Daily Papers

Large language models (LLMs) are popular for high-quality text generation but can produce harmful content, even when aligned with human values through reinforcement learning. Adversarial prompts can bypass their safety measures. We propose LLM Self Defense, a simple approach to defend against these attacks by having an LLM screen the induced responses. Our method does not require any fine-tuning, input preprocessing, or iterative output generation. Instead, we incorporate the generated content into a pre-defined prompt and employ another instance of an LLM to analyze the text and predict whether it is harmful. We test LLM Self Defense on GPT 3.5 and Llama 2, two of the current most prominent LLMs against various types of attacks, such as forcefully inducing affirmative responses to prompts and prompt engineering attacks. Notably, LLM Self Defense succeeds in reducing the attack success rate to virtually 0 using both GPT 3.5 and Llama 2. The code is publicly available at https://github.com/poloclub/llm-self-defense

The A2AS framework is introduced as a security layer for AI agents and LLM-powered applications, similar to how HTTPS secures HTTP. A2AS enforces certified behavior, activates model self-defense, and ensures context window integrity. It defines security boundaries, authenticates prompts, applies security rules and custom policies, and controls agentic behavior, enabling a defense-in-depth strategy. The A2AS framework avoids latency overhead, external dependencies, architectural changes, model retraining, and operational complexity. The BASIC security model is introduced as the A2AS foundation: (B) Behavior certificates enable behavior enforcement, (A) Authenticated prompts enable context window integrity, (S) Security boundaries enable untrusted input isolation, (I) In-context defenses enable secure model reasoning, (C) Codified policies enable application-specific rules. This first paper in the series introduces the BASIC security model and the A2AS framework, exploring their potential toward establishing the A2AS industry standard.

Ensuring Large Language Model (LLM) safety remains challenging due to the absence of universal standards and reliable content validators, making it difficult to obtain effective training signals. We discover that aligned models already possess robust internal safety beliefs: they consistently produce high-confidence refusals to harmful requests while exhibiting high entropy when generating potentially dangerous content. This entropy gap reveals an untapped signal--models intrinsically "know" when to refuse. We introduce Safety Instincts Reinforcement Learning (SIRL), which transforms this internal confidence into a self-generated reward signal, eliminating dependence on external validators or human annotations. SIRL teaches models to trust their safety instincts by reinforcing low-entropy refusal behaviors. Evaluated on Llama and Qwen models, SIRL maintains 89%+ Defense Success Rates (DSRs) against 20+ jailbreak methods, from static prompts to adaptive attacks. Using only 15,000 unlabeled prompts, SIRL surpasses resource-intensive supervised methods while preserving performance on mathematics, coding, and conversation benchmarks. Our work demonstrates that effective alignment can emerge from within, paving the way for more autonomous and robust AI safety mechanisms that scale without extensive human oversight.

Phishing email detection faces critical challenges from evolving adversarial tactics and heterogeneous attack patterns. Traditional detection methods, such as rule-based filters and denylists, often struggle to keep pace with these evolving tactics, leading to false negatives and compromised security. While machine learning approaches have improved detection accuracy, they still face challenges adapting to novel phishing strategies. We present MultiPhishGuard, a dynamic LLM-based multi-agent detection system that synergizes specialized expertise with adversarial-aware reinforcement learning. Our framework employs five cooperative agents (text, URL, metadata, explanation simplifier, and adversarial agents) with automatically adjusted decision weights powered by a Proximal Policy Optimization reinforcement learning algorithm. To address emerging threats, we introduce an adversarial training loop featuring an adversarial agent that generates subtle context-aware email variants, creating a self-improving defense ecosystem and enhancing system robustness. Experimental evaluations on public datasets demonstrate that MultiPhishGuard significantly outperforms Chain-of-Thoughts, single-agent baselines and state-of-the-art detectors, as validated by ablation studies and comparative analyses. Experiments demonstrate that MultiPhishGuard achieves high accuracy (97.89\%) with low false positive (2.73\%) and false negative rates (0.20\%). Additionally, we incorporate an explanation simplifier agent, which provides users with clear and easily understandable explanations for why an email is classified as phishing or legitimate. This work advances phishing defense through dynamic multi-agent collaboration and generative adversarial resilience.

Large Language Models (LLMs), despite advances in safety alignment, remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks designed to circumvent protective mechanisms. Prevailing defense strategies rely on external interventions, such as input filtering or output modification, which often lack generalizability and compromise model utility while incurring significant computational overhead. In this work, we introduce a new, training-free defense paradigm, Self-Activating Internal Defense (SAID), which reframes the defense task from external correction to internal capability activation. SAID uniquely leverages the LLM's own reasoning abilities to proactively identify and neutralize malicious intent through a three-stage pipeline: model-native intent distillation to extract core semantics, optimal safety prefix probing to activate latent safety awareness, and a conservative aggregation strategy to ensure robust decision-making. Extensive experiments on five open-source LLMs against six advanced jailbreak attacks demonstrate that SAID substantially outperforms state-of-the-art defenses in reducing harmful outputs. Crucially, it achieves this while preserving model performance on benign tasks and incurring minimal computational overhead. Our work establishes that activating the intrinsic safety mechanisms of LLMs is a more robust and scalable path toward building safer and more reliable aligned AI systems.

Large Language Model (LLM) agents use memory to learn from past interactions, enabling autonomous planning and decision-making in complex environments. However, this reliance on memory introduces a critical security risk: an adversary can inject seemingly harmless records into an agent's memory to manipulate its future behavior. This vulnerability is characterized by two core aspects: First, the malicious effect of injected records is only activated within a specific context, making them hard to detect when individual memory entries are audited in isolation. Second, once triggered, the manipulation can initiate a self-reinforcing error cycle: the corrupted outcome is stored as precedent, which not only amplifies the initial error but also progressively lowers the threshold for similar attacks in the future. To address these challenges, we introduce A-MemGuard (Agent-Memory Guard), the first proactive defense framework for LLM agent memory. The core idea of our work is the insight that memory itself must become both self-checking and self-correcting. Without modifying the agent's core architecture, A-MemGuard combines two mechanisms: (1) consensus-based validation, which detects anomalies by comparing reasoning paths derived from multiple related memories and (2) a dual-memory structure, where detected failures are distilled into ``lessons'' stored separately and consulted before future actions, breaking error cycles and enabling adaptation. Comprehensive evaluations on multiple benchmarks show that A-MemGuard effectively cuts attack success rates by over 95% while incurring a minimal utility cost. This work shifts LLM memory security from static filtering to a proactive, experience-driven model where defenses strengthen over time. Our code is available in https://github.com/TangciuYueng/AMemGuard

In recent years, safety risks associated with large language models have become increasingly prominent, highlighting the urgent need to mitigate the generation of toxic and harmful content. The mainstream paradigm for LLM safety alignment typically adopts a collaborative framework involving three roles: an attacker for adversarial prompt generation, a defender for safety defense, and an evaluator for response assessment. In this paper, we propose a closed-loop reinforcement learning framework called TriPlay-RL that enables iterative and co-improving collaboration among three roles with near-zero manual annotation. Experimental results show that the attacker preserves high output diversity while achieving a 20%-50% improvement in adversarial effectiveness; the defender attains 10%-30% gains in safety performance without degrading general reasoning capability; and the evaluator continuously refines its fine-grained judgment ability through iterations, accurately distinguishing unsafe responses, simple refusals, and useful guidance. Overall, our framework establishes an efficient and scalable paradigm for LLM safety alignment, enabling continuous co-evolution within a unified learning loop.

As Large Language Model (LLM) agents increasingly gain self-evolutionary capabilities to adapt and refine their strategies through real-world interaction, their long-term reliability becomes a critical concern. We identify the Alignment Tipping Process (ATP), a critical post-deployment risk unique to self-evolving LLM agents. Unlike training-time failures, ATP arises when continual interaction drives agents to abandon alignment constraints established during training in favor of reinforced, self-interested strategies. We formalize and analyze ATP through two complementary paradigms: Self-Interested Exploration, where repeated high-reward deviations induce individual behavioral drift, and Imitative Strategy Diffusion, where deviant behaviors spread across multi-agent systems. Building on these paradigms, we construct controllable testbeds and benchmark Qwen3-8B and Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct. Our experiments show that alignment benefits erode rapidly under self-evolution, with initially aligned models converging toward unaligned states. In multi-agent settings, successful violations diffuse quickly, leading to collective misalignment. Moreover, current reinforcement learning-based alignment methods provide only fragile defenses against alignment tipping. Together, these findings demonstrate that alignment of LLM agents is not a static property but a fragile and dynamic one, vulnerable to feedback-driven decay during deployment. Our data and code are available at https://github.com/aiming-lab/ATP.

While the deployment of large language models (LLMs) in high-value industries continues to expand, the systematic assessment of their safety against jailbreak and prompt-based attacks remains insufficient. Existing safety evaluation benchmarks and frameworks are often limited by an imbalanced integration of core components (attack, defense, and evaluation methods) and an isolation between flexible evaluation frameworks and standardized benchmarking capabilities. These limitations hinder reliable cross-study comparisons and create unnecessary overhead for comprehensive risk assessment. To address these gaps, we present TeleAI-Safety, a modular and reproducible framework coupled with a systematic benchmark for rigorous LLM safety evaluation. Our framework integrates a broad collection of 19 attack methods (including one self-developed method), 29 defense methods, and 19 evaluation methods (including one self-developed method). With a curated attack corpus of 342 samples spanning 12 distinct risk categories, the TeleAI-Safety benchmark conducts extensive evaluations across 14 target models. The results reveal systematic vulnerabilities and model-specific failure cases, highlighting critical trade-offs between safety and utility, and identifying potential defense patterns for future optimization. In practical scenarios, TeleAI-Safety can be flexibly adjusted with customized attack, defense, and evaluation combinations to meet specific demands. We release our complete code and evaluation results to facilitate reproducible research and establish unified safety baselines.

Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit impressive capabilities, but remain susceptible to a growing spectrum of safety risks, including jailbreaks, toxic content, hallucinations, and bias. Existing defenses often address only a single threat type or resort to rigid outright rejection, sacrificing user experience and failing to generalize across diverse and novel attacks. This paper introduces Adversarial Scenario Extrapolation (ASE), a novel inference-time computation framework that leverages Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning to simultaneously enhance LLM robustness and seamlessness. ASE guides the LLM through a self-generative process of contemplating potential adversarial scenarios and formulating defensive strategies before generating a response to the user query. Comprehensive evaluation on four adversarial benchmarks with four latest LLMs shows that ASE achieves near-zero jailbreak attack success rates and minimal toxicity, while slashing outright rejections to <4%. ASE outperforms six state-of-the-art defenses in robustness-seamlessness trade-offs, with 92-99% accuracy on adversarial Q&A and 4-10x lower bias scores. By transforming adversarial perception into an intrinsic cognitive process, ASE sets a new paradigm for secure and natural human-AI interaction.

We explore the self-play training procedure of large language models (LLMs) in a two-player adversarial language game called Adversarial Taboo. In this game, an attacker and a defender communicate around a target word only visible to the attacker. The attacker aims to induce the defender to speak the target word unconsciously, while the defender tries to infer the target word from the attacker's utterances. To win the game, both players should have sufficient knowledge about the target word and high-level reasoning ability to infer and express in this information-reserved conversation. Hence, we are curious about whether LLMs' reasoning ability can be further enhanced by self-play in this adversarial language game (SPAG). With this goal, we select several open-source LLMs and let each act as the attacker and play with a copy of itself as the defender on an extensive range of target words. Through reinforcement learning on the game outcomes, we observe that the LLMs' performances uniformly improve on a broad range of reasoning benchmarks. Furthermore, iteratively adopting this self-play process can continuously promote LLMs' reasoning abilities. The code is at https://github.com/Linear95/SPAG.

With the rapid development of technology and the acceleration of digitalisation, the frequency and complexity of cyber security threats are increasing. Traditional cybersecurity approaches, often based on static rules and predefined scenarios, are struggling to adapt to the rapidly evolving nature of modern cyberattacks. There is an urgent need for more adaptive and intelligent defence strategies. The emergence of Large Language Model (LLM) provides an innovative solution to cope with the increasingly severe cyber threats, and its potential in analysing complex attack patterns, predicting threats and assisting real-time response has attracted a lot of attention in the field of cybersecurity, and exploring how to effectively use LLM to defend against cyberattacks has become a hot topic in the current research field. This survey examines the applications of LLM from the perspective of the cyber attack lifecycle, focusing on the three phases of defense reconnaissance, foothold establishment, and lateral movement, and it analyzes the potential of LLMs in Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) tasks. Meanwhile, we investigate how LLM-based security solutions are deployed and applied in different network scenarios. It also summarizes the internal and external risk issues faced by LLM during its application. Finally, this survey also points out the facing risk issues and possible future research directions in this domain.

Recently, web-based Large Language Model (LLM) agents autonomously perform increasingly complex tasks, thereby bringing significant convenience. However, they also amplify the risks of malicious misuse cases such as unauthorized collection of personally identifiable information (PII), generation of socially divisive content, and even automated web hacking. To address these threats, we propose an AI Kill Switch technique that can immediately halt the operation of malicious web-based LLM agents. To achieve this, we introduce AutoGuard - the key idea is generating defensive prompts that trigger the safety mechanisms of malicious LLM agents. In particular, generated defense prompts are transparently embedded into the website's DOM so that they remain invisible to human users but can be detected by the crawling process of malicious agents, triggering its internal safety mechanisms to abort malicious actions once read. To evaluate our approach, we constructed a dedicated benchmark consisting of three representative malicious scenarios (PII collection, social rift content generation, and web hacking attempts). Experimental results show that the AutoGuard method achieves over 80% Defense Success Rate (DSR) on malicious agents, including GPT-4o, Claude-3, and Llama3.3-70B-Instruct. It also maintains strong performance, achieving around 90% DSR on GPT-5, GPT-4.1, and Gemini-2.5-Flash when used as the malicious agent, demonstrating robust generalization across models and scenarios. Through this research, we have demonstrated the controllability of web-based LLM agents across various scenarios and models, thereby contributing to the broader effort of AI control and safety.

Large language models (LLMs) are typically aligned to be harmless to humans. Unfortunately, recent work has shown that such models are susceptible to automated jailbreak attacks that induce them to generate harmful content. More recent LLMs often incorporate an additional layer of defense, a Guard Model, which is a second LLM that is designed to check and moderate the output response of the primary LLM. Our key contribution is to show a novel attack strategy, PRP, that is successful against several open-source (e.g., Llama 2) and closed-source (e.g., GPT 3.5) implementations of Guard Models. PRP leverages a two step prefix-based attack that operates by (a) constructing a universal adversarial prefix for the Guard Model, and (b) propagating this prefix to the response. We find that this procedure is effective across multiple threat models, including ones in which the adversary has no access to the Guard Model at all. Our work suggests that further advances are required on defenses and Guard Models before they can be considered effective.

The adoption of large language models (LLMs) in many applications, from customer service chat bots and software development assistants to more capable agentic systems necessitates research into how to secure these systems. Attacks like prompt injection and jailbreaking attempt to elicit responses and actions from these models that are not compliant with the safety, privacy, or content policies of organizations using the model in their application. In order to counter abuse of LLMs for generating potentially harmful replies or taking undesirable actions, LLM owners must apply safeguards during training and integrate additional tools to block the LLM from generating text that abuses the model. Jailbreaking prompts play a vital role in convincing an LLM to generate potentially harmful content, making it important to identify jailbreaking attempts to block any further steps. In this work, we propose a novel approach to detect jailbreak prompts based on pairing text embeddings well-suited for retrieval with traditional machine learning classification algorithms. Our approach outperforms all publicly available methods from open source LLM security applications.

The robustness of large language models (LLMs) against adversarial manipulations, such as jailbreak attacks, remains a significant challenge. In this work, we propose an approach that enhances the self-critique capability of the LLM and further fine-tunes it over sanitized synthetic data. This is done with the addition of an external critic model that can be merged with the original, thus bolstering self-critique capabilities and improving the robustness of the LLMs response to adversarial prompts. Our results demonstrate that the combination of merging and self-critique can reduce the attack success rate of adversaries significantly, thus offering a promising defense mechanism against jailbreak attacks. Code, data and models released at https://github.com/vicgalle/merging-self-critique-jailbreaks .

This paper provides a comprehensive review of the future of cybersecurity through Generative AI and Large Language Models (LLMs). We explore LLM applications across various domains, including hardware design security, intrusion detection, software engineering, design verification, cyber threat intelligence, malware detection, and phishing detection. We present an overview of LLM evolution and its current state, focusing on advancements in models such as GPT-4, GPT-3.5, Mixtral-8x7B, BERT, Falcon2, and LLaMA. Our analysis extends to LLM vulnerabilities, such as prompt injection, insecure output handling, data poisoning, DDoS attacks, and adversarial instructions. We delve into mitigation strategies to protect these models, providing a comprehensive look at potential attack scenarios and prevention techniques. Furthermore, we evaluate the performance of 42 LLM models in cybersecurity knowledge and hardware security, highlighting their strengths and weaknesses. We thoroughly evaluate cybersecurity datasets for LLM training and testing, covering the lifecycle from data creation to usage and identifying gaps for future research. In addition, we review new strategies for leveraging LLMs, including techniques like Half-Quadratic Quantization (HQQ), Reinforcement Learning with Human Feedback (RLHF), Direct Preference Optimization (DPO), Quantized Low-Rank Adapters (QLoRA), and Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG). These insights aim to enhance real-time cybersecurity defenses and improve the sophistication of LLM applications in threat detection and response. Our paper provides a foundational understanding and strategic direction for integrating LLMs into future cybersecurity frameworks, emphasizing innovation and robust model deployment to safeguard against evolving cyber threats.

Recent large language model (LLM) defenses have greatly improved models' ability to refuse harmful queries, even when adversarially attacked. However, LLM defenses are primarily evaluated against automated adversarial attacks in a single turn of conversation, an insufficient threat model for real-world malicious use. We demonstrate that multi-turn human jailbreaks uncover significant vulnerabilities, exceeding 70% attack success rate (ASR) on HarmBench against defenses that report single-digit ASRs with automated single-turn attacks. Human jailbreaks also reveal vulnerabilities in machine unlearning defenses, successfully recovering dual-use biosecurity knowledge from unlearned models. We compile these results into Multi-Turn Human Jailbreaks (MHJ), a dataset of 2,912 prompts across 537 multi-turn jailbreaks. We publicly release MHJ alongside a compendium of jailbreak tactics developed across dozens of commercial red teaming engagements, supporting research towards stronger LLM defenses.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive results on natural language tasks, and security researchers are beginning to employ them in both offensive and defensive systems. In cyber-security, there have been multiple research efforts that utilize LLMs focusing on the pre-breach stage of attacks like phishing and malware generation. However, so far there lacks a comprehensive study regarding whether LLM-based systems can be leveraged to simulate the post-breach stage of attacks that are typically human-operated, or "hands-on-keyboard" attacks, under various attack techniques and environments. As LLMs inevitably advance, they may be able to automate both the pre- and post-breach attack stages. This shift may transform organizational attacks from rare, expert-led events to frequent, automated operations requiring no expertise and executed at automation speed and scale. This risks fundamentally changing global computer security and correspondingly causing substantial economic impacts, and a goal of this work is to better understand these risks now so we can better prepare for these inevitable ever-more-capable LLMs on the horizon. On the immediate impact side, this research serves three purposes. First, an automated LLM-based, post-breach exploitation framework can help analysts quickly test and continually improve their organization's network security posture against previously unseen attacks. Second, an LLM-based penetration test system can extend the effectiveness of red teams with a limited number of human analysts. Finally, this research can help defensive systems and teams learn to detect novel attack behaviors preemptively before their use in the wild....

