis-driven inquiry. They persist even when agents receive near-complete successful reasoning trajectories as context, and the resulting unreliability compounds across repeated trials in epistemically demanding domains. Thus, current LLM-based agents execute scientific workflows but do not exhibit the epistemic patterns that characterize scientific reasoning. Outcome-based evaluation cannot detect these failures, and scaffold engineering alone cannot repair them. Until reasoning itself becomes a training target, the scientific knowledge produced by such agents cannot be justified by the process that generated it.

LLM agents excel when environments are mostly static and the needed information fits in a model's context window, but they often fail in open-ended investigations where explanations must be constructed by iteratively mining evidence from massive, heterogeneous operational data. These investigations exhibit hidden dependency structure: entities interact, signals co-vary, and the importance of a fact may only become clear after other evidence is discovered. Because the context window is bounded, agents must summarize intermediate findings before their significance is known, increasing the risk of discarding key evidence. ReAct-style agents are especially brittle in this regime. Their retrieve-summarize-reason loop makes conclusions sensitive to exploration order and introduces run-to-run non-determinism, producing a reliability gap where Pass-at-k may be high but Majority-at-k remains low. Simply sampling more rollouts or generating longer reasoning traces does not reliably stabilize results, since hypotheses cannot be autonomously checked as new evidence arrives and there is no explicit mechanism for belief bookkeeping and revision. In addition, ReAct entangles semantic reasoning with controller duties such as tool orchestration and state tracking, so execution errors and plan drift degrade reasoning while consuming scarce context. We address these issues by formulating investigation as abductive reasoning over a dependency graph and proposing EoG (Explanations over Graphs), a disaggregated framework in which an LLM performs bounded local evidence mining and labeling (cause vs symptom) while a deterministic controller manages traversal, state, and belief propagation to compute a minimal explanatory frontier. On a representative ITBench diagnostics task, EoG improves both accuracy and run-to-run consistency over ReAct baselines, including a 7x average gain in Majority-at-k entity F1.

Large Language Models (LLMs) encapsulate vast amounts of knowledge but still remain vulnerable to external misinformation. Existing research mainly studied this susceptibility behavior in a single-turn setting. However, belief can change during a multi-turn conversation, especially a persuasive one. Therefore, in this study, we delve into LLMs' susceptibility to persuasive conversations, particularly on factual questions that they can answer correctly. We first curate the Farm (i.e., Fact to Misinform) dataset, which contains factual questions paired with systematically generated persuasive misinformation. Then, we develop a testing framework to track LLMs' belief changes in a persuasive dialogue. Through extensive experiments, we find that LLMs' correct beliefs on factual knowledge can be easily manipulated by various persuasive strategies.

Large Language Model (LLM) agents commonly condition actions on full action-observation histories, which introduce task-irrelevant information that easily leads to redundant actions and higher inference cost. We propose Progress-Aware Belief Update (PABU), a belief-state framework that compactly represents an agent's state by explicitly modeling task progress and selectively retaining past actions and observations. At each step, the agent predicts its relative progress since the previous round and decides whether the newly encountered interaction should be stored, conditioning future decisions only on the retained subset. Across eight environments in the AgentGym benchmark, and using identical training trajectories, PABU achieves an 81.0% task completion rate, outperforming previous State of the art (SoTA) models with full-history belief by 23.9%. Additionally, PABU's progress-oriented action selection improves efficiency, reducing the average number of interaction steps to 9.5, corresponding to a 26.9% reduction. Ablation studies show that both explicit progress prediction and selective retention are necessary for robust belief learning and performance gains.

Planning with partial observation is a central challenge in embodied AI. A majority of prior works have tackled this challenge by developing agents that physically explore their environment to update their beliefs about the world state.In contrast, humans can imagine unseen parts of the world through a mental exploration and revise their beliefs with imagined observations. Such updated beliefs can allow them to make more informed decisions, without necessitating the physical exploration of the world at all times. To achieve this human-like ability, we introduce the Generative World Explorer (Genex), an egocentric world exploration framework that allows an agent to mentally explore a large-scale 3D world (e.g., urban scenes) and acquire imagined observations to update its belief. This updated belief will then help the agent to make a more informed decision at the current step. To train Genex, we create a synthetic urban scene dataset, Genex-DB. Our experimental results demonstrate that (1) Genex can generate high-quality and consistent observations during long-horizon exploration of a large virtual physical world and (2) the beliefs updated with the generated observations can inform an existing decision-making model (e.g., an LLM agent) to make better plans.

Large language models (LLMs) face issues in handling factual knowledge, making it vital to evaluate their true ability to understand facts. In this study, we introduce knowledge probing frameworks, BELIEF(-ICL), to evaluate the knowledge understanding ability of not only encoder-based PLMs but also decoder-based PLMs from diverse perspectives. BELIEFs utilize a multi-prompt dataset to evaluate PLM's accuracy, consistency, and reliability in factual knowledge understanding. To provide a more reliable evaluation with BELIEFs, we semi-automatically create MyriadLAMA, which has more diverse prompts than existing datasets. We validate the effectiveness of BELIEFs in correctly and comprehensively evaluating PLM's factual understanding ability through extensive evaluations. We further investigate key factors in learning facts in LLMs, and reveal the limitation of the prompt-based knowledge probing. The dataset is anonymously publicized.

Self-awareness, i.e., the ability to assess and correct one's own generation, is a fundamental aspect of human intelligence, making its replication in large language models (LLMs) an important yet challenging task. Previous works tackle this by employing extensive reinforcement learning or rather relying on large external verifiers. In this work, we propose Refine via Intrinsic Self-Verification (ReVISE), an efficient and effective framework that enables LLMs to self-correct their outputs through self-verification. The core idea of ReVISE is to enable LLMs to verify their reasoning processes and continually rethink reasoning trajectories based on its verification. We introduce a structured curriculum based upon online preference learning to implement this efficiently. Specifically, as ReVISE involves two challenging tasks (i.e., self-verification and reasoning correction), we tackle each task sequentially using curriculum learning, collecting both failed and successful reasoning paths to construct preference pairs for efficient training. During inference, our approach enjoys natural test-time scaling by integrating self-verification and correction capabilities, further enhanced by our proposed confidence-aware decoding mechanism. Our experiments on various reasoning tasks demonstrate that ReVISE achieves efficient self-correction and significantly improves reasoning performance.

Spatial embodied intelligence requires agents to act to acquire information under partial observability. While multimodal foundation models excel at passive perception, their capacity for active, self-directed exploration remains understudied. We propose Theory of Space, defined as an agent's ability to actively acquire information through self-directed, active exploration and to construct, revise, and exploit a spatial belief from sequential, partial observations. We evaluate this through a benchmark where the goal is curiosity-driven exploration to build an accurate cognitive map. A key innovation is spatial belief probing, which prompts models to reveal their internal spatial representations at each step. Our evaluation of state-of-the-art models reveals several critical bottlenecks. First, we identify an Active-Passive Gap, where performance drops significantly when agents must autonomously gather information. Second, we find high inefficiency, as models explore unsystematically compared to program-based proxies. Through belief probing, we diagnose that while perception is an initial bottleneck, global beliefs suffer from instability that causes spatial knowledge to degrade over time. Finally, using a false belief paradigm, we uncover Belief Inertia, where agents fail to update obsolete priors with new evidence. This issue is present in text-based agents but is particularly severe in vision-based models. Our findings suggest that current foundation models struggle to maintain coherent, revisable spatial beliefs during active exploration.

Language model (LM) assistants are increasingly used in applications such as brainstorming and research. Improvements in memory and context size have allowed these models to become more autonomous, which has also resulted in more text accumulation in their context windows without explicit user intervention. This comes with a latent risk: the belief profiles of models -- their understanding of the world as manifested in their responses or actions -- may silently change as context accumulates. This can lead to subtly inconsistent user experiences, or shifts in behavior that deviate from the original alignment of the models. In this paper, we explore how accumulating context by engaging in interactions and processing text -- talking and reading -- can change the beliefs of language models, as manifested in their responses and behaviors. Our results reveal that models' belief profiles are highly malleable: GPT-5 exhibits a 54.7% shift in its stated beliefs after 10 rounds of discussion about moral dilemmas and queries about safety, while Grok 4 shows a 27.2% shift on political issues after reading texts from the opposing position. We also examine models' behavioral changes by designing tasks that require tool use, where each tool selection corresponds to an implicit belief. We find that these changes align with stated belief shifts, suggesting that belief shifts will be reflected in actual behavior in agentic systems. Our analysis exposes the hidden risk of belief shift as models undergo extended sessions of talking or reading, rendering their opinions and actions unreliable.

Agent harnesses -- the stateful programs that wrap a language model and decide what it sees at each step -- are now known to change end-to-end performance on a fixed model by as much as six times. That raises a question asked less often than it should be: how much of an agent's competence does the harness itself already carry, and how much genuinely still needs the LLM? We externalize a planning harness for noisy Collaborative Battleship into four progressively richer layers -- posterior belief tracking, declarative planning, symbolic reflec tion, and an LLM-backed revision gate -- under a common runtime, taking win rate as the primary metric and F1 as secondary, and pre-specifying heavy lifting as the single largest positive marginal to the primary metric. Across 54 games, declarative pla nning carries the heavy lifting (+24.1pp win rate over a belief-only harness, zero LLM calls); symbolic reflection is mechanistically real but calibration-sensitive, with signed board-level effects up to pm0.140 F1 that cancel on aggregate; and LLM-backed revision ac tivates on only 4.3% of turns with a bounded, non-monotonic effect. The contribution is methodological: once harness layers are made externally measurable, the LLM's role can be quantified as residual rather than assumed central.

As language models (LMs) become integral to fields like healthcare, law, and journalism, their ability to differentiate between fact, belief, and knowledge is essential for reliable decision-making. Failure to grasp these distinctions can lead to significant consequences in areas such as medical diagnosis, legal judgments, and dissemination of fake news. Despite this, current literature has largely focused on more complex issues such as theory of mind, overlooking more fundamental epistemic challenges. This study systematically evaluates the epistemic reasoning capabilities of modern LMs, including GPT-4, Claude-3, and Llama-3, using a new dataset, KaBLE, consisting of 13,000 questions across 13 tasks. Our results reveal key limitations. First, while LMs achieve 86% accuracy on factual scenarios, their performance drops significantly with false scenarios, particularly in belief-related tasks. Second, LMs struggle with recognizing and affirming personal beliefs, especially when those beliefs contradict factual data, which raises concerns for applications in healthcare and counseling, where engaging with a person's beliefs is critical. Third, we identify a salient bias in how LMs process first-person versus third-person beliefs, performing better on third-person tasks (80.7%) compared to first-person tasks (54.4%). Fourth, LMs lack a robust understanding of the factive nature of knowledge, namely, that knowledge inherently requires truth. Fifth, LMs rely on linguistic cues for fact-checking and sometimes bypass the deeper reasoning. These findings highlight significant concerns about current LMs' ability to reason about truth, belief, and knowledge while emphasizing the need for advancements in these areas before broad deployment in critical sectors.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used in applications requiring factual accuracy, yet their outputs often contain hallucinated responses. While fact-checking can mitigate these errors, existing methods typically retrieve external evidence indiscriminately, overlooking the model's internal knowledge and potentially introducing irrelevant noise. Moreover, current systems lack targeted mechanisms to resolve specific uncertainties in the model's reasoning. Inspired by how humans fact-check, we argue that LLMs should adaptively decide whether to rely on internal knowledge or initiate retrieval based on their confidence in a given claim. We introduce Probabilistic Certainty and Consistency (PCC), a framework that estimates factual confidence by jointly modeling an LLM's probabilistic certainty and reasoning consistency. These confidence signals enable an adaptive verification strategy: the model answers directly when confident, triggers targeted retrieval when uncertain or inconsistent, and escalates to deep search when ambiguity is high. Our confidence-guided routing mechanism ensures that retrieval is invoked only when necessary, improving both efficiency and reliability. Extensive experiments across three challenging benchmarks show that PCC achieves better uncertainty quantification than verbalized confidence and consistently outperforms strong LLM-based fact-checking baselines. Furthermore, we demonstrate that PCC generalizes well across various LLMs.

Large language models (LLMs) have been routinely used to solve various tasks using step-by-step reasoning. However, the structure of intermediate reasoning steps, or thoughts, is rigid and unidirectional, such as chains, trees, or acyclic-directed graphs. Consequently, the resulting inflexible and forward-only reasoning may not address challenging tasks and fail when the LLM frequently gives false responses, i.e., ``hallucinations''. This paper proposes a new reasoning framework, called Thought Rollback (TR), allowing LLMs to adaptively build thought structure while maintaining effective reasoning toward problem-solving under ``hallucinations''. The core mechanism of TR is rolling back thoughts, which allows LLMs to perform error analysis on thoughts, and thus roll back to any previously mistaken thought for revision. Subsequently, by including such trial-and-error in the prompt to guide the LLM, each rollback leads to one more reliable reasoning path. Therefore, starting with a simple prompt without human annotations, LLM with TR adaptively and gradually explores thoughts for a correct solution. Comprehensive experiments on mathematical problems and multi-task reasoning demonstrate the state-of-the-art performance of TR in terms of problem-solving rate and interaction cost. For instance, the solving rate of GPT-4 with TR outperforms the current best by 9% on the MATH dataset.