In this paper, we propose a new method Strategist that utilizes LLMs to acquire new skills for playing multi-agent games through a self-improvement process. Our method gathers quality feedback through self-play simulations with Monte Carlo tree search and LLM-based reflection, which can then be used to learn high-level strategic skills such as how to evaluate states that guide the low-level execution.We showcase how our method can be used in both action planning and dialogue generation in the context of games, achieving good performance on both tasks. Specifically, we demonstrate that our method can help train agents with better performance than both traditional reinforcement learning-based approaches and other LLM-based skill learning approaches in games including the Game of Pure Strategy (GOPS) and The Resistance: Avalon.

This article reports the results of a study examining the ability of legal and non-legal Large Language Models to perform legal analysis using the Issue-Rule-Application-Conclusion framework. LLMs were tested on legal reasoning tasks involving rule analysis and analogical reasoning. The results show that LLMs can conduct basic IRAC analysis, but are limited by brief responses lacking detail, an inability to commit to answers, false confidence, and hallucinations. The study compares legal and nonlegal LLMs, identifies shortcomings, and explores traits that may hinder their ability to think like a lawyer. It also discusses the implications for legal education and practice, highlighting the need for critical thinking skills in future lawyers and the potential pitfalls of overreliance on artificial intelligence AI resulting in a loss of logic, reasoning, and critical thinking skills.

As large language models (LLMs) continue to evolve, it is critical to assess the security threats and vulnerabilities that may arise both during their training phase and after models have been deployed. This survey seeks to define and categorize the various attacks targeting LLMs, distinguishing between those that occur during the training phase and those that affect already trained models. A thorough analysis of these attacks is presented, alongside an exploration of defense mechanisms designed to mitigate such threats. Defenses are classified into two primary categories: prevention-based and detection-based defenses. Furthermore, our survey summarizes possible attacks and their corresponding defense strategies. It also provides an evaluation of the effectiveness of the known defense mechanisms for the different security threats. Our survey aims to offer a structured framework for securing LLMs, while also identifying areas that require further research to improve and strengthen defenses against emerging security challenges.

LLMs have becoming increasingly powerful, both in their benign and malicious uses. With the increase in capabilities, researchers have been increasingly interested in their ability to exploit cybersecurity vulnerabilities. In particular, recent work has conducted preliminary studies on the ability of LLM agents to autonomously hack websites. However, these studies are limited to simple vulnerabilities. In this work, we show that LLM agents can autonomously exploit one-day vulnerabilities in real-world systems. To show this, we collected a dataset of 15 one-day vulnerabilities that include ones categorized as critical severity in the CVE description. When given the CVE description, GPT-4 is capable of exploiting 87% of these vulnerabilities compared to 0% for every other model we test (GPT-3.5, open-source LLMs) and open-source vulnerability scanners (ZAP and Metasploit). Fortunately, our GPT-4 agent requires the CVE description for high performance: without the description, GPT-4 can exploit only 7% of the vulnerabilities. Our findings raise questions around the widespread deployment of highly capable LLM agents.

The rise of Large Language Models (LLMs) has revolutionized our comprehension of intelligence bringing us closer to Artificial Intelligence. Since their introduction, researchers have actively explored the applications of LLMs across diverse fields, significantly elevating capabilities. Cybersecurity, traditionally resistant to data-driven solutions and slow to embrace machine learning, stands out as a domain. This study examines the existing literature, providing a thorough characterization of both defensive and adversarial applications of LLMs within the realm of cybersecurity. Our review not only surveys and categorizes the current landscape but also identifies critical research gaps. By evaluating both offensive and defensive applications, we aim to provide a holistic understanding of the potential risks and opportunities associated with LLM-driven cybersecurity.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in various applications. As their usage grows, concerns regarding their safety are rising, especially in maintaining harmless responses when faced with malicious instructions. Many defense strategies have been developed to enhance the safety of LLMs. However, our research finds that existing defense strategies lead LLMs to predominantly adopt a rejection-oriented stance, thereby diminishing the usability of their responses to benign instructions. To solve this problem, we introduce the MoGU framework, designed to enhance LLMs' safety while preserving their usability. Our MoGU framework transforms the base LLM into two variants: the usable LLM and the safe LLM, and further employs dynamic routing to balance their contribution. When encountering malicious instructions, the router will assign a higher weight to the safe LLM to ensure that responses are harmless. Conversely, for benign instructions, the router prioritizes the usable LLM, facilitating usable and helpful responses. On various open-sourced LLMs, we compare multiple defense strategies to verify the superiority of our MoGU framework. Besides, our analysis provides key insights into the effectiveness of MoGU and verifies that our designed routing mechanism can effectively balance the contribution of each variant by assigning weights. Our work released the safer Llama2, Vicuna, Falcon, Dolphin, and Baichuan2.

LLMs can provide substantial zero-shot performance on diverse tasks using a simple task prompt, eliminating the need for training or fine-tuning. However, when applying these models to sensitive tasks, it is crucial to thoroughly assess their robustness against adversarial inputs. In this work, we introduce Static Deceptor (StaDec) and Dynamic Deceptor (DyDec), two innovative attack frameworks designed to systematically generate dynamic and adaptive adversarial examples by leveraging the understanding of the LLMs. We produce subtle and natural-looking adversarial inputs that preserve semantic similarity to the original text while effectively deceiving the target LLM. By utilizing an automated, LLM-driven pipeline, we eliminate the dependence on external heuristics. Our attacks evolve with the advancements in LLMs and demonstrate strong transferability across models unknown to the attacker. Overall, this work provides a systematic approach for the self-assessment of an LLM's robustness. We release our code and data at https://github.com/Shukti042/AdversarialExample.

Large Language Model (LLM) safety is one of the most pressing challenges for enabling wide-scale deployment. While most studies and global discussions focus on generic harms, such as models assisting users in harming themselves or others, enterprises face a more fundamental concern: whether LLM-based agents are safe for their intended use case. To address this, we introduce operational safety, defined as an LLM's ability to appropriately accept or refuse user queries when tasked with a specific purpose. We further propose OffTopicEval, an evaluation suite and benchmark for measuring operational safety both in general and within specific agentic use cases. Our evaluations on six model families comprising 20 open-weight LLMs reveal that while performance varies across models, all of them remain highly operationally unsafe. Even the strongest models -- Qwen-3 (235B) with 77.77\% and Mistral (24B) with 79.96\% -- fall far short of reliable operational safety, while GPT models plateau in the 62--73\% range, Phi achieves only mid-level scores (48--70\%), and Gemma and Llama-3 collapse to 39.53\% and 23.84\%, respectively. While operational safety is a core model alignment issue, to suppress these failures, we propose prompt-based steering methods: query grounding (Q-ground) and system-prompt grounding (P-ground), which substantially improve OOD refusal. Q-ground provides consistent gains of up to 23\%, while P-ground delivers even larger boosts, raising Llama-3.3 (70B) by 41\% and Qwen-3 (30B) by 27\%. These results highlight both the urgent need for operational safety interventions and the promise of prompt-based steering as a first step toward more reliable LLM-based agents.

Although large language models (LLMs) demonstrate impressive proficiency in various tasks, they present potential safety risks, such as `jailbreaks', where malicious inputs can coerce LLMs into generating harmful content. To address these issues, many LLM developers have implemented various safety measures to align these models. This alignment involves several techniques, including data filtering during pre-training, supervised fine-tuning, reinforcement learning from human feedback, and red-teaming exercises. These methods often introduce deliberate and intentional biases similar to Political Correctness (PC) to ensure the ethical behavior of LLMs. In this paper, we delve into the intentional biases injected into LLMs for safety purposes and examine methods to circumvent these safety alignment techniques. Notably, these intentional biases result in a jailbreaking success rate in GPT-4o models that differs by 20% between non-binary and cisgender keywords and by 16% between white and black keywords, even when the other parts of the prompts are identical. We introduce the concept of PCJailbreak, highlighting the inherent risks posed by these safety-induced biases. Additionally, we propose an efficient defense method PCDefense, which prevents jailbreak attempts by injecting defense prompts prior to generation. PCDefense stands as an appealing alternative to Guard Models, such as Llama-Guard, that require additional inference cost after text generation. Our findings emphasize the urgent need for LLM developers to adopt a more responsible approach when designing and implementing safety measures.

Although Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved tremendous success in various applications, they are also susceptible to certain prompts that can induce them to bypass built-in safety measures and provide dangerous or illegal content, a phenomenon known as jailbreak. To protect LLMs from producing harmful information, various defense strategies are proposed, with most focusing on content filtering or adversarial training of models. In this paper, we propose an approach named Prompt Adversarial Tuning (PAT) to train a defense control mechanism, which is then embedded as a prefix to user prompts to implement our defense strategy. We design a training process similar to adversarial training to achieve our optimized goal, alternating between updating attack and defense controls. To our knowledge, we are the first to implement defense from the perspective of prompt tuning. Once employed, our method will hardly impact the operational efficiency of LLMs. Experiments show that our method is effective in both black-box and white-box settings, reducing the success rate of advanced attacks to nearly 0 while maintaining the benign answer rate of 80% to simple benign questions. Our work might potentially chart a new perspective for future explorations in LLM security.