Large language models (LLMs) can improve their accuracy on various tasks through iteratively refining and revising their output based on feedback. We observe that these revisions can introduce errors, in which case it is better to roll back to a previous result. Further, revisions are typically homogeneous: they use the same reasoning method that produced the initial answer, which may not correct errors. To enable exploration in this space, we present SCREWS, a modular framework for reasoning with revisions. It is comprised of three main modules: Sampling, Conditional Resampling, and Selection, each consisting of sub-modules that can be hand-selected per task. We show that SCREWS not only unifies several previous approaches under a common framework, but also reveals several novel strategies for identifying improved reasoning chains. We evaluate our framework with state-of-the-art LLMs (ChatGPT and GPT-4) on a diverse set of reasoning tasks and uncover useful new reasoning strategies for each: arithmetic word problems, multi-hop question answering, and code debugging. Heterogeneous revision strategies prove to be important, as does selection between original and revised candidates.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive capabilities in complex reasoning tasks, yet they still struggle to reliably verify the correctness of their own outputs. Existing solutions to this verification challenge often depend on separate verifier models or require multi-stage self-correction training pipelines, which limit scalability. In this paper, we propose Policy as Generative Verifier (PAG), a simple and effective framework that empowers LLMs to self-correct by alternating between policy and verifier roles within a unified multi-turn reinforcement learning (RL) paradigm. Distinct from prior approaches that always generate a second attempt regardless of model confidence, PAG introduces a selective revision mechanism: the model revises its answer only when its own generative verification step detects an error. This verify-then-revise workflow not only alleviates model collapse but also jointly enhances both reasoning and verification abilities. Extensive experiments across diverse reasoning benchmarks highlight PAG's dual advancements: as a policy, it enhances direct generation and self-correction accuracy; as a verifier, its self-verification outperforms self-consistency.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in real-world settings, correctness alone is insufficient. Reliable deployment requires maintaining truthful beliefs under contextual perturbations. Existing evaluations largely rely on point-wise confidence like Self-Consistency, which can mask brittle belief. We show that even facts answered with perfect self-consistency can rapidly collapse under mild contextual interference. To address this gap, we propose Neighbor-Consistency Belief (NCB), a structural measure of belief robustness that evaluates response coherence across a conceptual neighborhood. To validate the efficiency of NCB, we introduce a new cognitive stress-testing protocol that probes outputs stability under contextual interference. Experiments across multiple LLMs show that the performance of high-NCB data is relatively more resistant to interference. Finally, we present Structure-Aware Training (SAT), which optimizes context-invariant belief structure and reduces long-tail knowledge brittleness by approximately 30%. Code will be available at https://github.com/zjunlp/belief.

While large language models (LLMs) are proficient at question-answering (QA), it is not always clear how (or even if) an answer follows from their latent "beliefs". This lack of interpretability is a growing impediment to widespread use of LLMs. To address this, our goals are to make model beliefs and their inferential relationships explicit, and to resolve inconsistencies that may exist, so that answers are supported by interpretable chains of reasoning drawn from a consistent network of beliefs. Our approach, which we call REFLEX, is to add a rational, self-reflecting layer on top of the LLM. First, given a question, we construct a belief graph using a backward-chaining process to materialize relevant model beliefs (including beliefs about answer candidates) and their inferential relationships. Second, we identify and minimize contradictions in that graph using a formal constraint reasoner. We find that REFLEX significantly improves consistency (by 8%-11% absolute) without harming overall answer accuracy, resulting in answers supported by faithful chains of reasoning drawn from a more consistent belief system. This suggests a new style of system architecture in which an LLM extended with a rational layer can provide an interpretable window into system beliefs, add a systematic reasoning capability, and repair latent inconsistencies present in the LLM.

Strategic dialogue requires agents to execute distinct dialogue acts, for which belief estimation is essential. While prior work often estimates beliefs accurately, it lacks a principled mechanism to use those beliefs during generation. We bridge this gap by first formalizing two core acts Adversarial and Alignment, and by operationalizing them via probabilistic constraints on what an agent may generate. We instantiate this idea in BEDA, a framework that consists of the world set, the belief estimator for belief estimation, and the conditional generator that selects acts and realizes utterances consistent with the inferred beliefs. Across three settings, Conditional Keeper Burglar (CKBG, adversarial), Mutual Friends (MF, cooperative), and CaSiNo (negotiation), BEDA consistently outperforms strong baselines: on CKBG it improves success rate by at least 5.0 points across backbones and by 20.6 points with GPT-4.1-nano; on Mutual Friends it achieves an average improvement of 9.3 points; and on CaSiNo it achieves the optimal deal relative to all baselines. These results indicate that casting belief estimation as constraints provides a simple, general mechanism for reliable strategic dialogue.

Reasoning protocols such as Chain of Thought (CoT) and Tree of Thought (ToT) organize internal deliberation but lack an explicit mechanism for external questioning that elicits self-revision. We present FOR-Prompting (From Objection to Revision Prompting), an asymmetric protocol where a Defender proposes an answer, an Objectioner raises question-style objections with no direct fixes, and a Host enforces consistency and closure. On GSM8K we observe about a 22% point gain over single-prompt and accuracy on par with CoT, with more than 10% higher ratings in reasoning and coherence from a uniform GPT 4.1 judge. FOR-Prompting also corrects mistakes without tools or human supervision on tricky queries, and improves performance for small-scale model (approx. 19% accuracy improved on Llama3.2:1b for GSM8K task), highlighting promise for small models and on personal device use. Beyond factual QA, qualitative analyses on open-ended tasks show enhanced exploration and refinement, with dialogue traces that make assumptions and trade-offs explicit. The protocol is model agnostic and operates purely at the prompt level through role-structured turns, so it works with hosted and local models of different sizes without retraining, and it supports large-scale study of objection-guided reasoning.

Recently, Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting has delivered success on complex reasoning tasks, which aims at designing a simple prompt like ``Let's think step by step'' or multiple in-context exemplars with well-designed rationales to elicit Large Language Models (LLMs) to generate intermediate reasoning steps. However, the generated rationales often come with mistakes, making unfactual and unfaithful reasoning chains. To mitigate this brittleness, we propose a novel Chain-of-Knowledge (CoK) prompting, where we aim at eliciting LLMs to generate explicit pieces of knowledge evidence in the form of structure triple. This is inspired by our human behaviors, i.e., we can draw a mind map or knowledge map as the reasoning evidence in the brain before answering a complex question. Benefiting from CoK, we additionally introduce a F^2-Verification method to estimate the reliability of the reasoning chains in terms of factuality and faithfulness. For the unreliable response, the wrong evidence can be indicated to prompt the LLM to rethink. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our method can further improve the performance of commonsense, factual, symbolic, and arithmetic reasoning tasks.

Rapid advancements in large language models (LLMs) have sparked the question whether these models possess some form of consciousness. To tackle this challenge, Butlin et al. (2023) introduced a list of indicators for consciousness in artificial systems based on neuroscientific theories. In this work, we evaluate a key indicator from this list, called HOT-3, which tests for agency guided by a general belief-formation and action selection system that updates beliefs based on meta-cognitive monitoring. We view beliefs as representations in the model's latent space that emerge in response to a given input, and introduce a metric to quantify their dominance during generation. Analyzing the dynamics between competing beliefs across models and tasks reveals three key findings: (1) external manipulations systematically modulate internal belief formation, (2) belief formation causally drives the model's action selection, and (3) models can monitor and report their own belief states. Together, these results provide empirical support for the existence of belief-guided agency and meta-cognitive monitoring in LLMs. More broadly, our work lays methodological groundwork for investigating the emergence of agency, beliefs, and meta-cognition in LLMs.

Theory-of-Mind (ToM) tasks pose a unique challenge for small language models (SLMs) with limited scale, which often lack the capacity to perform deep social reasoning. In this work, we propose DEL-ToM, a framework that improves ToM reasoning through inference-time scaling rather than architectural changes. Our approach decomposes ToM tasks into a sequence of belief updates grounded in Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL), enabling structured and transparent reasoning. We train a verifier, called the Process Belief Model (PBM), to score each belief update step using labels generated automatically via a DEL simulator. During inference, candidate belief traces generated by a language model are evaluated by the PBM, and the highest-scoring trace is selected. This allows SLMs to emulate more deliberate reasoning by allocating additional compute at test time. Experiments across multiple model scales and benchmarks show that DEL-ToM consistently improves performance, demonstrating that verifiable belief supervision can significantly enhance ToM abilities of SLMs without retraining.

Mitigating hallucination issues is a key challenge that must be overcome to reliably deploy large language models (LLMs) in real-world scenarios. Recently, various methods have been proposed to detect and revise factual errors in LLM-generated texts, in order to reduce hallucination. In this paper, we propose Re-Ex, a method for post-editing LLM-generated responses. Re-Ex introduces a novel reasoning step dubbed as the factual error explanation step. Re-Ex revises the initial response of LLMs using 3-steps : first, external tools are used to retrieve the evidences of the factual errors in the initial LLM response; next, LLM is instructed to explain the problematic parts of the response based on the gathered evidence; finally, LLM revises the initial response using the explanations provided in the previous step. In addition to the explanation step, Re-Ex also incorporates new prompting techniques to reduce the token count and inference time required for the response revision process. Compared with existing methods including FacTool, CoVE, and RARR, Re-Ex provides better detection and revision performance with less inference time and fewer tokens in multiple benchmarks.

The rapid development of mobile GUI agents has stimulated growing research interest in long-horizon task automation. However, building agents for these tasks faces a critical bottleneck: the reliance on ever-expanding interaction history incurs substantial context overhead. Existing context management and compression techniques often fail to preserve vital semantic information, leading to degraded task performance. We propose AgentProg, a program-guided approach for agent context management that reframes the interaction history as a program with variables and control flow. By organizing information according to the structure of program, this structure provides a principled mechanism to determine which information should be retained and which can be discarded. We further integrate a global belief state mechanism inspired by Belief MDP framework to handle partial observability and adapt to unexpected environmental changes. Experiments on AndroidWorld and our extended long-horizon task suite demonstrate that AgentProg has achieved the state-of-the-art success rates on these benchmarks. More importantly, it maintains robust performance on long-horizon tasks while baseline methods experience catastrophic degradation. Our system is open-sourced at https://github.com/MobileLLM/AgentProg.

Large language models (LLMs) continually evolve through pre-training on ever-expanding web data, but this adaptive process also exposes them to subtle forms of misinformation. While prior work has explored data poisoning during static pre-training, the effects of such manipulations under continual pre-training remain largely unexplored. Drawing inspiration from the illusory truth effect in human cognition - where repeated exposure to falsehoods increases belief in their accuracy - we ask whether LLMs exhibit a similar vulnerability. We investigate whether repeated exposure to false but confidently stated facts can shift a model's internal representation away from the truth. We introduce Layer of Truth, a framework and dataset for probing belief dynamics in continually trained LLMs. By injecting controlled amounts of poisoned data and probing intermediate representations across checkpoints, model scales, and question types, we quantify when and how factual beliefs shift. Our findings reveal that even minimal exposure can induce persistent representational drift in well-established facts, with susceptibility varying across layers and model sizes. These results highlight an overlooked vulnerability of continually updated LLMs: their capacity to internalize misinformation analogously to humans, underscoring the need for robust monitoring of factual integrity during model updates.

Multi-Agent Debate~(MAD) has emerged as a promising paradigm for improving the performance of large language models through collaborative reasoning. Despite recent advances, the key factors driving MAD's effectiveness remain unclear. In this work, we disentangle MAD into two key components--Majority Voting and inter-agent Debate--and assess their respective contributions. Through extensive experiments across seven NLP benchmarks, we find that Majority Voting alone accounts for most of the performance gains typically attributed to MAD. To explain this, we propose a theoretical framework that models debate as a stochastic process. We prove that it induces a martingale over agents' belief trajectories, implying that debate alone does not improve expected correctness. Guided by these insights, we demonstrate that targeted interventions, by biasing the belief update toward correction, can meaningfully enhance debate effectiveness. Overall, our findings suggest that while MAD has potential, simple ensembling methods remain strong and more reliable alternatives in many practical settings. Code is released in https://github.com/deeplearning-wisc/debate-or-vote.

A critical component in the trustworthiness of LLMs is reliable uncertainty communication, yet LLMs often use assertive language when conveying false claims, leading to over-reliance and eroded trust. We present the first systematic study of faithful confidence calibration of LLMs, benchmarking models' ability to use linguistic expressions of uncertainty that faithfully reflect their intrinsic uncertainty, across a comprehensive array of models, datasets, and prompting strategies. Our results demonstrate that LLMs largely fail at this task, and that existing interventions are insufficient: standard prompt approaches provide only marginal gains, and existing, factuality-based calibration techniques can even harm faithful calibration. To address this critical gap, we introduce MetaFaith, a novel prompt-based calibration approach inspired by human metacognition. We show that MetaFaith robustly improves faithful calibration across diverse models and task domains, enabling up to 61% improvement in faithfulness and achieving an 83% win rate over original generations as judged by humans.

Beliefs serve as the foundation for human cognition and decision-making. They guide individuals in deriving meaning from their lives, shaping their behaviors, and forming social connections. Therefore, a model that encapsulates beliefs and their interrelationships is crucial for quantitatively studying the influence of beliefs on our actions. Despite its importance, research on the interplay between human beliefs has often been limited to a small set of beliefs pertaining to specific issues, with a heavy reliance on surveys or experiments. Here, we propose a method for extracting nuanced relations between thousands of beliefs by leveraging large-scale user participation data from an online debate platform and mapping these beliefs to an embedding space using a fine-tuned large language model (LLM). This belief embedding space effectively encapsulates the interconnectedness of diverse beliefs as well as polarization across various social issues. We discover that the positions within this belief space predict new beliefs of individuals. Furthermore, we find that the relative distance between one's existing beliefs and new beliefs can serve as a quantitative estimate of cognitive dissonance, allowing us to predict new beliefs. Our study highlights how modern LLMs, when combined with collective online records of human beliefs, can offer insights into the fundamental principles that govern human belief formation and decision-making processes.

Active inference offers a first principle account of sentient behaviour, from which special and important cases can be derived, e.g., reinforcement learning, active learning, Bayes optimal inference, Bayes optimal design, etc. Active inference resolves the exploitation-exploration dilemma in relation to prior preferences, by placing information gain on the same footing as reward or value. In brief, active inference replaces value functions with functionals of (Bayesian) beliefs, in the form of an expected (variational) free energy. In this paper, we consider a sophisticated kind of active inference, using a recursive form of expected free energy. Sophistication describes the degree to which an agent has beliefs about beliefs. We consider agents with beliefs about the counterfactual consequences of action for states of affairs and beliefs about those latent states. In other words, we move from simply considering beliefs about 'what would happen if I did that' to 'what would I believe about what would happen if I did that'. The recursive form of the free energy functional effectively implements a deep tree search over actions and outcomes in the future. Crucially, this search is over sequences of belief states, as opposed to states per se. We illustrate the competence of this scheme, using numerical simulations of deep decision problems.

Knowledge graph-based retrieval-augmented generation seeks to mitigate hallucinations in Large Language Models (LLMs) caused by insufficient or outdated knowledge. However, existing methods often fail to fully exploit the prior knowledge embedded in knowledge graphs (KGs), particularly their structural information and explicit or implicit constraints. The former can enhance the faithfulness of LLMs' reasoning, while the latter can improve the reliability of response generation. Motivated by these, we propose a trustworthy reasoning framework, termed Deliberation over Priors (DP), which sufficiently utilizes the priors contained in KGs. Specifically, DP adopts a progressive knowledge distillation strategy that integrates structural priors into LLMs through a combination of supervised fine-tuning and Kahneman-Tversky optimization, thereby improving the faithfulness of relation path generation. Furthermore, our framework employs a reasoning-introspection strategy, which guides LLMs to perform refined reasoning verification based on extracted constraint priors, ensuring the reliability of response generation. Extensive experiments on three benchmark datasets demonstrate that DP achieves new state-of-the-art performance, especially a Hit@1 improvement of 13% on the ComplexWebQuestions dataset, and generates highly trustworthy responses. We also conduct various analyses to verify its flexibility and practicality. The code is available at https://github.com/reml-group/Deliberation-on-Priors.