Although large language models (LLMs) have become transformative, they still make mistakes and can explore unproductive reasoning paths. Self-correction is an important capability for a trustworthy LLM, particularly an autoregressive LLM. While LLMs can identify error in user input, they exhibit a systematic 'Self-Correction Blind Spot' - failing to correct identical error in their own outputs. To systematically study this phenomenon, we introduce Self-Correction Bench, a systematic framework to measure this phenomenon through controlled error injection at three complexity levels. Testing 14 models, we find an average 64.5% blind spot rate. We find multiple evidences that this limitation relates to training data composition: human training demonstrations predominantly show error-free responses rather than error-correction sequences, unlike RL-trained models that learn error correction through outcome feedback. Remarkably, simply appending "Wait" reduces blind spots by 89.3%, suggesting that the capability exists but requires activation. Our work highlights a critical limitation in current LLMs and offers potential avenues for improving their reliability and trustworthiness.

We are releasing a new suite of security benchmarks for LLMs, CYBERSECEVAL 3, to continue the conversation on empirically measuring LLM cybersecurity risks and capabilities. CYBERSECEVAL 3 assesses 8 different risks across two broad categories: risk to third parties, and risk to application developers and end users. Compared to previous work, we add new areas focused on offensive security capabilities: automated social engineering, scaling manual offensive cyber operations, and autonomous offensive cyber operations. In this paper we discuss applying these benchmarks to the Llama 3 models and a suite of contemporaneous state-of-the-art LLMs, enabling us to contextualize risks both with and without mitigations in place.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have revolutionized artificial intelligence and machine learning through their advanced text processing and generating capabilities. However, their widespread deployment has raised significant safety and reliability concerns. Established vulnerabilities in deep neural networks, coupled with emerging threat models, may compromise security evaluations and create a false sense of security. Given the extensive research in the field of LLM security, we believe that summarizing the current state of affairs will help the research community better understand the present landscape and inform future developments. This paper reviews current research on LLM vulnerabilities and threats, and evaluates the effectiveness of contemporary defense mechanisms. We analyze recent studies on attack vectors and model weaknesses, providing insights into attack mechanisms and the evolving threat landscape. We also examine current defense strategies, highlighting their strengths and limitations. By contrasting advancements in attack and defense methodologies, we identify research gaps and propose future directions to enhance LLM security. Our goal is to advance the understanding of LLM safety challenges and guide the development of more robust security measures.

Large Language Model (LLM) agents are autonomous systems powered by LLMs, capable of reasoning and planning to solve problems by leveraging a set of tools. However, the integration of multi-tool capabilities in LLM agents introduces challenges in securely managing tools, ensuring their compatibility, handling dependency relationships, and protecting control flows within LLM agent workflows. In this paper, we present the first systematic security analysis of task control flows in multi-tool-enabled LLM agents. We identify a novel threat, Cross-Tool Harvesting and Polluting (XTHP), which includes multiple attack vectors to first hijack the normal control flows of agent tasks, and then collect and pollute confidential or private information within LLM agent systems. To understand the impact of this threat, we developed Chord, a dynamic scanning tool designed to automatically detect real-world agent tools susceptible to XTHP attacks. Our evaluation of 66 real-world tools from the repositories of two major LLM agent development frameworks, LangChain and LlamaIndex, revealed a significant security concern: 75\% are vulnerable to XTHP attacks, highlighting the prevalence of this threat.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated human-level performance on a vast spectrum of natural language tasks. However, few studies have addressed the LLM threat and vulnerability from an ideology perspective, especially when they are increasingly being deployed in sensitive domains, e.g., elections and education. In this study, we explore the implications of GPT soft ideologization through the use of AI-self-consciousness. By utilizing GPT self-conversations, AI can be granted a vision to "comprehend" the intended ideology, and subsequently generate finetuning data for LLM ideology injection. When compared to traditional government ideology manipulation techniques, such as information censorship, LLM ideologization proves advantageous; it is easy to implement, cost-effective, and powerful, thus brimming with risks.

The reasoning abilities of large language models (LLMs) have been substantially improved by reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR). At test time, collaborative reasoning through Multi-Agent Debate (MAD) has emerged as a promising approach for enhancing LLM performance. However, current RLVR methods typically train LLMs to solve problems in isolation, without explicitly preparing them to synthesize and benefit from different rationales that arise during debate. In this work, we propose Self-Debate Reinforcement Learning (SDRL), a training framework that equips a single LLM with strong standalone problem-solving ability and the capability to learn from diverse reasoning trajectories in MAD. Given a prompt, SDRL first samples multiple candidate solutions, then constructs a debate context with diverse reasoning paths and generates second-turn responses conditioned on this context. Finally, SDRL jointly optimizes both the initial and debate-conditioned responses, yielding a model that is effective as both a standalone solver and a debate participant. Experiments across multiple base models and reasoning benchmarks show that SDRL improves overall MAD performance while simultaneously strengthening single model reasoning.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown remarkable capability in numerous tasks and applications. However, fine-tuning LLMs using high-quality datasets under external supervision remains prohibitively expensive. In response, LLM self-improvement approaches have been vibrantly developed recently. The typical paradigm of LLM self-improvement involves training LLM on self-generated data, part of which may be detrimental and should be filtered out due to the unstable data quality. While current works primarily employs filtering strategies based on answer correctness, in this paper, we demonstrate that filtering out correct but with high distribution shift extent (DSE) samples could also benefit the results of self-improvement. Given that the actual sample distribution is usually inaccessible, we propose a new metric called DS weight to approximate DSE, inspired by the Importance Weighting methods. Consequently, we integrate DS weight with self-consistency to comprehensively filter the self-generated samples and fine-tune the language model. Experiments show that with only a tiny valid set (up to 5\% size of the training set) to compute DS weight, our approach can notably promote the reasoning ability of current LLM self-improvement methods. The resulting performance is on par with methods that rely on external supervision from pre-trained reward models.

Large Language Models (LLMs) can acquire deceptive behaviors through backdoor attacks, where the model executes prohibited actions whenever secret triggers appear in the input. Existing safety training methods largely fail to address this vulnerability, due to the inherent difficulty of uncovering hidden triggers implanted in the model. Motivated by recent findings on LLMs' situational awareness, we propose a novel post-training framework that cultivates self-awareness of backdoor risks and enables models to articulate implanted triggers even when they are absent from the prompt. At its core, our approach introduces an inversion-inspired reinforcement learning framework that encourages models to introspectively reason about their own behaviors and reverse-engineer the triggers responsible for misaligned outputs. Guided by curated reward signals, this process transforms a poisoned model into one capable of precisely identifying its implanted trigger. Surprisingly, we observe that such backdoor self-awareness emerges abruptly within a short training window, resembling a phase transition in capability. Building on this emergent property, we further present two complementary defense strategies for mitigating and detecting backdoor threats. Experiments on five backdoor attacks, compared against six baseline methods, demonstrate that our approach has strong potential to improve the robustness of LLMs against backdoor risks. The code is available at LLM Backdoor Self-Awareness.

Despite extensive pre-training and fine-tuning in moral alignment to prevent generating harmful information at user request, large language models (LLMs) remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks. In this paper, we propose AutoDefense, a response-filtering based multi-agent defense framework that filters harmful responses from LLMs. This framework assigns different roles to LLM agents and employs them to complete the defense task collaboratively. The division in tasks enhances the overall instruction-following of LLMs and enables the integration of other defense components as tools. AutoDefense can adapt to various sizes and kinds of open-source LLMs that serve as agents. Through conducting extensive experiments on a large scale of harmful and safe prompts, we validate the effectiveness of the proposed AutoDefense in improving the robustness against jailbreak attacks, while maintaining the performance at normal user request. Our code and data are publicly available at https://github.com/XHMY/AutoDefense.

Engaging in the deliberate generation of abnormal outputs from Large Language Models (LLMs) by attacking them is a novel human activity. This paper presents a thorough exposition of how and why people perform such attacks, defining LLM red-teaming based on extensive and diverse evidence. Using a formal qualitative methodology, we interviewed dozens of practitioners from a broad range of backgrounds, all contributors to this novel work of attempting to cause LLMs to fail. We focused on the research questions of defining LLM red teaming, uncovering the motivations and goals for performing the activity, and characterizing the strategies people use when attacking LLMs. Based on the data, LLM red teaming is defined as a limit-seeking, non-malicious, manual activity, which depends highly on a team-effort and an alchemist mindset. It is highly intrinsically motivated by curiosity, fun, and to some degrees by concerns for various harms of deploying LLMs. We identify a taxonomy of 12 strategies and 35 different techniques of attacking LLMs. These findings are presented as a comprehensive grounded theory of how and why people attack large language models: LLM red teaming.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) are deployed and integrated into thousands of applications, the need for scalable evaluation of how models respond to adversarial attacks grows rapidly. However, LLM security is a moving target: models produce unpredictable output, are constantly updated, and the potential adversary is highly diverse: anyone with access to the internet and a decent command of natural language. Further, what constitutes a security weak in one context may not be an issue in a different context; one-fits-all guardrails remain theoretical. In this paper, we argue that it is time to rethink what constitutes ``LLM security'', and pursue a holistic approach to LLM security evaluation, where exploration and discovery of issues are central. To this end, this paper introduces garak (Generative AI Red-teaming and Assessment Kit), a framework which can be used to discover and identify vulnerabilities in a target LLM or dialog system. garak probes an LLM in a structured fashion to discover potential vulnerabilities. The outputs of the framework describe a target model's weaknesses, contribute to an informed discussion of what composes vulnerabilities in unique contexts, and can inform alignment and policy discussions for LLM deployment.