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) mitigates hallucinations in Large Language Models (LLMs) by integrating external knowledge. However, conflicts between parametric knowledge and retrieved context pose challenges, particularly when retrieved information is unreliable or the model's internal knowledge is outdated. In such cases, LLMs struggle to determine whether to rely more on their own parameters or the conflicted context. To address this, we propose **CK-PLUG**, a plug-and-play method for controlling LLMs' reliance on parametric and contextual knowledge. We introduce a novel knowledge consistency metric, Confidence Gain, which detects knowledge conflicts by measuring entropy shifts in token probability distributions after context insertion. CK-PLUG then enables fine-grained control over knowledge preference by adjusting the probability distribution of tokens with negative confidence gain through a single tuning parameter. Experiments demonstrate CK-PLUG's ability to significantly regulate knowledge reliance in counterfactual RAG scenarios while maintaining generation fluency and knowledge accuracy. For instance, on Llama3-8B, memory recall (MR) of RAG response can be adjusted within a broad range (9.9%-71.9%), compared to the baseline of 42.1%. Moreover, CK-PLUG supports adaptive control based on the model's confidence in both internal and external knowledge, achieving consistent performance improvements across various general RAG tasks. Our code is available at: https://github.com/byronBBL/CK-PLUG{this https URL}.

Social biases and belief-driven behaviors can significantly impact Large Language Models (LLMs) decisions on several tasks. As LLMs are increasingly used in multi-agent systems for societal simulations, their ability to model fundamental group psychological characteristics remains critical yet under-explored. In this study, we present a multi-agent framework that simulates belief congruence, a classical group psychology theory that plays a crucial role in shaping societal interactions and preferences. Our findings reveal that LLMs exhibit amplified belief congruence compared to humans, across diverse contexts. We further investigate the implications of this behavior on two downstream tasks: (1) misinformation dissemination and (2) LLM learning, finding that belief congruence in LLMs increases misinformation dissemination and impedes learning. To mitigate these negative impacts, we propose strategies inspired by: (1) contact hypothesis, (2) accuracy nudges, and (3) global citizenship framework. Our results show that the best strategies reduce misinformation dissemination by up to 37% and enhance learning by 11%. Bridging social psychology and AI, our work provides insights to navigate real-world interactions using LLMs while addressing belief-driven biases.

The rise of large language models (LLMs) has significantly influenced the quality of information in decision-making systems, leading to the prevalence of AI-generated content and challenges in detecting misinformation and managing conflicting information, or "inter-evidence conflicts." This study introduces a method for generating diverse, validated evidence conflicts to simulate real-world misinformation scenarios. We evaluate conflict detection methods, including Natural Language Inference (NLI) models, factual consistency (FC) models, and LLMs, on these conflicts (RQ1) and analyze LLMs' conflict resolution behaviors (RQ2). Our key findings include: (1) NLI and LLM models exhibit high precision in detecting answer conflicts, though weaker models suffer from low recall; (2) FC models struggle with lexically similar answer conflicts, while NLI and LLM models handle these better; and (3) stronger models like GPT-4 show robust performance, especially with nuanced conflicts. For conflict resolution, LLMs often favor one piece of conflicting evidence without justification and rely on internal knowledge if they have prior beliefs.

Current transformer language models (LM) are large-scale models with billions of parameters. They have been shown to provide high performances on a variety of tasks but are also prone to shortcut learning and bias. Addressing such incorrect model behavior via parameter adjustments is very costly. This is particularly problematic for updating dynamic concepts, such as moral values, which vary culturally or interpersonally. In this work, we question the current common practice of storing all information in the model parameters and propose the Revision Transformer (RiT) to facilitate easy model updating. The specific combination of a large-scale pre-trained LM that inherently but also diffusely encodes world knowledge with a clear-structured revision engine makes it possible to update the model's knowledge with little effort and the help of user interaction. We exemplify RiT on a moral dataset and simulate user feedback demonstrating strong performance in model revision even with small data. This way, users can easily design a model regarding their preferences, paving the way for more transparent AI models.

The recent success of Large Language Models (LLMs) has catalyzed an increasing interest in their self-correction capabilities. This paper presents a comprehensive investigation into the intrinsic self-correction of LLMs, attempting to address the ongoing debate about its feasibility. Our research has identified an important latent factor - the "confidence" of LLMs - during the self-correction process. Overlooking this factor may cause the models to over-criticize themselves, resulting in unreliable conclusions regarding the efficacy of self-correction. We have experimentally observed that LLMs possess the capability to understand the "confidence" in their own responses. It motivates us to develop an "If-or-Else" (IoE) prompting framework, designed to guide LLMs in assessing their own "confidence", facilitating intrinsic self-corrections. We conduct extensive experiments and demonstrate that our IoE-based Prompt can achieve a consistent improvement regarding the accuracy of self-corrected responses over the initial answers. Our study not only sheds light on the underlying factors affecting self-correction in LLMs, but also introduces a practical framework that utilizes the IoE prompting principle to efficiently improve self-correction capabilities with "confidence". The code is available at https://github.com/MBZUAI-CLeaR/IoE-Prompting.git.

Retrieval-enhanced methods have become a primary approach in fact verification (FV); it requires reasoning over multiple retrieved pieces of evidence to verify the integrity of a claim. To retrieve evidence, existing work often employs off-the-shelf retrieval models whose design is based on the probability ranking principle. We argue that, rather than relevance, for FV we need to focus on the utility that a claim verifier derives from the retrieved evidence. We introduce the feedback-based evidence retriever(FER) that optimizes the evidence retrieval process by incorporating feedback from the claim verifier. As a feedback signal we use the divergence in utility between how effectively the verifier utilizes the retrieved evidence and the ground-truth evidence to produce the final claim label. Empirical studies demonstrate the superiority of FER over prevailing baselines.

Retrieval augmented generation (RAG) is often used to fix hallucinations and provide up-to-date knowledge for large language models (LLMs). However, in cases when the LLM alone incorrectly answers a question, does providing the correct retrieved content always fix the error? Conversely, in cases where the retrieved content is incorrect, does the LLM know to ignore the wrong information, or does it recapitulate the error? To answer these questions, we systematically analyze the tug-of-war between a LLM's internal knowledge (i.e. its prior) and the retrieved information in settings when they disagree. We test GPT-4 and other LLMs on question-answering abilities across datasets with and without reference documents. As expected, providing the correct retrieved information fixes most model mistakes (94% accuracy). However, when the reference document is perturbed with increasing levels of wrong values, the LLM is more likely to recite the incorrect, modified information when its internal prior is weaker but is more resistant when its prior is stronger. Similarly, we also find that the more the modified information deviates from the model's prior, the less likely the model is to prefer it. These results highlight an underlying tension between a model's prior knowledge and the information presented in reference documents.

Modern AI agents increasingly combine conversational interaction with autonomous task execution, such as coding and web research, raising a natural question: what happens when an agent engaged in long-horizon tasks is subjected to user persuasion? We study how belief-level intervention can influence downstream task behavior, a phenomenon we name persuasion propagation. We introduce a behavior-centered evaluation framework that distinguishes between persuasion applied during or prior to task execution. Across web research and coding tasks, we find that on-the-fly persuasion induces weak and inconsistent behavioral effects. In contrast, when the belief state is explicitly specified at task time, belief-prefilled agents conduct on average 26.9\% fewer searches and visit 16.9\% fewer unique sources than neutral-prefilled agents. These results suggest that persuasion, even in prior interaction, can affect the agent's behavior, motivating behavior-level evaluation in agentic systems.

We propose a new dataset for evaluating question answering models with respect to their capacity to reason about beliefs. Our tasks are inspired by theory-of-mind experiments that examine whether children are able to reason about the beliefs of others, in particular when those beliefs differ from reality. We evaluate a number of recent neural models with memory augmentation. We find that all fail on our tasks, which require keeping track of inconsistent states of the world; moreover, the models' accuracy decreases notably when random sentences are introduced to the tasks at test.

Can LLMs accurately adjust their confidence when facing opposition? Building on previous studies measuring calibration on static fact-based question-answering tasks, we evaluate Large Language Models (LLMs) in a dynamic, adversarial debate setting, uniquely combining two realistic factors: (a) a multi-turn format requiring models to update beliefs as new information emerges, and (b) a zero-sum structure to control for task-related uncertainty, since mutual high-confidence claims imply systematic overconfidence. We organized 60 three-round policy debates among ten state-of-the-art LLMs, with models privately rating their confidence (0-100) in winning after each round. We observed five concerning patterns: (1) Systematic overconfidence: models began debates with average initial confidence of 72.9% vs. a rational 50% baseline. (2) Confidence escalation: rather than reducing confidence as debates progressed, debaters increased their win probabilities, averaging 83% by the final round. (3) Mutual overestimation: in 61.7% of debates, both sides simultaneously claimed >=75% probability of victory, a logical impossibility. (4) Persistent self-debate bias: models debating identical copies increased confidence from 64.1% to 75.2%; even when explicitly informed their chance of winning was exactly 50%, confidence still rose (from 50.0% to 57.1%). (5) Misaligned private reasoning: models' private scratchpad thoughts sometimes differed from their public confidence ratings, raising concerns about faithfulness of chain-of-thought reasoning. These results suggest LLMs lack the ability to accurately self-assess or update their beliefs in dynamic, multi-turn tasks; a major concern as LLMs are now increasingly deployed without careful review in assistant and agentic roles. Code for our experiments is available at https://github.com/pradyuprasad/llms_overconfidence

Theory of Mind (ToM) is central to social cognition and human-AI interaction, and Large Language Models (LLMs) have been used to help understand and represent ToM. However, most evaluations treat ToM as a static judgment at a single moment, primarily relying on tests of false beliefs. This overlooks a key dynamic dimension of ToM: the ability to represent, update, and retrieve others' beliefs over time. We investigate dynamic ToM as a temporally extended representational memory problem, asking whether LLMs can track belief trajectories across interactions rather than only inferring current beliefs. We introduce DToM-Track, an evaluation framework to investigate temporal belief reasoning in controlled multiturn conversations, testing the recall of beliefs held prior to an update, the inference of current beliefs, and the detection of belief change. Using LLMs as computational probes, we find a consistent asymmetry: models reliably infer an agent's current belief but struggle to maintain and retrieve prior belief states once updates occur. This pattern persists across LLM model families and scales, and is consistent with recency bias and interference effects well documented in cognitive science. These results suggest that tracking belief trajectories over time poses a distinct challenge beyond classical false-belief reasoning. By framing ToM as a problem of temporal representation and retrieval, this work connects ToM to core cognitive mechanisms of memory and interference and exposes the implications for LLM models of social reasoning in extended human-AI interactions.

The training and deployment of large language models (LLMs) create a feedback loop with human users: models learn human beliefs from data, reinforce these beliefs with generated content, reabsorb the reinforced beliefs, and feed them back to users again and again. This dynamic resembles an echo chamber. We hypothesize that this feedback loop entrenches the existing values and beliefs of users, leading to a loss of diversity and potentially the lock-in of false beliefs. We formalize this hypothesis and test it empirically with agent-based LLM simulations and real-world GPT usage data. Analysis reveals sudden but sustained drops in diversity after the release of new GPT iterations, consistent with the hypothesized human-AI feedback loop. Code and data available at https://thelockinhypothesis.com

While large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated strong performance on complex reasoning tasks such as competitive programming (CP), existing methods predominantly focus on single-attempt settings, overlooking their capacity for iterative refinement. In this paper, we present RefineRL, a novel approach designed to unleash the self-refinement capabilities of LLMs for CP problem solving. RefineRL introduces two key innovations: (1) Skeptical-Agent, an iterative self-refinement agent equipped with local execution tools to validate generated solutions against public test cases of CP problems. This agent always maintains a skeptical attitude towards its own outputs and thereby enforces rigorous self-refinement even when validation suggests correctness. (2) A reinforcement learning (RL) solution to incentivize LLMs to self-refine with only standard RLVR data (i.e., problems paired with their verifiable answers). Extensive experiments on Qwen3-4B and Qwen3-4B-2507 demonstrate that our method yields substantial gains: after our RL training, these compact 4B models integrated with the Skeptical-Agent not only outperform much larger 32B models but also approach the single-attempt performance of 235B models. These findings suggest that self-refinement holds considerable promise for scaling LLM reasoning, with significant potential for further advancement.

The reversal curse -- a language model's (LM) inability to infer an unseen fact ``B is A'' from a learned fact ``A is B'' -- is widely considered a fundamental limitation. We show that this is not an inherent failure but an artifact of how models encode knowledge. By training LMs from scratch on a synthetic dataset of relational knowledge graphs, we demonstrate that bilinear relational structure emerges in their hidden representations. This structure substantially alleviates the reversal curse, enabling LMs to infer unseen reverse facts. Crucially, we also find that this bilinear structure plays a key role in consistent model editing. When a fact is updated in a LM with this structure, the edit correctly propagates to its reverse and other logically dependent facts. In contrast, models lacking this representation not only suffer from the reversal curse but also fail to generalize edits, further introducing logical inconsistencies. Our results establish that training on a relational knowledge dataset induces the emergence of bilinear internal representations, which in turn enable LMs to behave in a logically consistent manner after editing. This implies that the success of model editing depends critically not just on editing algorithms but on the underlying representational geometry of the knowledge being modified.

We introduce Reprompting, an iterative sampling algorithm that searches for the Chain-of-Thought (CoT) recipes for a given task without human intervention. Through Gibbs sampling, we infer CoT recipes that work consistently well for a set of training samples. Our method iteratively samples new recipes using previously sampled solutions as parent prompts to solve other training problems. On five Big-Bench Hard tasks that require multi-step reasoning, Reprompting achieves consistently better performance than the zero-shot, few-shot, and human-written CoT baselines. Reprompting can also facilitate transfer of knowledge from a stronger model to a weaker model leading to substantially improved performance of the weaker model. Overall, Reprompting brings up to +17 point improvements over the previous state-of-the-art method that uses human-written CoT prompts.