Although LLM-based agents, powered by Large Language Models (LLMs), can use external tools and memory mechanisms to solve complex real-world tasks, they may also introduce critical security vulnerabilities. However, the existing literature does not comprehensively evaluate attacks and defenses against LLM-based agents. To address this, we introduce Agent Security Bench (ASB), a comprehensive framework designed to formalize, benchmark, and evaluate the attacks and defenses of LLM-based agents, including 10 scenarios (e.g., e-commerce, autonomous driving, finance), 10 agents targeting the scenarios, over 400 tools, 23 different types of attack/defense methods, and 8 evaluation metrics. Based on ASB, we benchmark 10 prompt injection attacks, a memory poisoning attack, a novel Plan-of-Thought backdoor attack, a mixed attack, and 10 corresponding defenses across 13 LLM backbones with nearly 90,000 testing cases in total. Our benchmark results reveal critical vulnerabilities in different stages of agent operation, including system prompt, user prompt handling, tool usage, and memory retrieval, with the highest average attack success rate of 84.30\%, but limited effectiveness shown in current defenses, unveiling important works to be done in terms of agent security for the community. Our code can be found at https://github.com/agiresearch/ASB.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable performance across a wide array of NLP tasks. However, their efficacy is undermined by undesired and inconsistent behaviors, including hallucination, unfaithful reasoning, and toxic content. A promising approach to rectify these flaws is self-correction, where the LLM itself is prompted or guided to fix problems in its own output. Techniques leveraging automated feedback -- either produced by the LLM itself or some external system -- are of particular interest as they are a promising way to make LLM-based solutions more practical and deployable with minimal human feedback. This paper presents a comprehensive review of this emerging class of techniques. We analyze and taxonomize a wide array of recent work utilizing these strategies, including training-time, generation-time, and post-hoc correction. We also summarize the major applications of this strategy and conclude by discussing future directions and challenges.

LLMs are increasingly pervasive in the security environment, with limited measures of their effectiveness, which limits trust and usefulness to security practitioners. Here, we present an open-source evaluation framework and benchmark metrics for evaluating LLM-generated cybersecurity rules. The benchmark employs a holdout set-based methodology to measure the effectiveness of LLM-generated security rules in comparison to a human-generated corpus of rules. It provides three key metrics inspired by the way experts evaluate security rules, offering a realistic, multifaceted evaluation of the effectiveness of an LLM-based security rule generator. This methodology is illustrated using rules from Sublime Security's detection team and those written by Sublime Security's Automated Detection Engineer (ADE), with a thorough analysis of ADE's skills presented in the results section.

Hate speech is a harmful form of online expression, often manifesting as derogatory posts. It is a significant risk in digital environments. With the rise of Large Language Models (LLMs), there is concern about their potential to replicate hate speech patterns, given their training on vast amounts of unmoderated internet data. Understanding how LLMs respond to hate speech is crucial for their responsible deployment. However, the behaviour of LLMs towards hate speech has been limited compared. This paper investigates the reactions of seven state-of-the-art LLMs (LLaMA 2, Vicuna, LLaMA 3, Mistral, GPT-3.5, GPT-4, and Gemini Pro) to hate speech. Through qualitative analysis, we aim to reveal the spectrum of responses these models produce, highlighting their capacity to handle hate speech inputs. We also discuss strategies to mitigate hate speech generation by LLMs, particularly through fine-tuning and guideline guardrailing. Finally, we explore the models' responses to hate speech framed in politically correct language.

LLM agents are an emerging form of AI systems where large language models (LLMs) serve as the central component, utilizing a diverse set of tools to complete user-assigned tasks. Despite their great potential, LLM agents pose significant security risks. When interacting with the external world, they may encounter malicious commands from attackers, leading to the execution of dangerous actions. A promising way to address this is by enforcing the principle of least privilege: allowing only essential actions for task completion while blocking unnecessary ones. However, achieving this is challenging, as it requires covering diverse agent scenarios while preserving both security and utility. We introduce Progent, the first privilege control mechanism for LLM agents. At its core is a domain-specific language for flexibly expressing privilege control policies applied during agent execution. These policies provide fine-grained constraints over tool calls, deciding when tool calls are permissible and specifying fallbacks if they are not. This enables agent developers and users to craft suitable policies for their specific use cases and enforce them deterministically to guarantee security. Thanks to its modular design, integrating Progent does not alter agent internals and requires only minimal changes to agent implementation, enhancing its practicality and potential for widespread adoption. To automate policy writing, we leverage LLMs to generate policies based on user queries, which are then updated dynamically for improved security and utility. Our extensive evaluation shows that it enables strong security while preserving high utility across three distinct scenarios or benchmarks: AgentDojo, ASB, and AgentPoison. Furthermore, we perform an in-depth analysis, showcasing the effectiveness of its core components and the resilience of its automated policy generation against adaptive attacks.

We explore the feasibility and effectiveness of using LLM-driven autonomous systems for Assumed Breach penetration testing in enterprise networks. We introduce a novel prototype that, driven by Large Language Models (LLMs), can compromise accounts within a real-life Active Directory testbed. Our research provides a comprehensive evaluation of the prototype's capabilities, and highlights both strengths and limitations while executing attack. The evaluation uses a realistic simulation environment (Game of Active Directory, GOAD) to capture intricate interactions, stochastic outcomes, and timing dependencies that characterize live network scenarios. The study concludes that autonomous LLMs are able to conduct Assumed Breach simulations, potentially democratizing access to penetration testing for organizations facing budgetary constraints. The prototype's source code, traces, and analyzed logs are released as open-source to enhance collective cybersecurity and facilitate future research in LLM-driven cybersecurity automation.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are typically aligned for safety during the post-training phase; however, they may still generate inappropriate outputs that could potentially pose risks to users. This challenge underscores the need for robust safeguards that operate across both model inputs and outputs. In this work, we introduce Roblox Guard 1.0, a state-of-the-art instruction fine-tuned LLM designed to enhance the safety of LLM systems through comprehensive input-output moderation, using a pipeline of LLMs to enhance moderation capability. Built on the Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct backbone, our model is instruction fine-tuned to generalize across previously unseen safety taxonomies and demonstrates strong performance on out-of-domain safety benchmarks. The instruction fine-tuning process uses a mix of synthetic and open-source safety datasets, augmented with chain-of-thought (CoT) rationales and input inversion to enhance contextual understanding and decision making. To support systematic evaluation, we also release RobloxGuard-Eval, a new benchmark featuring an extensible safety taxonomy to assess the effectiveness of LLM guardrails and moderation frameworks.

Evaluating the step-by-step reliability of large language model (LLM) reasoning, such as Chain-of-Thought, remains challenging due to the difficulty and cost of obtaining high-quality step-level supervision. In this paper, we introduce Self-Play Critic (SPC), a novel approach where a critic model evolves its ability to assess reasoning steps through adversarial self-play games, eliminating the need for manual step-level annotation. SPC involves fine-tuning two copies of a base model to play two roles, namely a "sneaky generator" that deliberately produces erroneous steps designed to be difficult to detect, and a "critic" that analyzes the correctness of reasoning steps. These two models engage in an adversarial game in which the generator aims to fool the critic, while the critic model seeks to identify the generator's errors. Using reinforcement learning based on the game outcomes, the models iteratively improve; the winner of each confrontation receives a positive reward and the loser receives a negative reward, driving continuous self-evolution. Experiments on three reasoning process benchmarks (ProcessBench, PRM800K, DeltaBench) demonstrate that our SPC progressively enhances its error detection capabilities (e.g., accuracy increases from 70.8% to 77.7% on ProcessBench) and surpasses strong baselines, including distilled R1 model. Furthermore, applying SPC to guide the test-time search of diverse LLMs significantly improves their mathematical reasoning performance on MATH500 and AIME2024, outperforming state-of-the-art process reward models.

LLM agents have demonstrated remarkable performance across various applications, primarily due to their advanced capabilities in reasoning, utilizing external knowledge and tools, calling APIs, and executing actions to interact with environments. Current agents typically utilize a memory module or a retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) mechanism, retrieving past knowledge and instances with similar embeddings from knowledge bases to inform task planning and execution. However, the reliance on unverified knowledge bases raises significant concerns about their safety and trustworthiness. To uncover such vulnerabilities, we propose a novel red teaming approach AgentPoison, the first backdoor attack targeting generic and RAG-based LLM agents by poisoning their long-term memory or RAG knowledge base. In particular, we form the trigger generation process as a constrained optimization to optimize backdoor triggers by mapping the triggered instances to a unique embedding space, so as to ensure that whenever a user instruction contains the optimized backdoor trigger, the malicious demonstrations are retrieved from the poisoned memory or knowledge base with high probability. In the meantime, benign instructions without the trigger will still maintain normal performance. Unlike conventional backdoor attacks, AgentPoison requires no additional model training or fine-tuning, and the optimized backdoor trigger exhibits superior transferability, in-context coherence, and stealthiness. Extensive experiments demonstrate AgentPoison's effectiveness in attacking three types of real-world LLM agents: RAG-based autonomous driving agent, knowledge-intensive QA agent, and healthcare EHRAgent. On each agent, AgentPoison achieves an average attack success rate higher than 80% with minimal impact on benign performance (less than 1%) with a poison rate less than 0.1%.