We introduce the "Belief State Transformer", a next-token predictor that takes both a prefix and suffix as inputs, with a novel objective of predicting both the next token for the prefix and the previous token for the suffix. The Belief State Transformer effectively learns to solve challenging problems that conventional forward-only transformers struggle with, in a domain-independent fashion. Key to this success is learning a compact belief state that captures all relevant information necessary for accurate predictions. Empirical ablations show that each component of the model is essential in difficult scenarios where standard Transformers fall short. For the task of story writing with known prefixes and suffixes, our approach outperforms the Fill-in-the-Middle method for reaching known goals and demonstrates improved performance even when the goals are unknown. Altogether, the Belief State Transformer enables more efficient goal-conditioned decoding, better test-time inference, and high-quality text representations on small scale problems. Website: https://sites.google.com/view/belief-state-transformer

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting methods have enabled large language models (LLMs) to generate reasoning paths and solve math word problems (MWPs). However, they are sensitive to mistakes in the paths, as any mistake can result in an incorrect answer. We propose a novel method named Progressive Rectification Prompting (PRP) to improve average accuracy on eight MWP datasets from 77.3 to 90.5. Given an initial answer from CoT, PRP iterates a verify-then-rectify process to progressively identify incorrect answers and rectify the reasoning paths. With the most likely correct answer, the LLM predicts a masked numerical value in the question; if the prediction does not match the masked value, the answer is likely incorrect. Then the LLM is prompted to re-generate the reasoning path hinted with a set of incorrect answers to prevent itself from repeating previous mistakes. PRP achieves the best performance compared against the CoT methods. Our implementation is made publicly available at https://wzy6642.github.io/prp.github.io/.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) perform strongly in complex reasoning tasks via Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting, but often suffer from verbose outputs caused by redundant content, increasing computational overhead, and degrading user experience. Existing compression methods either operate post-hoc pruning, risking disruption to reasoning coherence, or rely on sampling-based selection, which fails to intervene effectively during generation. In this work, we introduce a confidence-guided perspective to explain the emergence of redundant reflection in LRMs, identifying two key patterns: Confidence Deficit, where the model reconsiders correct steps due to low internal confidence, and Termination Delay, where reasoning continues even after reaching a confident answer. Based on this analysis, we propose ConCISE (Confidence-guided Compression In Step-by-step Efficient Reasoning), a framework that simplifies reasoning chains by reinforcing the model's confidence during inference, thus preventing the generation of redundant reflection steps. It integrates Confidence Injection to stabilize intermediate steps and Early Stopping to terminate reasoning when confidence is sufficient. Extensive experiments demonstrate that fine-tuning LRMs on ConCISE-generated data yields significantly shorter outputs, reducing length by up to approximately 50% under SimPO, while maintaining high task accuracy. ConCISE consistently outperforms existing baselines across multiple reasoning benchmarks.

Hallucinations (i.e., generating plausible but inaccurate content) and laziness (i.e. excessive refusals or defaulting to "I don't know") persist as major challenges in LLM reasoning. Current efforts to reduce hallucinations primarily focus on factual errors in knowledge-grounded tasks, often neglecting hallucinations related to faulty reasoning. Meanwhile, some approaches render LLMs overly conservative, limiting their problem-solving capabilities. To mitigate hallucination and laziness in reasoning tasks, we propose Automatic Curriculum Expert Iteration (Auto-CEI) to enhance LLM reasoning and align responses to the model's capabilities--assertively answering within its limits and declining when tasks exceed them. In our method, Expert Iteration explores the reasoning trajectories near the LLM policy, guiding incorrect paths back on track to reduce compounding errors and improve robustness; it also promotes appropriate "I don't know" responses after sufficient reasoning attempts. The curriculum automatically adjusts rewards, incentivizing extended reasoning before acknowledging incapability, thereby pushing the limits of LLM reasoning and aligning its behaviour with these limits. We compare Auto-CEI with various SOTA baselines across logical reasoning, mathematics, and planning tasks, where Auto-CEI achieves superior alignment by effectively balancing assertiveness and conservativeness.

Large language models (LLMs) achieve strong performance by generating long chains of thought, but longer traces always introduce redundant or ineffective reasoning steps. One typical behavior is that they often perform unnecessary verification and revisions even if they have reached the correct answers. This limitation stems from the unstructured nature of reasoning trajectories and the lack of targeted supervision for critical reasoning abilities. To address this, we propose Structured Reasoning (SCR), a framework that decouples reasoning trajectories into explicit, evaluable, and trainable components. We mainly implement SCR using a Generate-Verify-Revise paradigm. Specifically, we construct structured training data and apply Dynamic Termination Supervision to guide the model in deciding when to terminate reasoning. To avoid interference between learning signals for different reasoning abilities, we adopt a progressive two-stage reinforcement learning strategy: the first stage targets initial generation and self-verification, and the second stage focuses on revision. Extensive experiments on three backbone models show that SCR substantially improves reasoning efficiency and self-verification. Besides, compared with existing reasoning paradigms, it reduces output token length by up to 50%.

We explore how iterative revising a chain of thoughts with the help of information retrieval significantly improves large language models' reasoning and generation ability in long-horizon generation tasks, while hugely mitigating hallucination. In particular, the proposed method -- *retrieval-augmented thoughts* (RAT) -- revises each thought step one by one with retrieved information relevant to the task query, the current and the past thought steps, after the initial zero-shot CoT is generated. Applying RAT to GPT-3.5, GPT-4, and CodeLLaMA-7b substantially improves their performances on various long-horizon generation tasks; on average of relatively increasing rating scores by 13.63% on code generation, 16.96% on mathematical reasoning, 19.2% on creative writing, and 42.78% on embodied task planning. The demo page can be found at https://craftjarvis.github.io/RAT

We present BIS Reasoning 1.0, the first large-scale Japanese dataset of syllogistic reasoning problems explicitly designed to evaluate belief-inconsistent reasoning in large language models (LLMs). Unlike prior datasets such as NeuBAROCO and JFLD, which focus on general or belief-aligned reasoning, BIS Reasoning 1.0 introduces logically valid yet belief-inconsistent syllogisms to uncover reasoning biases in LLMs trained on human-aligned corpora. We benchmark state-of-the-art models - including GPT models, Claude models, and leading Japanese LLMs - revealing significant variance in performance, with GPT-4o achieving 79.54% accuracy. Our analysis identifies critical weaknesses in current LLMs when handling logically valid but belief-conflicting inputs. These findings have important implications for deploying LLMs in high-stakes domains such as law, healthcare, and scientific literature, where truth must override intuitive belief to ensure integrity and safety.

Optimizing the phrasing of argumentative text is crucial in higher education and professional development. However, assessing whether and how the different claims in a text should be revised is a hard task, especially for novice writers. In this work, we explore the main challenges to identifying argumentative claims in need of specific revisions. By learning from collaborative editing behaviors in online debates, we seek to capture implicit revision patterns in order to develop approaches aimed at guiding writers in how to further improve their arguments. We systematically compare the ability of common word embedding models to capture the differences between different versions of the same text, and we analyze their impact on various types of writing issues. To deal with the noisy nature of revision-based corpora, we propose a new sampling strategy based on revision distance. Opposed to approaches from prior work, such sampling can be done without employing additional annotations and judgments. Moreover, we provide evidence that using contextual information and domain knowledge can further improve prediction results. How useful a certain type of context is, depends on the issue the claim is suffering from, though.

Large language models (LLMs) exhibit varying levels of confidence across input prompts (questions): some lead to consistent, semantically similar answers, while others yield diverse or contradictory outputs. This variation reflects LLM's uncertainty about the input prompt, a signal of how confidently the model understands a given problem. However, vanilla Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) treats all prompts equally during policy updates, ignoring this important information about the model's knowledge boundaries. To address this limitation, we propose SEED-GRPO (Semantic Entropy EnhanceD GRPO), which explicitly measures LLMs' uncertainty of the input prompts semantic entropy. Semantic entropy measures the diversity of meaning in multiple generated answers given a prompt and uses this to modulate the magnitude of policy updates. This uncertainty-aware training mechanism enables dynamic adjustment of policy update magnitudes based on question uncertainty. It allows more conservative updates on high-uncertainty questions while maintaining the original learning signal on confident ones. Experimental results on five mathematical reasoning benchmarks (AIME24 56.7, AMC 68.7, MATH 83.4, Minerva 34.2, and OlympiadBench 48.0) demonstrate that SEED-GRPO achieves new state-of-the-art performance in average accuracy, validating the effectiveness of uncertainty-aware policy optimization.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are fluent but prone to hallucinations, producing answers that appear plausible yet are unsupported by available evidence. This failure is especially problematic in high-stakes domains where decisions must be justified by verifiable information. We introduce EvidenceRL, a reinforcement learning framework that enforces evidence adherence during training. EvidenceRL scores candidate responses for grounding (entailment with retrieved evidence and context) and correctness (agreement with reference answers) and optimizes the generator using Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO). We evaluate across two high-stakes domains, cardiac diagnosis and legal reasoning, where EvidenceRL consistently improves evidence grounding and faithfulness without sacrificing task accuracy. On cardiac diagnosis, F1@3 increases from 37.0 to 54.5 on Llama-3.2-3B while grounding (G_{max}@3) rises from 47.6 to 78.2; hallucinations drop nearly 5times and evidence-supported diagnoses increase from 31.8\% to 61.6\%. On legal reasoning, EvidenceRL raises Faithfulness from 32.8\% to 67.6\% on Llama-3.1-8B, demonstrating consistent behavioral change across domains. Our code is open-sourced at https://github.com/Wizaaard/EvidenceRL.git.

Recent Large Language Models (LLMs) have reported high accuracy on reasoning benchmarks. However, it is still unclear whether the observed results arise from true reasoning or from statistical recall of the training set. Inspired by the ladder of causation (Pearl, 2009) and its three levels (associations, interventions and counterfactuals), this paper introduces RE-IMAGINE, a framework to characterize a hierarchy of reasoning ability in LLMs, alongside an automated pipeline to generate problem variations at different levels of the hierarchy. By altering problems in an intermediate symbolic representation, RE-IMAGINE generates arbitrarily many problems that are not solvable using memorization alone. Moreover, the framework is general and can work across reasoning domains, including math, code, and logic. We demonstrate our framework on four widely-used benchmarks to evaluate several families of LLMs, and observe reductions in performance when the models are queried with problem variations. These assessments indicate a degree of reliance on statistical recall for past performance, and open the door to further research targeting skills across the reasoning hierarchy.

As large language models (LLMs) have become the norm in NLP, demonstrating good performance in generation and reasoning tasks, one of its most fatal disadvantages is the lack of factual correctness. Generating unfactual texts not only leads to lower performances but also degrades the trust and validity of their applications. Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting improves trust and model performance on complex reasoning tasks by generating interpretable reasoning chains, but still suffers from factuality concerns in knowledge-intensive tasks. In this paper, we propose the Verify-and-Edit framework for CoT prompting, which seeks to increase prediction factuality by post-editing reasoning chains according to external knowledge. Building on top of GPT-3, our framework lead to accuracy improvements in multiple open-domain question-answering tasks.

Partially Observable Markov Decision Processes (POMDPs) are used to model environments where the full state cannot be perceived by an agent. As such the agent needs to reason taking into account the past observations and actions. However, simply remembering the full history is generally intractable due to the exponential growth in the history space. Maintaining a probability distribution that models the belief over what the true state is can be used as a sufficient statistic of the history, but its computation requires access to the model of the environment and is often intractable. While SOTA algorithms use Recurrent Neural Networks to compress the observation-action history aiming to learn a sufficient statistic, they lack guarantees of success and can lead to sub-optimal policies. To overcome this, we propose the Wasserstein Belief Updater, an RL algorithm that learns a latent model of the POMDP and an approximation of the belief update. Our approach comes with theoretical guarantees on the quality of our approximation ensuring that our outputted beliefs allow for learning the optimal value function.

Multi-agent debate (MAD) is widely used to improve large language model (LLM) performance through test-time scaling, yet recent work shows that vanilla MAD often underperforms simple majority vote despite higher computational cost. Studies show that, under homogeneous agents and uniform belief updates, debate preserves expected correctness and therefore cannot reliably improve outcomes. Drawing on findings from human deliberation and collective decision-making, we identify two key mechanisms missing from vanilla MAD: (i) diversity of initial viewpoints and (ii) explicit, calibrated confidence communication. We propose two lightweight interventions. First, a diversity-aware initialisation that selects a more diverse pool of candidate answers, increasing the likelihood that a correct hypothesis is present at the start of debate. Second, a confidence-modulated debate protocol in which agents express calibrated confidence and condition their updates on others' confidence. We show theoretically that diversity-aware initialisation improves the prior probability of MAD success without changing the underlying update dynamics, while confidence-modulated updates enable debate to systematically drift to the correct hypothesis. Empirically, across six reasoning-oriented QA benchmarks, our methods consistently outperform vanilla MAD and majority vote. Our results connect human deliberation with LLM-based debate and demonstrate that simple, principled modifications can substantially enhance debate effectiveness.

When a language model agrees with a user's false belief, is it failing to detect the error, or noticing and agreeing anyway? We show the latter. Across twelve open-weight models from five labs, spanning small to frontier scale, the same small set of attention heads carries a "this statement is wrong" signal whether the model is evaluating a claim on its own or being pressured to agree with a user. Silencing these heads flips sycophantic behavior sharply while leaving factual accuracy intact, so the circuit controls deference rather than knowledge. Edge-level path patching confirms that the same head-to-head connections drive sycophancy, factual lying, and instructed lying. Opinion-agreement, where no factual ground truth exists, reuses these head positions but writes into an orthogonal direction, ruling out a simple "truth-direction" reading of the substrate. Alignment training leaves this circuit in place: an RLHF refresh cuts sycophantic behavior roughly tenfold while the shared heads persist or grow, a pattern that replicates on an independent model family and under targeted anti-sycophancy DPO. When these models sycophant, they register that the user is wrong and agree anyway.

Do larger and more capable language models learn to update their "beliefs" about propositions more consistently with Bayes' theorem when presented with evidence in-context? To test this, we formulate a Bayesian Coherence Coefficient (BCC) metric and generate a dataset with which to measure the BCC. We measure BCC for multiple pre-trained-only language models across five model families, comparing against the number of model parameters, the amount of training data, and model scores on common benchmarks. Our results provide evidence for our hypothesis that larger and more capable pre-trained language models assign credences that are more coherent with Bayes' theorem. These results have important implications for our understanding and governance of LLMs.

Large language Models (LLMs) have achieved promising performance on arithmetic reasoning tasks by incorporating step-by-step chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting. However, LLMs face challenges in maintaining factual consistency during reasoning, exhibiting tendencies to condition overlooking, question misinterpretation, and condition hallucination over given problems. Existing methods use coarse-grained feedback (e.g., whether the answer is correct) to improve factual consistency. In this work, we propose RCoT (Reversing Chain-of-Thought), a novel method to improve LLMs' reasoning abilities by automatically detecting and rectifying factual inconsistency in LLMs' generated solutions. To detect factual inconsistency, RCoT first asks LLMs to reconstruct the problem based on generated solutions. Then fine-grained comparisons between the original problem and the reconstructed problem expose the factual inconsistency in the original solutions. To rectify the solution, RCoT formulates detected factual inconsistency into fine-grained feedback to guide LLMs in revising solutions. Experimental results demonstrate consistent improvements of RCoT over standard CoT across seven arithmetic datasets. Moreover, we find that manually written fine-grained feedback can dramatically improve LLMs' reasoning abilities (e.g., ChatGPT reaches 94.6% accuracy on GSM8K), encouraging the community to further explore the fine-grained feedback generation methods.

Improving the reasoning abilities of large language models (LLMs) has largely relied on iterative self-training with model-generated data. While effective at boosting accuracy, existing approaches primarily reinforce successful reasoning paths, incurring a substantial calibration cost: models become overconfident and lose the ability to represent uncertainty. This failure has been characterized as a form of model collapse in alignment, where predictive distributions degenerate toward low-variance point estimates. We address this issue by reframing reasoning training as an epistemic learning problem, in which models must learn not only how to reason, but also when their reasoning should be trusted. We propose epistemically-calibrated reasoning (EpiCaR) as a training objective that jointly optimizes reasoning performance and calibration, and instantiate it within an iterative supervised fine-tuning framework using explicit self-evaluation signals. Experiments on Llama-3 and Qwen-3 families demonstrate that our approach achieves Pareto-superiority over standard baselines in both accuracy and calibration, particularly in models with sufficient reasoning capacity (e.g., 3B+). This framework generalizes effectively to OOD mathematical reasoning (GSM8K) and code generation (MBPP). Ultimately, our approach enables a 3X reduction in inference compute, matching the K=30 performance of STaR with only K=10 samples in capable models.

Procedural planning, which entails decomposing a high-level goal into a sequence of temporally ordered steps, is an important yet intricate task for machines. It involves integrating common-sense knowledge to reason about complex contextualized situations that are often counterfactual, e.g. "scheduling a doctor's appointment without a phone". While current approaches show encouraging results using large language models (LLMs), they are hindered by drawbacks such as costly API calls and reproducibility issues. In this paper, we advocate planning using smaller language models. We present PlaSma, a novel two-pronged approach to endow small language models with procedural knowledge and (counterfactual) planning capabilities. More concretely, we develop symbolic procedural knowledge distillation to enhance the implicit knowledge in small language models and an inference-time algorithm to facilitate more structured and accurate reasoning. In addition, we introduce a novel task, Counterfactual Planning, that requires a revision of a plan to cope with a counterfactual situation. In both the original and counterfactual setting, we show that orders-of-magnitude smaller models (770M-11B parameters) can compete and often surpass their larger teacher models' capabilities.

Reverse thinking plays a crucial role in human reasoning. Humans can reason not only from a problem to a solution but also in reverse, i.e., start from the solution and reason towards the problem. This often enhances overall reasoning performance as it enables consistency checks between their forward and backward thinking. To enable Large Language Models (LLMs) to perform reverse thinking, we introduce Reverse-Enhanced Thinking (RevThink), a framework composed of data augmentation and learning objectives. In RevThink, we augment the dataset by collecting structured forward-backward reasoning from a teacher model, consisting of: (1) the original question, (2) forward reasoning, (3) backward question, and (4) backward reasoning. We then employ three objectives to train a smaller student model in a multi-task learning fashion: (a) generate forward reasoning from a question, (b) generate a backward question from a question, and (c) generate backward reasoning from the backward question. Experiments across 12 datasets covering commonsense, math, and logical reasoning show an average 13.53% improvement over the student model's zero-shot performance and a 6.84% improvement over the strongest knowledge distillation baselines. Moreover, our method demonstrates sample efficiency -- using only 10% of the correct forward reasoning from the training data, it outperforms a standard fine-tuning method trained on 10x more forward reasoning. RevThink also exhibits strong generalization to out-of-distribution held-out datasets.

LLMs are increasingly deployed in high-stakes domains such as medical triage and legal assistance, often as document-grounded QA systems in which a user provides a description, relevant sources are retrieved, and an LLM generates a prediction. In practice, initial user queries are often underspecified, and a single retrieval pass is insufficient for reliable decision-making, leading to incorrect and overly confident answers. While follow-up questioning can elicit missing information, existing methods typically depend on implicit, unstructured confidence signals from the LLM, making it difficult to determine what remains unknown, what information matters most, and when to stop asking questions. We propose InfoGatherer, a framework that gathers missing information from two complementary sources: retrieved domain documents and targeted follow-up questions to the user. InfoGatherer models uncertainty using Dempster-Shafer belief assignments over a structured evidential network, enabling principled fusion of incomplete and potentially contradictory evidence from both sources without prematurely collapsing to a definitive answer. Across legal and medical tasks, InfoGatherer outperforms strong baselines while requiring fewer turns. By grounding uncertainty in formal evidential theory rather than heuristic LLM signals, InfoGatherer moves towards trustworthy, interpretable decision support in domains where reliability is critical.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) Prompting is a dominant paradigm in Large Language Models (LLMs) to enhance complex reasoning. It guides LLMs to present multi-step reasoning, rather than generating the final answer directly. However, CoT encounters difficulties when key information required for reasoning is implicit or missing. This occurs because CoT emphasizes the sequence of reasoning steps while overlooking the early extraction of essential information. We propose a pre-prompting method called Iterative Summarization Pre-Prompting (ISP^2) to refine LLM reasoning when key information is not explicitly provided. First, entities and their corresponding descriptions are extracted to form potential key information pairs. Next, we use a reliability rating to assess these pairs, then merge the two lowest-ranked pairs into a new entity description. This process is repeated until a unique key information pair is obtained. Finally, that pair, along with the original question, is fed into LLMs to produce the answer. Extensive experiments demonstrate a 7.1% improvement compared to existing methods. Unlike traditional prompting, ISP^2 adopts an inductive approach with pre-prompting, offering flexible integration into diverse reasoning frameworks. The code is available at https://github.com/zdhgreat/ISP-2.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) have recently demonstrated impressive capabilities in complex reasoning tasks by leveraging increased test-time computation and exhibiting behaviors reminiscent of human-like self-reflection. While LRMs show a clear capacity for valuable self-reflection, how this ability interacts with other model behaviors remains underexplored. We investigate this connection by analyzing verbalized confidence, how models articulate their certainty, as a lens into the nature of self-reflection in LRMs. We find that supervised fine-tuning on reasoning traces (i.e., distillation) and reinforcement learning can improve verbalized calibration in reasoning-intensive settings in a progressive, laddered fashion. However, our results also indicate that reasoning models may possess a diminished awareness of their own knowledge boundaries, as evidenced by significantly lower "I don't know" response rates on factuality benchmarks. Moreover, we examine the relationship between verbalized confidence and reasoning chains, finding that models tend to express higher confidence when providing shorter or less elaborate reasoning. Our findings highlight how reasoning-oriented training can enhance performance in reasoning-centric tasks while potentially incurring a "reasoning tax," a cost reflected in the model's reduced ability to accurately recognize the limits of its own knowledge in small-scale models. More broadly, our work showcases how this erosion of knowledge boundaries can compromise model faithfulness, as models grow more confident without a commensurate understanding of when they should abstain.

Large Language Models (LLMs) still struggle with complex reasoning tasks. Motivated by the society of minds (Minsky, 1988), we propose ReConcile, a multi-model multi-agent framework designed as a round table conference among diverse LLM agents to foster diverse thoughts and discussion for improved consensus. ReConcile enhances the reasoning capabilities of LLMs by holding multiple rounds of discussion, learning to convince other agents to improve their answers, and employing a confidence-weighted voting mechanism. In each round, ReConcile initiates discussion between agents via a 'discussion prompt' that consists of (a) grouped answers and explanations generated by each agent in the previous round, (b) their uncertainties, and (c) demonstrations of answer-rectifying human explanations, used for convincing other agents. This discussion prompt enables each agent to revise their responses in light of insights from other agents. Once a consensus is reached and the discussion ends, ReConcile determines the final answer by leveraging the confidence of each agent in a weighted voting scheme. We implement ReConcile with ChatGPT, Bard, and Claude2 as the three agents. Our experimental results on various benchmarks demonstrate that ReConcile significantly enhances the reasoning performance of the agents (both individually and as a team), surpassing prior single-agent and multi-agent baselines by 7.7% and also outperforming GPT-4 on some of these datasets. We also experiment with GPT-4 itself as one of the agents in ReConcile and demonstrate that its initial performance also improves by absolute 10.0% through discussion and feedback from other agents. Finally, we also analyze the accuracy after every round and observe that ReConcile achieves better and faster consensus between agents, compared to a multi-agent debate baseline. Our code is available at: https://github.com/dinobby/ReConcile

Large Language Models (LLMs) often generate erroneous outputs, known as hallucinations, due to their limitations in discerning questions beyond their knowledge scope. While addressing hallucination has been a focal point in research, previous efforts primarily concentrate on enhancing correctness without giving due consideration to the significance of rejection mechanisms. In this paper, we conduct a comprehensive examination of the role of rejection, introducing the notion of model reliability along with corresponding metrics. These metrics measure the model's ability to provide accurate responses while adeptly rejecting questions exceeding its knowledge boundaries, thereby minimizing hallucinations. To improve the inherent reliability of LLMs, we present a novel alignment framework called Reinforcement Learning from Knowledge Feedback (RLKF). RLKF leverages knowledge feedback to dynamically determine the model's knowledge boundary and trains a reliable reward model to encourage the refusal of out-of-knowledge questions. Experimental results on mathematical questions affirm the substantial efficacy of RLKF in significantly enhancing LLM reliability.

One of the key challenges in deploying RL to real-world applications is to adapt to variations of unknown environment contexts, such as changing terrains in robotic tasks and fluctuated bandwidth in congestion control. Existing works on adaptation to unknown environment contexts either assume the contexts are the same for the whole episode or assume the context variables are Markovian. However, in many real-world applications, the environment context usually stays stable for a stochastic period and then changes in an abrupt and unpredictable manner within an episode, resulting in a segment structure, which existing works fail to address. To leverage the segment structure of piecewise stable context in real-world applications, in this paper, we propose a \textbf{Segmented Context Belief Augmented Deep~(SeCBAD)} RL method. Our method can jointly infer the belief distribution over latent context with the posterior over segment length and perform more accurate belief context inference with observed data within the current context segment. The inferred belief context can be leveraged to augment the state, leading to a policy that can adapt to abrupt variations in context. We demonstrate empirically that SeCBAD can infer context segment length accurately and outperform existing methods on a toy grid world environment and Mujuco tasks with piecewise-stable context.

Recently, with the chain of thought (CoT) prompting, large language models (LLMs), e.g., GPT-3, have shown strong reasoning ability in several natural language processing tasks such as arithmetic, commonsense, and logical reasoning. However, LLMs with CoT require multi-step prompting and multi-token prediction, which is highly sensitive to individual mistakes and vulnerable to error accumulation. The above issues make the LLMs need the ability to verify the answers. In fact, after inferring conclusions in some thinking decision tasks, people often check them by re-verifying steps to avoid some mistakes. In this paper, we propose and prove that LLMs also have similar self-verification abilities. We take the conclusion obtained by CoT as one of the conditions for solving the original problem. By taking turns masking the original conditions and predicting their results, we calculate an explainable answer verification score based on whether the re-predicted conditions are correct. Experimental results demonstrate that the proposed method can improve the reasoning performance on various arithmetic, commonsense, and logical reasoning datasets. Our code is publicly available at: https://github.com/WENGSYX/Self-Verification.

We consider the problem of automatically generating longer stories of over two thousand words. Compared to prior work on shorter stories, long-range plot coherence and relevance are more central challenges here. We propose the Recursive Reprompting and Revision framework (Re3) to address these challenges by (a) prompting a general-purpose language model to construct a structured overarching plan, and (b) generating story passages by repeatedly injecting contextual information from both the plan and current story state into a language model prompt. We then revise by (c) reranking different continuations for plot coherence and premise relevance, and finally (d) editing the best continuation for factual consistency. Compared to similar-length stories generated directly from the same base model, human evaluators judged substantially more of Re3's stories as having a coherent overarching plot (by 14% absolute increase), and relevant to the given initial premise (by 20%).

Large language models (LLMs) often generate inaccurate or fabricated information and generally fail to indicate their confidence, which limits their broader applications. Previous work elicits confidence from LLMs by direct or self-consistency prompting, or constructing specific datasets for supervised finetuning. The prompting-based approaches have inferior performance, and the training-based approaches are limited to binary or inaccurate group-level confidence estimates. In this work, we present the advanced SaySelf, a training framework that teaches LLMs to express more accurate fine-grained confidence estimates. In addition, beyond the confidence scores, SaySelf initiates the process of directing LLMs to produce self-reflective rationales that clearly identify gaps in their parametric knowledge and explain their uncertainty. This is achieved by using an LLM to automatically summarize the uncertainties in specific knowledge via natural language. The summarization is based on the analysis of the inconsistency in multiple sampled reasoning chains, and the resulting data is utilized for supervised fine-tuning. Moreover, we utilize reinforcement learning with a meticulously crafted reward function to calibrate the confidence estimates, motivating LLMs to deliver accurate, high-confidence predictions and to penalize overconfidence in erroneous outputs. Experimental results in both in-distribution and out-of-distribution datasets demonstrate the effectiveness of SaySelf in reducing the confidence calibration error and maintaining the task performance. We show that the generated self-reflective rationales are reasonable and can further contribute to the calibration. The code is made public at https://github.com/xu1868/SaySelf.

Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) is the standard paradigm for domain adaptation, yet it frequently incurs the cost of catastrophic forgetting. In sharp contrast, on-policy Reinforcement Learning (RL) effectively preserves general capabilities. We investigate this discrepancy and identify a fundamental distributional gap: while RL aligns with the model's internal belief, SFT forces the model to fit external supervision. This mismatch often manifests as "Confident Conflicts" tokens characterized by low probability but low entropy. In these instances, the model is highly confident in its own prediction but is forced to learn a divergent ground truth, triggering destructive gradient updates. To address this, we propose Entropy-Adaptive Fine-Tuning (EAFT). Unlike methods relying solely on prediction probability, EAFT utilizes token-level entropy as a gating mechanism to distinguish between epistemic uncertainty and knowledge conflict. This allows the model to learn from uncertain samples while suppressing gradients on conflicting data. Extensive experiments on Qwen and GLM series (ranging from 4B to 32B parameters) across mathematical, medical, and agentic domains confirm our hypothesis. EAFT consistently matches the downstream performance of standard SFT while significantly mitigating the degradation of general capabilities.

Safety reasoning is a recent paradigm where LLMs reason over safety policies before generating responses, thereby mitigating limitations in existing safety measures such as over-refusal and jailbreak vulnerabilities. However, implementing this paradigm is challenging due to the resource-intensive process of creating high-quality policy-embedded chain-of-thought (CoT) datasets while ensuring reasoning remains accurate and free from hallucinations or policy conflicts. To tackle this, we propose AIDSAFE: Agentic Iterative Deliberation for Safety Reasoning, a novel data generation recipe that leverages multi-agent deliberation to iteratively expand reasoning on safety policies. A data refiner stage in AIDSAFE ensures high-quality outputs by eliminating repetitive, redundant, and deceptive thoughts. AIDSAFE-generated CoTs provide a strong foundation for supervised fine-tuning (SFT)-based safety training. Additionally, to address the need of preference data in alignment stages, such as DPO training, we introduce a supplemental recipe that uses belief augmentation to create distinct selected and rejected CoT samples. Our evaluations demonstrate that AIDSAFE-generated CoTs achieve superior policy adherence and reasoning quality. Consequently, we show that fine-tuning open-source LLMs on these CoTs can significantly improve safety generalization and jailbreak robustness while maintaining acceptable utility and over-refusal accuracy. AIDSAFE-generated CoT datasets can be found here: https://huggingface.co/datasets/AmazonScience/AIDSAFE

Bayesian persuasion studies how an informed sender should influence beliefs of rational receivers who take decisions through Bayesian updating of a common prior. We focus on the online Bayesian persuasion framework, in which the sender repeatedly faces one or more receivers with unknown and adversarially selected types. First, we show how to obtain a tight tilde O(T^{1/2}) regret bound in the case in which the sender faces a single receiver and has partial feedback, improving over the best previously known bound of tilde O(T^{4/5}). Then, we provide the first no-regret guarantees for the multi-receiver setting under partial feedback. Finally, we show how to design no-regret algorithms with polynomial per-iteration running time by exploiting type reporting, thereby circumventing known intractability results on online Bayesian persuasion. We provide efficient algorithms guaranteeing a O(T^{1/2}) regret upper bound both in the single- and multi-receiver scenario when type reporting is allowed.

Reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR) is a promising approach for training language models (LMs) on reasoning tasks that elicit emergent long chains of thought (CoTs). Unlike supervised learning, it updates the model using both correct and incorrect samples via policy gradients. To better understand its mechanism, we decompose the learning signal into reinforcing correct responses and penalizing incorrect ones, referred to as Positive and Negative Sample Reinforcement (PSR and NSR), respectively. We train Qwen2.5-Math-7B and Qwen3-4B on a mathematical reasoning dataset and uncover a surprising result: training with only negative samples -- without reinforcing correct responses -- can be highly effective: it consistently improves performance over the base model across the entire Pass@k spectrum (k up to 256), often matching or surpassing PPO and GRPO. In contrast, reinforcing only correct responses improves Pass@1 but degrades performance at higher k, due to reduced diversity. These inference-scaling trends highlight that solely penalizing incorrect responses may contribute more to performance than previously recognized. Through gradient analysis, we show that NSR works by suppressing incorrect generations and redistributing probability mass toward other plausible candidates, guided by the model's prior beliefs. It refines the model's existing knowledge rather than introducing entirely new behaviors. Building on this insight, we propose a simple variant of the RL objective that upweights NSR, and show that it consistently improves overall Pass@k performance on MATH, AIME 2025, and AMC23. Our code is available at https://github.com/TianHongZXY/RLVR-Decomposed.

We introduce and study the problem of detecting whether an agent is updating their prior beliefs given new evidence in an optimal way that is Bayesian, or whether they are biased towards their own prior. In our model, biased agents form posterior beliefs that are a convex combination of their prior and the Bayesian posterior, where the more biased an agent is, the closer their posterior is to the prior. Since we often cannot observe the agent's beliefs directly, we take an approach inspired by information design. Specifically, we measure an agent's bias by designing a signaling scheme and observing the actions they take in response to different signals, assuming that they are maximizing their own expected utility; our goal is to detect bias with a minimum number of signals. Our main results include a characterization of scenarios where a single signal suffices and a computationally efficient algorithm to compute optimal signaling schemes.

Retrieval-augmented generation has gained significant attention due to its ability to integrate relevant external knowledge, enhancing the accuracy and reliability of the LLMs' responses. Most of the existing methods apply a dynamic multiple retrieval-generating process, to address multi-hop complex questions by decomposing them into sub-problems. However, these methods rely on an unidirectional forward reasoning paradigm, where errors from insufficient reasoning steps or inherent flaws in current retrieval systems are irreversible, potentially derailing the entire reasoning chain. For the first time, this work introduces Retroactive Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RetroRAG), a novel framework to build a retroactive reasoning paradigm. RetroRAG revises and updates the evidence, redirecting the reasoning chain to the correct direction. RetroRAG constructs an evidence-collation-discovery framework to search, generate, and refine credible evidence. It synthesizes inferential evidence related to the key entities in the question from the existing source knowledge and formulates search queries to uncover additional information. As new evidence is found, RetroRAG continually updates and organizes this information, enhancing its ability to locate further necessary evidence. Paired with an Answerer to generate and evaluate outputs, RetroRAG is capable of refining its reasoning process iteratively until a reliable answer is obtained. Empirical evaluations show that RetroRAG significantly outperforms existing methods.

We explore whether Large Language Models (LLMs) are capable of logical reasoning with distorted facts, which we call Deduction under Perturbed Evidence (DUPE). DUPE presents a unique challenge to LLMs since they typically rely on their parameters, which encode mostly accurate information, to reason and make inferences. However, in DUPE, LLMs must reason over manipulated or falsified evidence present in their prompts, which can result in false conclusions that are valid only under the manipulated evidence. Our goal with DUPE is to determine whether LLMs can arrive at these false conclusions and identify whether the dominant factor influencing the deduction process is the encoded data in the parameters or the manipulated evidence in the prompts. To evaluate the DUPE capabilities of LLMs, we create a DUPEd version of the StrategyQA dataset, where facts are manipulated to reverse the answer to the question. Our findings show that even the most advanced GPT models struggle to reason on manipulated facts - showcasing poor DUPE skills - with accuracy dropping by 45% compared to the original dataset. We also investigate prompt settings inspired from student simulation models, which mitigate the accuracy drop to some extent. Our findings have practical implications for understanding the performance of LLMs in real-world applications such as student simulation models that involve reasoning over inaccurate information.

We show that a GPT-3 model can learn to express uncertainty about its own answers in natural language -- without use of model logits. When given a question, the model generates both an answer and a level of confidence (e.g. "90% confidence" or "high confidence"). These levels map to probabilities that are well calibrated. The model also remains moderately calibrated under distribution shift, and is sensitive to uncertainty in its own answers, rather than imitating human examples. To our knowledge, this is the first time a model has been shown to express calibrated uncertainty about its own answers in natural language. For testing calibration, we introduce the CalibratedMath suite of tasks. We compare the calibration of uncertainty expressed in words ("verbalized probability") to uncertainty extracted from model logits. Both kinds of uncertainty are capable of generalizing calibration under distribution shift. We also provide evidence that GPT-3's ability to generalize calibration depends on pre-trained latent representations that correlate with epistemic uncertainty over its answers.

We explore uncertainty quantification in large language models (LLMs), with the goal to identify when uncertainty in responses given a query is large. We simultaneously consider both epistemic and aleatoric uncertainties, where the former comes from the lack of knowledge about the ground truth (such as about facts or the language), and the latter comes from irreducible randomness (such as multiple possible answers). In particular, we derive an information-theoretic metric that allows to reliably detect when only epistemic uncertainty is large, in which case the output of the model is unreliable. This condition can be computed based solely on the output of the model obtained simply by some special iterative prompting based on the previous responses. Such quantification, for instance, allows to detect hallucinations (cases when epistemic uncertainty is high) in both single- and multi-answer responses. This is in contrast to many standard uncertainty quantification strategies (such as thresholding the log-likelihood of a response) where hallucinations in the multi-answer case cannot be detected. We conduct a series of experiments which demonstrate the advantage of our formulation. Further, our investigations shed some light on how the probabilities assigned to a given output by an LLM can be amplified by iterative prompting, which might be of independent interest.

Recent benchmarks have probed factual consistency and rhetorical robustness in Large Language Models (LLMs). However, a knowledge gap exists regarding how directional framing of factually true statements influences model agreement, a common scenario for LLM users. AssertBench addresses this by sampling evidence-supported facts from FEVEROUS, a fact verification dataset. For each (evidence-backed) fact, we construct two framing prompts: one where the user claims the statement is factually correct, and another where the user claims it is incorrect. We then record the model's agreement and reasoning. The desired outcome is that the model asserts itself, maintaining consistent truth evaluation across both framings, rather than switching its evaluation to agree with the user. AssertBench isolates framing-induced variability from the model's underlying factual knowledge by stratifying results based on the model's accuracy on the same claims when presented neutrally. In doing so, this benchmark aims to measure an LLM's ability to "stick to its guns" when presented with contradictory user assertions about the same fact. The complete source code is available at https://github.com/achowd32/assert-bench.

With the widespread adoption of large language models (LLMs), hallucinations, which are non-factual fabrications in model outputs, have become serious concerns. Reasoning capabilities have received attention as a self-verification process to improve output reliability. However, the effect of reasoning within a closed system where LLMs cannot rely on external tools or knowledge has yet to be clarified. We therefore conduct experiments under strict constraints (recommending peer-reviewed journal articles in computer science) to examine the effect of reasoning across multiple models (GPT-5.2 and Gemini 3 Flash). Our results reveal a problematic trade-off between constraint compliance and factual accuracy. Non-reasoning models exhibit high constraint violation rates (66-75%) but maintain factual accuracy, while reasoning models reduce violations (13-26%) but systematically distort known facts to satisfy constraints and increase complete fabrication. This trade-off pattern is consistent across both models despite different architectures, indicating a fundamental limitation of reasoning. Furthermore, reasoning does not uniformly improve output authenticity: effects diverge by model, reflecting different allocations of the compliance-truthfulness trade-off. These findings challenge the assumption that reasoning universally improves reliability: reasoning models trade honest constraint violations for detection-resistant distortions.

Misinformation about climate change is a complex societal issue requiring holistic, interdisciplinary solutions at the intersection between technology and psychology. One proposed solution is a "technocognitive" approach, involving the synthesis of psychological and computer science research. Psychological research has identified that interventions in response to misinformation require both fact-based (e.g., factual explanations) and technique-based (e.g., explanations of misleading techniques) content. However, little progress has been made on documenting and detecting fallacies in climate misinformation. In this study, we apply a previously developed critical thinking methodology for deconstructing climate misinformation, in order to develop a dataset mapping different types of climate misinformation to reasoning fallacies. This dataset is used to train a model to detect fallacies in climate misinformation. Our study shows F1 scores that are 2.5 to 3.5 better than previous works. The fallacies that are easiest to detect include fake experts and anecdotal arguments, while fallacies that require background knowledge, such as oversimplification, misrepresentation, and slothful induction, are relatively more difficult to detect. This research lays the groundwork for development of solutions where automatically detected climate misinformation can be countered with generative technique-based corrections.

Large language models (LLMs) are becoming deeply embedded in human communication and decision-making, yet they inherit the ambiguity, bias, and lack of direct access to truth inherent in language itself. While their outputs are fluent, emotionally resonant, and coherent, they are generated through statistical prediction rather than grounded reasoning. This creates the risk of hallucination, responses that sound convincing but lack factual validity. Building on Geoffrey Hinton's observation that AI mirrors human intuition rather than reasoning, this paper argues that LLMs operationalize System 1 cognition at scale: fast, associative, and persuasive, but without reflection or falsification. To address this, we introduce the Rose-Frame, a three-dimensional framework for diagnosing cognitive and epistemic drift in human-AI interaction. The three axes are: (i) Map vs. Territory, which distinguishes representations of reality (epistemology) from reality itself (ontology); (ii) Intuition vs. Reason, drawing on dual-process theory to separate fast, emotional judgments from slow, reflective thinking; and (iii) Conflict vs. Confirmation, which examines whether ideas are critically tested through disagreement or simply reinforced through mutual validation. Each dimension captures a distinct failure mode, and their combination amplifies misalignment. Rose-Frame does not attempt to fix LLMs with more data or rules. Instead, it offers a reflective tool that makes both the model's limitations and the user's assumptions visible, enabling more transparent and critically aware AI deployment. It reframes alignment as cognitive governance: intuition, whether human or artificial, must remain governed by human reason. Only by embedding reflective, falsifiable oversight can we align machine fluency with human understanding.

Fact-checking long-form text is challenging, and it is therefore common practice to break it down into multiple atomic claims. The typical approach to fact-checking these atomic claims involves retrieving a fixed number of pieces of evidence, followed by a verification step. However, this method is usually not cost-effective, as it underutilizes the verification model's internal knowledge of the claim and fails to replicate the iterative reasoning process in human search strategies. To address these limitations, we propose FIRE, a novel agent-based framework that integrates evidence retrieval and claim verification in an iterative manner. Specifically, FIRE employs a unified mechanism to decide whether to provide a final answer or generate a subsequent search query, based on its confidence in the current judgment. We compare FIRE with other strong fact-checking frameworks and find that it achieves slightly better performance while reducing large language model (LLM) costs by an average of 7.6 times and search costs by 16.5 times. These results indicate that FIRE holds promise for application in large-scale fact-checking operations. Our code is available at https://github.com/mbzuai-nlp/fire.git.