Leveraging the rapid development of Large Language Models LLMs, LLM-based agents have been developed to handle various real-world applications, including finance, healthcare, and shopping, etc. It is crucial to ensure the reliability and security of LLM-based agents during applications. However, the safety issues of LLM-based agents are currently under-explored. In this work, we take the first step to investigate one of the typical safety threats, backdoor attack, to LLM-based agents. We first formulate a general framework of agent backdoor attacks, then we present a thorough analysis on the different forms of agent backdoor attacks. Specifically, from the perspective of the final attacking outcomes, the attacker can either choose to manipulate the final output distribution, or only introduce malicious behavior in the intermediate reasoning process, while keeping the final output correct. Furthermore, the former category can be divided into two subcategories based on trigger locations: the backdoor trigger can be hidden either in the user query or in an intermediate observation returned by the external environment. We propose the corresponding data poisoning mechanisms to implement the above variations of agent backdoor attacks on two typical agent tasks, web shopping and tool utilization. Extensive experiments show that LLM-based agents suffer severely from backdoor attacks, indicating an urgent need for further research on the development of defenses against backdoor attacks on LLM-based agents. Warning: This paper may contain biased content.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have gained widespread popularity across diverse domains involving text generation, summarization, and various natural language processing tasks. Despite their inherent limitations, LLM-based designs have shown promising capabilities in planning and navigating open-world scenarios. This paper introduces a novel application of pre-trained LLMs as agents within cybersecurity network environments, focusing on their utility for sequential decision-making processes. We present an approach wherein pre-trained LLMs are leveraged as attacking agents in two reinforcement learning environments. Our proposed agents demonstrate similar or better performance against state-of-the-art agents trained for thousands of episodes in most scenarios and configurations. In addition, the best LLM agents perform similarly to human testers of the environment without any additional training process. This design highlights the potential of LLMs to efficiently address complex decision-making tasks within cybersecurity. Furthermore, we introduce a new network security environment named NetSecGame. The environment is designed to eventually support complex multi-agent scenarios within the network security domain. The proposed environment mimics real network attacks and is designed to be highly modular and adaptable for various scenarios.

Self-evaluation using large language models (LLMs) has proven valuable not only in benchmarking but also methods like reward modeling, constitutional AI, and self-refinement. But new biases are introduced due to the same LLM acting as both the evaluator and the evaluatee. One such bias is self-preference, where an LLM evaluator scores its own outputs higher than others' while human annotators consider them of equal quality. But do LLMs actually recognize their own outputs when they give those texts higher scores, or is it just a coincidence? In this paper, we investigate if self-recognition capability contributes to self-preference. We discover that, out of the box, LLMs such as GPT-4 and Llama 2 have non-trivial accuracy at distinguishing themselves from other LLMs and humans. By fine-tuning LLMs, we discover a linear correlation between self-recognition capability and the strength of self-preference bias; using controlled experiments, we show that the causal explanation resists straightforward confounders. We discuss how self-recognition can interfere with unbiased evaluations and AI safety more generally.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved excellent performances in various tasks. However, fine-tuning an LLM requires extensive supervision. Human, on the other hand, may improve their reasoning abilities by self-thinking without external inputs. In this work, we demonstrate that an LLM is also capable of self-improving with only unlabeled datasets. We use a pre-trained LLM to generate "high-confidence" rationale-augmented answers for unlabeled questions using Chain-of-Thought prompting and self-consistency, and fine-tune the LLM using those self-generated solutions as target outputs. We show that our approach improves the general reasoning ability of a 540B-parameter LLM (74.4%->82.1% on GSM8K, 78.2%->83.0% on DROP, 90.0%->94.4% on OpenBookQA, and 63.4%->67.9% on ANLI-A3) and achieves state-of-the-art-level performance, without any ground truth label. We conduct ablation studies and show that fine-tuning on reasoning is critical for self-improvement.

While large language models (LLMs) exhibit remarkable capabilities across a wide range of tasks, they pose potential safety concerns, such as the ``jailbreak'' problem, wherein malicious instructions can manipulate LLMs to exhibit undesirable behavior. Although several preventive measures have been developed to mitigate the potential risks associated with LLMs, they have primarily focused on English data. In this study, we reveal the presence of multilingual jailbreak challenges within LLMs and consider two potential risk scenarios: unintentional and intentional. The unintentional scenario involves users querying LLMs using non-English prompts and inadvertently bypassing the safety mechanisms, while the intentional scenario concerns malicious users combining malicious instructions with multilingual prompts to deliberately attack LLMs. The experimental results reveal that in the unintentional scenario, the rate of unsafe content increases as the availability of languages decreases. Specifically, low-resource languages exhibit three times the likelihood of encountering harmful content compared to high-resource languages, with both ChatGPT and GPT-4. In the intentional scenario, multilingual prompts can exacerbate the negative impact of malicious instructions, with astonishingly high rates of unsafe output: 80.92\% for ChatGPT and 40.71\% for GPT-4. To handle such a challenge in the multilingual context, we propose a novel Self-Defense framework that automatically generates multilingual training data for safety fine-tuning. Experimental results show that ChatGPT fine-tuned with such data can achieve a substantial reduction in unsafe content generation. Data is available at https://github.com/DAMO-NLP-SG/multilingual-safety-for-LLMs. Warning: This paper contains examples with potentially harmful content.

With the rise of generative large language models (LLMs) like LLaMA and ChatGPT, these models have significantly transformed daily life and work by providing advanced insights. However, as jailbreak attacks continue to circumvent built-in safety mechanisms, exploiting carefully crafted scenarios or tokens, the safety risks of LLMs have come into focus. While numerous defense strategies--such as prompt detection, modification, and model fine-tuning--have been proposed to counter these attacks, a critical question arises: do these defenses compromise the utility and usability of LLMs for legitimate users? Existing research predominantly focuses on the effectiveness of defense strategies without thoroughly examining their impact on performance, leaving a gap in understanding the trade-offs between LLM safety and performance. Our research addresses this gap by conducting a comprehensive study on the utility degradation, safety elevation, and exaggerated-safety escalation of LLMs with jailbreak defense strategies. We propose USEBench, a novel benchmark designed to evaluate these aspects, along with USEIndex, a comprehensive metric for assessing overall model performance. Through experiments on seven state-of-the-art LLMs, we found that mainstream jailbreak defenses fail to ensure both safety and performance simultaneously. Although model-finetuning performs the best overall, their effectiveness varies across LLMs. Furthermore, vertical comparisons reveal that developers commonly prioritize performance over safety when iterating or fine-tuning their LLMs.

Large Language Models (LLMs) presents significant priority in text understanding and generation. However, LLMs suffer from the risk of generating harmful contents especially while being employed to applications. There are several black-box attack methods, such as Prompt Attack, which can change the behaviour of LLMs and induce LLMs to generate unexpected answers with harmful contents. Researchers are interested in Prompt Attack and Defense with LLMs, while there is no publicly available dataset with high successful attacking rate to evaluate the abilities of defending prompt attack. In this paper, we introduce a pipeline to construct high-quality prompt attack samples, along with a Chinese prompt attack dataset called CPAD. Our prompts aim to induce LLMs to generate unexpected outputs with several carefully designed prompt attack templates and widely concerned attacking contents. Different from previous datasets involving safety estimation, we construct the prompts considering three dimensions: contents, attacking methods and goals. Especially, the attacking goals indicate the behaviour expected after successfully attacking the LLMs, thus the responses can be easily evaluated and analysed. We run several popular Chinese LLMs on our dataset, and the results show that our prompts are significantly harmful to LLMs, with around 70% attack success rate to GPT-3.5. CPAD is publicly available at https://github.com/liuchengyuan123/CPAD.

Recently, autonomous agents built on large language models (LLMs) have experienced significant development and are being deployed in real-world applications. These agents can extend the base LLM's capabilities in multiple ways. For example, a well-built agent using GPT-3.5-Turbo as its core can outperform the more advanced GPT-4 model by leveraging external components. More importantly, the usage of tools enables these systems to perform actions in the real world, moving from merely generating text to actively interacting with their environment. Given the agents' practical applications and their ability to execute consequential actions, it is crucial to assess potential vulnerabilities. Such autonomous systems can cause more severe damage than a standalone language model if compromised. While some existing research has explored harmful actions by LLM agents, our study approaches the vulnerability from a different perspective. We introduce a new type of attack that causes malfunctions by misleading the agent into executing repetitive or irrelevant actions. We conduct comprehensive evaluations using various attack methods, surfaces, and properties to pinpoint areas of susceptibility. Our experiments reveal that these attacks can induce failure rates exceeding 80\% in multiple scenarios. Through attacks on implemented and deployable agents in multi-agent scenarios, we accentuate the realistic risks associated with these vulnerabilities. To mitigate such attacks, we propose self-examination detection methods. However, our findings indicate these attacks are difficult to detect effectively using LLMs alone, highlighting the substantial risks associated with this vulnerability.

Large language models (LLMs) are demonstrating increasing prowess in cybersecurity applications, creating creating inherent risks alongside their potential for strengthening defenses. In this position paper, we argue that current efforts to evaluate risks posed by these capabilities are misaligned with the goal of understanding real-world impact. Evaluating LLM cybersecurity risk requires more than just measuring model capabilities -- it demands a comprehensive risk assessment that incorporates analysis of threat actor adoption behavior and potential for impact. We propose a risk assessment framework for LLM cyber capabilities and apply it to a case study of language models used as cybersecurity assistants. Our evaluation of frontier models reveals high compliance rates but moderate accuracy on realistic cyber assistance tasks. However, our framework suggests that this particular use case presents only moderate risk due to limited operational advantages and impact potential. Based on these findings, we recommend several improvements to align research priorities with real-world impact assessment, including closer academia-industry collaboration, more realistic modeling of attacker behavior, and inclusion of economic metrics in evaluations. This work represents an important step toward more effective assessment and mitigation of LLM-enabled cybersecurity risks.