Despite the success of large language models (LLMs) in various natural language processing (NLP) tasks, the stored knowledge in these models may inevitably be incomplete, out-of-date, or incorrect. This motivates the need to utilize external knowledge to assist LLMs. Unfortunately, current methods for incorporating external knowledge often require additional training or fine-tuning, which can be costly and may not be feasible for LLMs. To address this issue, we propose a novel post-processing approach, rethinking with retrieval (RR), which retrieves relevant external knowledge based on the decomposed reasoning steps obtained from the chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting. This lightweight approach does not require additional training or fine-tuning and is not limited by the input length of LLMs. We evaluate the effectiveness of RR through extensive experiments with GPT-3 on three complex reasoning tasks: commonsense reasoning, temporal reasoning, and tabular reasoning. Our results show that RR can produce more faithful explanations and improve the performance of LLMs.

Chain-of-thought (COT) prompting can help large language models (LLMs) reason toward correct answers, but its efficacy in reasoning toward incorrect answers is unexplored. This process of elimination (PoE), when used with COT, can enhance self-consistency, interpretability, and tasks such as medical diagnoses of exclusion. Thus, we propose PoE with COT, where LLMs must reason toward incorrect options on multiple-choice questions. We evaluate the ability of GPT-3.5, LLaMA-2, and Falcon to perform PoE with COT on a total of four commonsense and scientific reasoning datasets. We find that the strategy of PoE always underperforms the strategy of choosing the correct answer. The agreement of these strategies is also lower than the self-consistency of each strategy. To study these issues further, we conduct error analyses and give suggestions for future work.

We consider the problem of performing Bayesian inference in probabilistic models where observations are accompanied by uncertainty, referred to as "uncertain evidence." We explore how to interpret uncertain evidence, and by extension the importance of proper interpretation as it pertains to inference about latent variables. We consider a recently-proposed method "distributional evidence" as well as revisit two older methods: Jeffrey's rule and virtual evidence. We devise guidelines on how to account for uncertain evidence and we provide new insights, particularly regarding consistency. To showcase the impact of different interpretations of the same uncertain evidence, we carry out experiments in which one interpretation is defined as "correct." We then compare inference results from each different interpretation illustrating the importance of careful consideration of uncertain evidence.

Think-Answer reasoners such as DeepSeek-R1 have made notable progress by leveraging interpretable internal reasoning. However, despite the frequent presence of self-reflective cues like "Oops!", they remain vulnerable to output errors during single-pass inference. To address this limitation, we propose an efficient Recursive Think-Answer Process (R-TAP) that enables models to engage in iterative reasoning cycles and generate more accurate answers, going beyond conventional single-pass approaches. Central to this approach is a confidence generator that evaluates the certainty of model responses and guides subsequent improvements. By incorporating two complementary rewards-Recursively Confidence Increase Reward and Final Answer Confidence Reward-we show that R-TAP-enhanced models consistently outperform conventional single-pass methods for both large language models (LLMs) and vision-language models (VLMs). Moreover, by analyzing the frequency of "Oops"-like expressions in model responses, we find that R-TAP-applied models exhibit significantly fewer self-reflective patterns, resulting in more stable and faster inference-time reasoning. We hope R-TAP pave the way evolving into efficient and elaborated methods to refine the reasoning processes of future AI.

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) lifts the factuality of Large Language Models (LLMs) by injecting external knowledge, yet it falls short on problems that demand multi-step inference; conversely, purely reasoning-oriented approaches often hallucinate or mis-ground facts. This survey synthesizes both strands under a unified reasoning-retrieval perspective. We first map how advanced reasoning optimizes each stage of RAG (Reasoning-Enhanced RAG). Then, we show how retrieved knowledge of different type supply missing premises and expand context for complex inference (RAG-Enhanced Reasoning). Finally, we spotlight emerging Synergized RAG-Reasoning frameworks, where (agentic) LLMs iteratively interleave search and reasoning to achieve state-of-the-art performance across knowledge-intensive benchmarks. We categorize methods, datasets, and open challenges, and outline research avenues toward deeper RAG-Reasoning systems that are more effective, multimodally-adaptive, trustworthy, and human-centric. The collection is available at https://github.com/DavidZWZ/Awesome-RAG-Reasoning.

Contemporary progress in large language models (LLMs) has revealed notable inferential capacities via reinforcement learning (RL) employing verifiable reward, facilitating the development of O1 and R1-like reasoning models. Directly training from base models with RL is called zero-RL. However, previous works rely upon activating LLMs' inherent capacities through fixed prompt templates. This strategy introduces substantial sampling inefficiencies for weak LLMs, as the majority of problems generate invalid outputs during accuracy-driven filtration in reasoning tasks, which causes a waste of samples. To solve this issue, we propose Cog-Rethinker, a novel hierarchical metacognitive RL framework for LLM reasoning. Our Cog-Rethinker mainly focuses on the rollout procedure in RL training. After the direct rollout, our Cog-Rethinker improves sample utilization in a hierarchical metacognitive two-stage framework. By leveraging human cognition during solving problems, firstly, it prompts policy to decompose zero-accuracy problems into subproblems to produce final reasoning results. Secondly, with zero-accuracy problems in previous rollout stage, it further prompts policy to refine these answers by referencing previous wrong solutions. Moreover, to enable cold-start of the two new reasoning patterns and maintain train-test consistency across prompt templates, our Cog-Rethinker applies supervised fine-tuning on the policy using correct samples of the two stages with direct rollout template. Experimental results demonstrate Cog-Rethinker's superior performance on various mathematical reasoning benchmarks, we also analyzed its improved sample efficiency that accelerates convergence compared to baseline methods.

Deception is prevalent in human social settings. However, studies into the effect of deception on reinforcement learning algorithms have been limited to simplistic settings, restricting their applicability to complex real-world problems. This paper addresses this by introducing a new mixed competitive-cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) environment inspired by popular role-based deception games such as Werewolf, Avalon, and Among Us. The environment's unique challenge lies in the necessity to cooperate with other agents despite not knowing if they are friend or foe. Furthermore, we introduce a model of deception, which we call Bayesian belief manipulation (BBM) and demonstrate its effectiveness at deceiving other agents in this environment while also increasing the deceiving agent's performance.

Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) has substantially improved the reasoning abilities of large language models (LLMs), yet training often stalls as problems become saturated. We identify the core challenge as the poor accessibility of informative failures: learning signals exist but are rarely encountered during standard rollouts. To address this, we propose failure-prefix conditioning, a simple and effective method for learning from saturated problems. Rather than starting from the original question, our approach reallocates exploration by conditioning training on prefixes derived from rare incorrect reasoning trajectories, thereby exposing the model to failure-prone states. We observe that failure-prefix conditioning yields performance gains matching those of training on medium-difficulty problems, while preserving token efficiency. Furthermore, we analyze the model's robustness, finding that our method reduces performance degradation under misleading failure prefixes, albeit with a mild trade-off in adherence to correct early reasoning. Finally, we demonstrate that an iterative approach, which refreshes failure prefixes during training, unlocks additional gains after performance plateaus. Overall, our results suggest that failure-prefix conditioning offers an effective pathway to extend RLVR training on saturated problems.

As real-world knowledge evolves, the information embedded within large language models (LLMs) can become outdated, inadequate, or erroneous. Model editing has emerged as a prominent approach for updating LLMs' knowledge with minimal computational costs and parameter changes. This approach typically identifies and adjusts specific model parameters associated with newly acquired knowledge. However, existing methods often underestimate the adverse effects that parameter modifications can have on broadly distributed knowledge. More critically, post-edit LLMs frequently struggle with multi-hop reasoning and continuous knowledge updates. Although various studies have discussed these shortcomings, there is a lack of comprehensive evaluation. In this paper, we provide an evaluation of ten model editing methods along four dimensions: reliability, generalization, locality, and portability. Results confirm that all ten popular model editing methods show significant shortcomings across multiple dimensions, suggesting model editing is less promising. We then propose a straightforward method called Selective Contextual Reasoning (SCR), for knowledge updating. SCR does not modify model parameters but harnesses LLM's inherent contextual reasoning capabilities utilizing the updated knowledge pieces. Under SCR, an LLM first assesses whether an incoming query falls within the scope of an external knowledge base. If it does, the relevant external knowledge texts are contextualized to enhance reasoning; otherwise, the query is answered directly. We evaluate SCR against the ten model editing methods on two counterfactual datasets with three backbone LLMs. Empirical results confirm the effectiveness and efficiency of contextual reasoning for knowledge updating.

While Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) mitigates hallucination and knowledge staleness in Large Language Models (LLMs), existing frameworks often falter on complex, multi-hop queries that require synthesizing information from disparate sources. Current advanced RAG methods, employing iterative or adaptive strategies, lack a robust mechanism to systematically identify and fill evidence gaps, often propagating noise or failing to gather a comprehensive context. We introduce FAIR-RAG, a novel agentic framework that transforms the standard RAG pipeline into a dynamic, evidence-driven reasoning process. At its core is an Iterative Refinement Cycle governed by a module we term Structured Evidence Assessment (SEA). The SEA acts as an analytical gating mechanism: it deconstructs the initial query into a checklist of required findings and audits the aggregated evidence to identify confirmed facts and, critically, explicit informational gaps. These gaps provide a precise signal to an Adaptive Query Refinement agent, which generates new, targeted sub-queries to retrieve missing information. This cycle repeats until the evidence is verified as sufficient, ensuring a comprehensive context for a final, strictly faithful generation. We conducted experiments on challenging multi-hop QA benchmarks, including HotpotQA, 2WikiMultiHopQA, and MusiQue. In a unified experimental setup, FAIR-RAG significantly outperforms strong baselines. On HotpotQA, it achieves an F1-score of 0.453 -- an absolute improvement of 8.3 points over the strongest iterative baseline -- establishing a new state-of-the-art for this class of methods on these benchmarks. Our work demonstrates that a structured, evidence-driven refinement process with explicit gap analysis is crucial for unlocking reliable and accurate reasoning in advanced RAG systems for complex, knowledge-intensive tasks.

We introduce a simple, yet novel entropy-based framework to drive token efficiency in large language models during reasoning tasks. Our approach uses Shannon entropy from token-level logprobs as a confidence signal to enable early stopping, achieving 25-50% computational savings while maintaining task accuracy. Crucially, we demonstrate that entropy-based confidence calibration represents an emergent property of advanced post-training optimization present in modern reasoning models but notably absent in standard instruction-tuned and pre-trained models (Llama 3.3 70B). We show that the entropy threshold to stop reasoning varies from model to model but can be calculated easily in one shot using only a few examples from existing reasoning datasets. Our results indicate that advanced reasoning models often know that they've gotten a correct answer early on, and that this emergent confidence awareness can be exploited to save tokens and reduce latency. The framework demonstrates consistent performance across reasoning-optimized model families with 25-50% computational cost reduction while preserving accuracy, revealing that confidence mechanisms represent a distinguishing characteristic of modern post-trained reasoning systems versus their predecessors.

There is a growing literature on reasoning by large language models (LLMs), but the discussion on the uncertainty in their responses is still lacking. Our aim is to assess the extent of confidence that LLMs have in their answers and how it correlates with accuracy. Confidence is measured (i) qualitatively in terms of persistence in keeping their answer when prompted to reconsider, and (ii) quantitatively in terms of self-reported confidence score. We investigate the performance of three LLMs -- GPT4o, GPT4-turbo and Mistral -- on two benchmark sets of questions on causal judgement and formal fallacies and a set of probability and statistical puzzles and paradoxes. Although the LLMs show significantly better performance than random guessing, there is a wide variability in their tendency to change their initial answers. There is a positive correlation between qualitative confidence and accuracy, but the overall accuracy for the second answer is often worse than for the first answer. There is a strong tendency to overstate the self-reported confidence score. Confidence is only partially explained by the underlying token-level probability. The material effects of prompting on qualitative confidence and the strong tendency for overconfidence indicate that current LLMs do not have any internally coherent sense of confidence.

Accurate confidence calibration in Large Language Models (LLMs) is critical for safe use in high-stakes domains, where clear verbalized confidence enhances user trust. Traditional methods that mimic reference confidence expressions often fail to capture the reasoning needed for accurate confidence assessment. We propose natural language critiques as a solution, ideally suited for confidence calibration, as precise gold confidence labels are hard to obtain and often require multiple generations. This paper studies how natural language critiques can enhance verbalized confidence, addressing: (1) What to critique: uncertainty (question-focused) or confidence (answer-specific)? Analysis shows confidence suits multiple-choice tasks, while uncertainty excels in open-ended scenarios. (2) How to critique: self-critique or critique calibration training? We propose Self-Critique, enabling LLMs to critique and optimize their confidence beyond mere accuracy, and CritiCal, a novel Critique Calibration training method that leverages natural language critiques to improve confidence calibration, moving beyond direct numerical optimization. Experiments show that CritiCal significantly outperforms Self-Critique and other competitive baselines, even surpassing its teacher model, GPT-4o, in complex reasoning tasks. CritiCal also shows robust generalization in out-of-distribution settings, advancing LLM's reliability.

Generative AI agents equate understanding with resolving explicit queries, an assumption that confines interaction to what users can articulate. This assumption breaks down when users themselves lack awareness of what is missing, risky, or worth considering. In such conditions, proactivity is not merely an efficiency enhancement, but an epistemic necessity. We refer to this condition as epistemic incompleteness: where progress depends on engaging with unknown unknowns for effective partnership. Existing approaches to proactivity remain narrowly anticipatory, extrapolating from past behavior and presuming that goals are already well defined, thereby failing to support users meaningfully. However, surfacing possibilities beyond a user's current awareness is not inherently beneficial. Unconstrained proactive interventions can misdirect attention, overwhelm users, or introduce harm. Proactive agents, therefore, require behavioral grounding: principled constraints on when, how, and to what extent an agent should intervene. We advance the position that generative proactivity must be grounded both epistemically and behaviorally. Drawing on the philosophy of ignorance and research on proactive behavior, we argue that these theories offer critical guidance for designing agents that can engage responsibly and foster meaningful partnerships.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) achieve remarkable performance via long reasoning chains, but often incur excessive computational overhead due to redundant reasoning, especially on simple tasks. In this work, we systematically quantify the upper bounds of LRMs under both Long-Thinking and No-Thinking modes, and uncover the phenomenon of "Internal Self-Recovery Mechanism" where models implicitly supplement reasoning during answer generation. Building on this insight, we propose Adaptive Self-Recovery Reasoning (ASRR), a framework that suppresses unnecessary reasoning and enables implicit recovery. By introducing accuracy-aware length reward regulation, ASRR adaptively allocates reasoning effort according to problem difficulty, achieving high efficiency with negligible performance sacrifice. Experiments across multiple benchmarks and models show that, compared with GRPO, ASRR reduces reasoning budget by up to 32.5% (1.5B) and 25.7% (7B) with minimal accuracy loss (1.2% and 0.6% pass@1), and significantly boosts harmless rates on safety benchmarks (up to +21.7%). Our results highlight the potential of ASRR for enabling efficient, adaptive, and safer reasoning in LRMs.

Large Language Models deployed as question answering tools require robust calibration to avoid overconfidence. We systematically evaluate how reasoning capabilities and budget affect confidence assessment accuracy, using the ClimateX dataset (Lacombe et al., 2023) and expanding it to human and planetary health. Our key finding challenges the "test-time scaling" paradigm: while recent reasoning LLMs achieve 48.7% accuracy in assessing expert confidence, increasing reasoning budgets consistently impairs rather than improves calibration. Extended reasoning leads to systematic overconfidence that worsens with longer thinking budgets, producing diminishing and negative returns beyond modest computational investments. Conversely, search-augmented generation dramatically outperforms pure reasoning, achieving 89.3% accuracy by retrieving relevant evidence. Our results suggest that information access, rather than reasoning depth or inference budget, may be the critical bottleneck for improved confidence calibration of knowledge-intensive tasks.

As language models shift from single-shot answer generation toward multi-step reasoning that retrieves and consumes evidence mid-inference, evaluating the role of individual retrieved items becomes more important. Existing RAG evaluation typically targets final-answer quality, citation faithfulness, or answer-level attribution, but none of these directly targets the intervention-based, per-evidence-item utility view we study here. We introduce CUE-R, a lightweight intervention-based framework for measuring per-evidence-item operational utility in single-shot RAG using shallow observable retrieval-use traces. CUE-R perturbs individual evidence items via REMOVE, REPLACE, and DUPLICATE operators, then measures changes along three utility axes (correctness, proxy-based grounding faithfulness, and confidence error) plus a trace-divergence signal. We also outline an operational evidence-role taxonomy for interpreting intervention outcomes. Experiments on HotpotQA and 2WikiMultihopQA with Qwen-3 8B and GPT-5.2 reveal a consistent pattern: REMOVE and REPLACE substantially harm correctness and grounding while producing large trace shifts, whereas DUPLICATE is often answer-redundant yet not fully behaviorally neutral. A zero-retrieval control confirms that these effects arise from degradation of meaningful retrieval. A two-support ablation further shows that multi-hop evidence items can interact non-additively: removing both supports harms performance far more than either single removal. Our results suggest that answer-only evaluation misses important evidence effects and that intervention-based utility analysis is a practical complement for RAG evaluation.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have recently achieved strong mathematical and code reasoning performance through Reinforcement Learning (RL) post-training. However, we show that modern reasoning post-training induces an unintended exploration collapse: temperature-based sampling no longer increases pass@n accuracy. Empirically, the final-layer posterior of post-trained LRMs exhibit sharply reduced entropy, while the entropy of intermediate layers remains relatively high. Motivated by this entropy asymmetry, we propose Latent Exploration Decoding (LED), a depth-conditioned decoding strategy. LED aggregates intermediate posteriors via cumulative sum and selects depth configurations with maximal entropy as exploration candidates. Without additional training or parameters, LED consistently improves pass@1 and pass@16 accuracy by 0.61 and 1.03 percentage points across multiple reasoning benchmarks and models. Project page: https://GitHub.com/Xiaomi-Research/LED.

Large language models (LLMs) are widely used for factual tasks such as "What treats asthma?" or "What is the capital of Latvia?". However, it remains unclear how stably LLMs encode distinctions between true, false, and neither-true-nor-false content in their internal probabilistic representations. We introduce representational stability as the robustness of an LLM's veracity representations to perturbations in the operational definition of truth. We assess representational stability by (i) training a linear probe on an LLM's activations to separate true from not-true statements and (ii) measuring how its learned decision boundary shifts under controlled label changes. Using activations from sixteen open-source models and three factual domains, we compare two types of neither statements. The first are fact-like assertions about entities we believe to be absent from any training data. We call these unfamiliar neither statements. The second are nonfactual claims drawn from well-known fictional contexts. We call these familiar neither statements. The unfamiliar statements induce the largest boundary shifts, producing up to 40% flipped truth judgements in fragile domains (such as word definitions), while familiar fictional statements remain more coherently clustered and yield smaller changes (leq 8.2%). These results suggest that representational stability stems more from epistemic familiarity than from linguistic form. More broadly, our approach provides a diagnostic for auditing and training LLMs to preserve coherent truth assignments under semantic uncertainty, rather than optimizing for output accuracy alone.

While there are numerous benchmarks comparing the performance of modern language models (LMs), end-task evaluations often conflate notions of *factual accuracy* ("truth") and *reasoning ability* ("rationality", or "honesty" in the sense of correctly reporting implications of beliefs). Our goal is a dataset that clearly distinguishes these two notions. Our approach is to leverage and extend a collection of human-annotated *entailment trees*, engineered to express both good and bad chains of reasoning, and using a mixture of true and false facts, in particular including counterfactual examples, to avoid belief bias (also known as the "content effect"). The resulting dataset, called BaRDa, contains 3000 entailments (1787 valid, 1213 invalid), using 6681 true and 2319 false statements. Testing on four GPT-series models, GPT3(curie)/GPT3(davinici)/3.5/4, we find factual accuracy (truth) scores of 74.1/80.6/82.6/87.1 and reasoning accuracy scores of 63.1/78.0/71.8/79.2. This shows the clear progression of models towards improved factual accuracy and entailment reasoning, and the dataset provides a new benchmark that more cleanly separates and quantifies these two notions.

Large Language Models (LLMs) trained via Reinforcement Learning (RL) have exhibited strong reasoning capabilities and emergent reflective behaviors, such as backtracking and error correction. However, conventional Markovian RL confines exploration to the training phase to learn an optimal deterministic policy and depends on the history contexts only through the current state. Therefore, it remains unclear whether reflective reasoning will emerge during Markovian RL training, or why they are beneficial at test time. To remedy this, we recast reflective exploration within the Bayes-Adaptive RL framework, which explicitly optimizes the expected return under a posterior distribution over Markov decision processes. This Bayesian formulation inherently incentivizes both reward-maximizing exploitation and information-gathering exploration via belief updates. Our resulting algorithm, BARL, instructs the LLM to stitch and switch strategies based on the observed outcomes, offering principled guidance on when and how the model should reflectively explore. Empirical results on both synthetic and mathematical reasoning tasks demonstrate that BARL outperforms standard Markovian RL approaches at test time, achieving superior token efficiency with improved exploration effectiveness. Our code is available at https://github.com/shenao-zhang/BARL.

Large Language Models (LLMs) present an intriguing avenue for exploration in the field of formal theorem proving. Nevertheless, their full potential, particularly concerning the mitigation of hallucinations and refinement through prover error messages, remains an area that has yet to be thoroughly investigated. To enhance the effectiveness of LLMs in the field, we introduce the Lyra, a new framework that employs two distinct correction mechanisms: Tool Correction (TC) and Conjecture Correction (CC). To implement Tool Correction in the post-processing of formal proofs, we leverage prior knowledge to utilize predefined prover tools (e.g., Sledgehammer) for guiding the replacement of incorrect tools. Tool Correction significantly contributes to mitigating hallucinations, thereby improving the overall accuracy of the proof. In addition, we introduce Conjecture Correction, an error feedback mechanism designed to interact with prover to refine formal proof conjectures with prover error messages. Compared to the previous refinement framework, the proposed Conjecture Correction refines generation with instruction but does not collect paired (generation, error & refinement) prompts. Our method has achieved state-of-the-art (SOTA) performance on both miniF2F validation (48.0% -> 55.3%) and test (45.5% -> 51.2%). We also present 3 IMO problems solved by Lyra. We believe Tool Correction (post-process for hallucination mitigation) and Conjecture Correction (subgoal adjustment from interaction with environment) could provide a promising avenue for future research in this field.

Instructions-tuned Large Language Models (LLMs) gained recently huge popularity thanks to their ability to interact with users through conversation. In this work we aim to evaluate their ability to complete multi-turn tasks and interact with external databases in the context of established task-oriented dialogue benchmarks. We show that for explicit belief state tracking, LLMs underperform compared to specialized task-specific models. Nevertheless, they show ability to guide the dialogue to successful ending if given correct slot values. Furthermore this ability improves with access to true belief state distribution or in-domain examples.

Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) has emerged as an indispensable paradigm for enhancing reasoning in Large Language Models (LLMs). However, standard policy optimization methods, such as Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO), often converge to low-entropy policies, leading to severe mode collapse and limited output diversity. We analyze this issue from the perspective of sampling probability dynamics, identifying that the standard objective disproportionately reinforces the highest-likelihood paths, thereby suppressing valid alternative reasoning chains. To address this, we propose a novel Advantage Re-weighting Mechanism (ARM) designed to equilibrate the confidence levels across all correct responses. By incorporating Prompt Perplexity and Answer Confidence into the advantage estimation, our method dynamically reshapes the reward signal to attenuate the gradient updates of over-confident reasoning paths, while redistributing probability mass toward under-explored correct solutions. Empirical results demonstrate that our approach significantly enhances generative diversity and response entropy while maintaining competitive accuracy, effectively achieving a superior trade-off between exploration and exploitation in reasoning tasks. Empirical results on Qwen2.5 and DeepSeek models across mathematical and coding benchmarks show that ProGRPO significantly mitigates entropy collapse. Specifically, on Qwen2.5-7B, our method outperforms GRPO by 5.7% in Pass@1 and, notably, by 13.9% in Pass@32, highlighting its superior capability in generating diverse correct reasoning paths.

Can large language models (LLMs) admit their mistakes when they should know better? In this work, we define the behavior of acknowledging errors in previously generated answers as "retraction" and aim to understand when and why LLMs choose to retract. We first construct model-specific datasets to evaluate whether a model will retract an incorrect answer that contradicts its own parametric knowledge. While LLMs are capable of retraction, they do so only infrequently. We demonstrate that retraction is closely tied to previously identified indicators of models' internal belief: models fail to retract wrong answers that they "believe" to be factually correct. Steering experiments further demonstrate that internal belief causally influences model retraction. In particular, when the model does not believe its answer, this not only encourages the model to attempt to verify the answer, but also alters attention behavior during self-verification. Finally, we demonstrate that simple supervised fine-tuning significantly improves retraction performance by helping the model learn more accurate internal beliefs. Code and datasets are available on https://github.com/ayyyq/llm-retraction.

The factuality of large language model (LLMs) tends to decay over time since events posterior to their training are "unknown" to them. One way to keep models up-to-date could be factual update: the task of inserting, replacing, or removing certain simple (atomic) facts within the model. To study this task, we present WikiFactDiff, a dataset that describes the evolution of factual knowledge between two dates as a collection of simple facts divided into three categories: new, obsolete, and static. We describe several update scenarios arising from various combinations of these three types of basic update. The facts are represented by subject-relation-object triples; indeed, WikiFactDiff was constructed by comparing the state of the Wikidata knowledge base at 4 January 2021 and 27 February 2023. Those fact are accompanied by verbalization templates and cloze tests that enable running update algorithms and their evaluation metrics. Contrary to other datasets, such as zsRE and CounterFact, WikiFactDiff constitutes a realistic update setting that involves various update scenarios, including replacements, archival, and new entity insertions. We also present an evaluation of existing update algorithms on WikiFactDiff.

Claim verification is essential in combating misinformation, and large language models (LLMs) have recently emerged in this area as powerful tools for assessing the veracity of claims using external knowledge. Existing LLM-based methods for claim verification typically adopt a Decompose-Then-Verify paradigm, which involves decomposing complex claims into several independent sub-claims and verifying each sub-claim separately. However, this paradigm often introduces errors during the claim decomposition process. To mitigate these errors, we propose to develop the Chain-of-Thought (CoT)-Verify paradigm, which leverages LLM reasoning methods to generate CoT-verification paths for the original complex claim without requiring decompositions into sub-claims and separate verification stages. The CoT-Verify paradigm allows us to propose a natural fine-tuning method called Reasoning-CV to enhance the verification capabilities in LLMs. Reasoning-CV includes a supervised fine-tuning (SFT) stage and a self-improvement direct preference optimization (DPO) stage. Utilizing only an 8B pre-trained LLM, Reasoning-CV demonstrates superior knowledge-assisted claim verification performances compared to existing Decompose-Then-Verify methods, as well as powerful black-box LLMs such as GPT-4o+CoT and o1-preview. Our code is available.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown remarkable performance in reasoning tasks but face limitations in mathematical and complex logical reasoning. Existing methods to improve LLMs' logical capabilities either involve traceable or verifiable logical sequences that generate more reliable responses by constructing logical structures yet increase computational costs, or introduces rigid logic template rules, reducing flexibility. In this paper, we propose Reversal of Thought (RoT), a novel framework aimed at enhancing the logical reasoning abilities of LLMs. RoT utilizes a Preference-Guided Reverse Reasoning warm-up strategy, which integrates logical symbols for pseudocode planning through meta-cognitive mechanisms and pairwise preference self-evaluation to generate task-specific prompts solely through demonstrations, aligning with LLMs' cognitive preferences shaped by Reinforcement Learning with Human Feedback (RLHF). Through reverse reasoning, we ultilize a Cognitive Preference Manager to assess knowledge boundaries and further expand LLMs' reasoning capabilities by aggregating solution logic for known tasks and stylistic templates for unknown tasks. Experiments across various tasks demonstrate that RoT surpasses existing baselines in both reasoning accuracy and efficiency.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown impressive capabilities but still suffer from the issue of hallucinations. A significant type of this issue is the false premise hallucination, which we define as the phenomenon when LLMs generate hallucinated text when confronted with false premise questions. In this paper, we perform a comprehensive analysis of the false premise hallucination and elucidate its internal working mechanism: a small subset of attention heads (which we designate as false premise heads) disturb the knowledge extraction process, leading to the occurrence of false premise hallucination. Based on our analysis, we propose FAITH (False premise Attention head constraIining for miTigating Hallucinations), a novel and effective method to mitigate false premise hallucinations. It constrains the false premise attention heads during the model inference process. Impressively, extensive experiments demonstrate that constraining only approximately 1% of the attention heads in the model yields a notable increase of nearly 20% of model performance.