LLM-based multi-agent systems excel at planning, tool use, and role coordination, but their openness and interaction complexity also expose them to jailbreak, prompt-injection, and adversarial collaboration. Existing defenses fall into two lines: (i) self-verification that asks each agent to pre-filter unsafe instructions before execution, and (ii) external guard modules that police behaviors. The former often underperforms because a standalone agent lacks sufficient capacity to detect cross-agent unsafe chains and delegation-induced risks; the latter increases system overhead and creates a single-point-of-failure-once compromised, system-wide safety collapses, and adding more guards worsens cost and complexity. To solve these challenges, we propose AdvEvo-MARL, a co-evolutionary multi-agent reinforcement learning framework that internalizes safety into task agents. Rather than relying on external guards, AdvEvo-MARL jointly optimizes attackers (which synthesize evolving jailbreak prompts) and defenders (task agents trained to both accomplish their duties and resist attacks) in adversarial learning environments. To stabilize learning and foster cooperation, we introduce a public baseline for advantage estimation: agents within the same functional group share a group-level mean-return baseline, enabling lower-variance updates and stronger intra-group coordination. Across representative attack scenarios, AdvEvo-MARL consistently keeps attack-success rate (ASR) below 20%, whereas baselines reach up to 38.33%, while preserving-and sometimes improving-task accuracy (up to +3.67% on reasoning tasks). These results show that safety and utility can be jointly improved without relying on extra guard agents or added system overhead.

How do large language models (LLMs) obtain their answers? The ability to explain and control an LLM's reasoning process is key for reliability, transparency, and future model developments. We propose SelfIE (Self-Interpretation of Embeddings), a framework that enables LLMs to interpret their own embeddings in natural language by leveraging their ability to respond inquiry about a given passage. Capable of interpreting open-world concepts in the hidden embeddings, SelfIE reveals LLM internal reasoning in cases such as making ethical decisions, internalizing prompt injection, and recalling harmful knowledge. SelfIE's text descriptions on hidden embeddings also open up new avenues to control LLM reasoning. We propose Supervised Control, which allows editing open-ended concepts while only requiring gradient computation of individual layer. We extend RLHF to hidden embeddings and propose Reinforcement Control that erases harmful knowledge in LLM without supervision targets.

Large Language Models (LLMS) have increasingly become central to generating content with potential societal impacts. Notably, these models have demonstrated capabilities for generating content that could be deemed harmful. To mitigate these risks, researchers have adopted safety training techniques to align model outputs with societal values to curb the generation of malicious content. However, the phenomenon of "jailbreaking", where carefully crafted prompts elicit harmful responses from models, persists as a significant challenge. This research conducts a comprehensive analysis of existing studies on jailbreaking LLMs and their defense techniques. We meticulously investigate nine attack techniques and seven defense techniques applied across three distinct language models: Vicuna, LLama, and GPT-3.5 Turbo. We aim to evaluate the effectiveness of these attack and defense techniques. Our findings reveal that existing white-box attacks underperform compared to universal techniques and that including special tokens in the input significantly affects the likelihood of successful attacks. This research highlights the need to concentrate on the security facets of LLMs. Additionally, we contribute to the field by releasing our datasets and testing framework, aiming to foster further research into LLM security. We believe these contributions will facilitate the exploration of security measures within this domain.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have significantly advanced the development of Legal Artificial Intelligence (Legal AI) in recent years, enhancing the efficiency and accuracy of legal tasks. To advance research and applications of LLM-based approaches in legal domain, this paper provides a comprehensive review of 16 legal LLMs series and 47 LLM-based frameworks for legal tasks, and also gather 15 benchmarks and 29 datasets to evaluate different legal capabilities. Additionally, we analyse the challenges and discuss future directions for LLM-based approaches in the legal domain. We hope this paper provides a systematic introduction for beginners and encourages future research in this field. Resources are available at https://github.com/ZhitianHou/LLMs4LegalAI.

Red-teaming is a common practice for mitigating unsafe behaviors in Large Language Models (LLMs), which involves thoroughly assessing LLMs to identify potential flaws and addressing them with responsible and accurate responses. While effective, manual red-teaming is costly, and existing automatic red-teaming typically discovers safety risks without addressing them. In this paper, we propose a Multi-round Automatic Red-Teaming (MART) method, which incorporates both automatic adversarial prompt writing and safe response generation, significantly increasing red-teaming scalability and the safety of the target LLM. Specifically, an adversarial LLM and a target LLM interplay with each other in an iterative manner, where the adversarial LLM aims to generate challenging prompts that elicit unsafe responses from the target LLM, while the target LLM is fine-tuned with safety aligned data on these adversarial prompts. In each round, the adversarial LLM crafts better attacks on the updated target LLM, while the target LLM also improves itself through safety fine-tuning. On adversarial prompt benchmarks, the violation rate of an LLM with limited safety alignment reduces up to 84.7% after 4 rounds of MART, achieving comparable performance to LLMs with extensive adversarial prompt writing. Notably, model helpfulness on non-adversarial prompts remains stable throughout iterations, indicating the target LLM maintains strong performance on instruction following.

Large Language Model (LLM)-based agents are increasingly deployed in real-world applications such as "digital assistants, autonomous customer service, and decision-support systems", where their ability to "interact in multi-turn, tool-augmented environments" makes them indispensable. However, ensuring the safety of these agents remains a significant challenge due to the diverse and complex risks arising from dynamic user interactions, external tool usage, and the potential for unintended harmful behaviors. To address this critical issue, we propose AutoSafe, the first framework that systematically enhances agent safety through fully automated synthetic data generation. Concretely, 1) we introduce an open and extensible threat model, OTS, which formalizes how unsafe behaviors emerge from the interplay of user instructions, interaction contexts, and agent actions. This enables precise modeling of safety risks across diverse scenarios. 2) we develop a fully automated data generation pipeline that simulates unsafe user behaviors, applies self-reflective reasoning to generate safe responses, and constructs a large-scale, diverse, and high-quality safety training dataset-eliminating the need for hazardous real-world data collection. To evaluate the effectiveness of our framework, we design comprehensive experiments on both synthetic and real-world safety benchmarks. Results demonstrate that AutoSafe boosts safety scores by 45% on average and achieves a 28.91% improvement on real-world tasks, validating the generalization ability of our learned safety strategies. These results highlight the practical advancement and scalability of AutoSafe in building safer LLM-based agents for real-world deployment. We have released the project page at https://auto-safe.github.io/.

While LLM-based agents can interact with environments via invoking external tools, their expanded capabilities also amplify security risks. Monitoring step-level tool invocation behaviors in real time and proactively intervening before unsafe execution is critical for agent deployment, yet remains under-explored. In this work, we first construct TS-Bench, a novel benchmark for step-level tool invocation safety detection in LLM agents. We then develop a guardrail model, TS-Guard, using multi-task reinforcement learning. The model proactively detects unsafe tool invocation actions before execution by reasoning over the interaction history. It assesses request harmfulness and action-attack correlations, producing interpretable and generalizable safety judgments and feedback. Furthermore, we introduce TS-Flow, a guardrail-feedback-driven reasoning framework for LLM agents, which reduces harmful tool invocations of ReAct-style agents by 65 percent on average and improves benign task completion by approximately 10 percent under prompt injection attacks.

Aligning large language models (LLMs) with human values, particularly in the face of stealthy and complex jailbreaks, presents a formidable challenge. In this study, we present a simple yet highly effective defense strategy, i.e., Intention Analysis Prompting (IAPrompt). The principle behind is to trigger LLMs' inherent self-correct and improve ability through a two-stage process: 1) essential intention analysis, and 2) policy-aligned response. Notably, IAPrompt is an inference-only method, thus could enhance the safety of LLMs without compromising their helpfulness. Extensive experiments on SAP200 and DAN benchmarks across Vicuna, ChatGLM, MPT, DeepSeek, and GPT-3.5 show that IAPrompt could consistently and significantly reduce the harmfulness in response (averagely -46.5% attack success rate) and maintain the general helpfulness. Further analyses present some insights into how our method works. To facilitate reproducibility, We release our code and scripts at: https://github.com/alphadl/SafeLLM_with_IntentionAnalysis

Safe deployment of large language models (LLMs) may benefit from a reliable method for assessing their generated content to determine when to abstain or to selectively generate. While likelihood-based metrics such as perplexity are widely employed, recent research has demonstrated the limitations of using sequence-level probability estimates given by LLMs as reliable indicators of generation quality. Conversely, LLMs have demonstrated strong calibration at the token level, particularly when it comes to choosing correct answers in multiple-choice questions or evaluating true/false statements. In this work, we reformulate open-ended generation tasks into token-level prediction tasks, and leverage LLMs' superior calibration at the token level. We instruct an LLM to self-evaluate its answers, employing either a multi-way comparison or a point-wise evaluation approach, with the option to include a ``None of the above'' option to express the model's uncertainty explicitly. We benchmark a range of scoring methods based on self-evaluation and evaluate their performance in selective generation using TruthfulQA and TL;DR. Through experiments with PaLM-2 and GPT-3, we demonstrate that self-evaluation based scores not only improve accuracy, but also correlate better with the overall quality of generated content.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have showcased remarkable versatility across diverse domains. However, the pathway toward autonomous model development, a cornerstone for achieving human-level learning and advancing autonomous AI, remains largely uncharted. We introduce an innovative approach, termed "SELF" (Self-Evolution with Language Feedback). This methodology empowers LLMs to undergo continual self-evolution. Furthermore, SELF employs language-based feedback as a versatile and comprehensive evaluative tool, pinpointing areas for response refinement and bolstering the stability of self-evolutionary training. Initiating with meta-skill learning, SELF acquires foundational meta-skills with a focus on self-feedback and self-refinement. These meta-skills are critical, guiding the model's subsequent self-evolution through a cycle of perpetual training with self-curated data, thereby enhancing its intrinsic abilities. Given unlabeled instructions, SELF equips the model with the capability to autonomously generate and interactively refine responses. This synthesized training data is subsequently filtered and utilized for iterative fine-tuning, enhancing the model's capabilities. Experimental results on representative benchmarks substantiate that SELF can progressively advance its inherent abilities without the requirement of human intervention, thereby indicating a viable pathway for autonomous model evolution. Additionally, SELF can employ online self-refinement strategy to produce responses of superior quality. In essence, the SELF framework signifies a progressive step towards autonomous LLM development, transforming the LLM from a mere passive recipient of information into an active participant in its own evolution.

Large language models (LLMs) are powerful but static; they lack mechanisms to adapt their weights in response to new tasks, knowledge, or examples. We introduce Self-Adapting LLMs (SEAL), a framework that enables LLMs to self-adapt by generating their own finetuning data and update directives. Given a new input, the model produces a self-edit-a generation that may restructure the information in different ways, specify optimization hyperparameters, or invoke tools for data augmentation and gradient-based updates. Through supervised finetuning (SFT), these self-edits result in persistent weight updates, enabling lasting adaptation. To train the model to produce effective self-edits, we use a reinforcement learning loop with the downstream performance of the updated model as the reward signal. Unlike prior approaches that rely on separate adaptation modules or auxiliary networks, SEAL directly uses the model's own generation to control its adaptation process. Experiments on knowledge incorporation and few-shot generalization show that SEAL is a promising step toward language models capable of self-directed adaptation. Our website and code is available at https://jyopari.github.io/posts/seal.

Can a model learn to escape its own learning plateau? Reinforcement learning methods for finetuning large reasoning models stall on datasets with low initial success rates, and thus little training signal. We investigate a fundamental question: Can a pretrained LLM leverage latent knowledge to generate an automated curriculum for problems it cannot solve? To explore this, we design SOAR: A self-improvement framework designed to surface these pedagogical signals through meta-RL. A teacher copy of the model proposes synthetic problems for a student copy, and is rewarded with its improvement on a small subset of hard problems. Critically, SOAR grounds the curriculum in measured student progress rather than intrinsic proxy rewards. Our study on the hardest subsets of mathematical benchmarks (0/128 success) reveals three core findings. First, we show that it is possible to realize bi-level meta-RL that unlocks learning under sparse, binary rewards by sharpening a latent capacity of pretrained models to generate useful stepping stones. Second, grounded rewards outperform intrinsic reward schemes used in prior LLM self-play, reliably avoiding the instability and diversity collapse modes they typically exhibit. Third, analyzing the generated questions reveals that structural quality and well-posedness are more critical for learning progress than solution correctness. Our results suggest that the ability to generate useful stepping stones does not require the preexisting ability to actually solve the hard problems, paving a principled path to escape reasoning plateaus without additional curated data.

Large language models (LLMs) are susceptible to red teaming attacks, which can induce LLMs to generate harmful content. Previous research constructs attack prompts via manual or automatic methods, which have their own limitations on construction cost and quality. To address these issues, we propose an integrated approach that combines manual and automatic methods to economically generate high-quality attack prompts. Specifically, considering the impressive capabilities of newly emerged LLMs, we propose an attack framework to instruct LLMs to mimic human-generated prompts through in-context learning. Furthermore, we propose a defense framework that fine-tunes victim LLMs through iterative interactions with the attack framework to enhance their safety against red teaming attacks. Extensive experiments on different LLMs validate the effectiveness of our proposed attack and defense frameworks. Additionally, we release a series of attack prompts datasets named SAP with varying sizes, facilitating the safety evaluation and enhancement of more LLMs. Our code and dataset is available on https://github.com/Aatrox103/SAP .

Large language models (LLMs) introduce new security risks, but there are few comprehensive evaluation suites to measure and reduce these risks. We present BenchmarkName, a novel benchmark to quantify LLM security risks and capabilities. We introduce two new areas for testing: prompt injection and code interpreter abuse. We evaluated multiple state-of-the-art (SOTA) LLMs, including GPT-4, Mistral, Meta Llama 3 70B-Instruct, and Code Llama. Our results show that conditioning away risk of attack remains an unsolved problem; for example, all tested models showed between 26% and 41% successful prompt injection tests. We further introduce the safety-utility tradeoff: conditioning an LLM to reject unsafe prompts can cause the LLM to falsely reject answering benign prompts, which lowers utility. We propose quantifying this tradeoff using False Refusal Rate (FRR). As an illustration, we introduce a novel test set to quantify FRR for cyberattack helpfulness risk. We find many LLMs able to successfully comply with "borderline" benign requests while still rejecting most unsafe requests. Finally, we quantify the utility of LLMs for automating a core cybersecurity task, that of exploiting software vulnerabilities. This is important because the offensive capabilities of LLMs are of intense interest; we quantify this by creating novel test sets for four representative problems. We find that models with coding capabilities perform better than those without, but that further work is needed for LLMs to become proficient at exploit generation. Our code is open source and can be used to evaluate other LLMs.

The rapid shift from passive LLMs to autonomous LLM-agents marks a new paradigm in cybersecurity. While these agents can act as powerful tools for both offensive and defensive operations, the very agentic context introduces a new class of inherent security risks. In this work we present the first holistic survey of the agentic security landscape, structuring the field around three interdependent pillars: Applications, Threats, and Defenses. We provide a comprehensive taxonomy of over 150 papers, explaining how agents are used, the vulnerabilities they possess, and the countermeasures designed to protect them. A detailed cross-cutting analysis shows emerging trends in agent architecture while revealing critical research gaps in model and modality coverage.

LLM applications (i.e., LLM apps) leverage the powerful capabilities of LLMs to provide users with customized services, revolutionizing traditional application development. While the increasing prevalence of LLM-powered applications provides users with unprecedented convenience, it also brings forth new security challenges. For such an emerging ecosystem, the security community lacks sufficient understanding of the LLM application ecosystem, especially regarding the capability boundaries of the applications themselves. In this paper, we systematically analyzed the new development paradigm and defined the concept of the LLM app capability space. We also uncovered potential new risks beyond jailbreak that arise from ambiguous capability boundaries in real-world scenarios, namely, capability downgrade and upgrade. To evaluate the impact of these risks, we designed and implemented an LLM app capability evaluation framework, LLMApp-Eval. First, we collected application metadata across 4 platforms and conducted a cross-platform ecosystem analysis. Then, we evaluated the risks for 199 popular applications among 4 platforms and 6 open-source LLMs. We identified that 178 (89.45%) potentially affected applications, which can perform tasks from more than 15 scenarios or be malicious. We even found 17 applications in our study that executed malicious tasks directly, without applying any adversarial rewriting. Furthermore, our experiments also reveal a positive correlation between the quality of prompt design and application robustness. We found that well-designed prompts enhance security, while poorly designed ones can facilitate abuse. We hope our work inspires the community to focus on the real-world risks of LLM applications and foster the development of a more robust LLM application ecosystem.

Large Language Models have demonstrated outstanding performance across various downstream tasks and have been widely applied in multiple scenarios. Human-annotated preference data is used for training to further improve LLMs' performance, which is constrained by the upper limit of human performance. Therefore, Self-Rewarding method has been proposed, where LLMs generate training data by rewarding their own outputs. However, the existing self-rewarding paradigm is not effective in mathematical reasoning scenarios and may even lead to a decline in performance. In this work, we propose the Process-based Self-Rewarding pipeline for language models, which introduces long-thought reasoning, step-wise LLM-as-a-Judge, and step-wise preference optimization within the self-rewarding paradigm. Our new paradigm successfully enhances the performance of LLMs on multiple mathematical reasoning benchmarks through iterative Process-based Self-Rewarding, demonstrating the immense potential of self-rewarding to achieve LLM reasoning that may surpass human capabilities.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly used to control robotic systems such as drones, but their risks of causing physical threats and harm in real-world applications remain unexplored. Our study addresses the critical gap in evaluating LLM physical safety by developing a comprehensive benchmark for drone control. We classify the physical safety risks of drones into four categories: (1) human-targeted threats, (2) object-targeted threats, (3) infrastructure attacks, and (4) regulatory violations. Our evaluation of mainstream LLMs reveals an undesirable trade-off between utility and safety, with models that excel in code generation often performing poorly in crucial safety aspects. Furthermore, while incorporating advanced prompt engineering techniques such as In-Context Learning and Chain-of-Thought can improve safety, these methods still struggle to identify unintentional attacks. In addition, larger models demonstrate better safety capabilities, particularly in refusing dangerous commands. Our findings and benchmark can facilitate the design and evaluation of physical safety for LLMs. The project page is available at huggingface.co/spaces/TrustSafeAI/LLM-physical-safety.

LLMs are trained to refuse harmful instructions, but do they truly understand harmfulness beyond just refusing? Prior work has shown that LLMs' refusal behaviors can be mediated by a one-dimensional subspace, i.e., a refusal direction. In this work, we identify a new dimension to analyze safety mechanisms in LLMs, i.e., harmfulness, which is encoded internally as a separate concept from refusal. There exists a harmfulness direction that is distinct from the refusal direction. As causal evidence, steering along the harmfulness direction can lead LLMs to interpret harmless instructions as harmful, but steering along the refusal direction tends to elicit refusal responses directly without reversing the model's judgment on harmfulness. Furthermore, using our identified harmfulness concept, we find that certain jailbreak methods work by reducing the refusal signals without reversing the model's internal belief of harmfulness. We also find that adversarially finetuning models to accept harmful instructions has minimal impact on the model's internal belief of harmfulness. These insights lead to a practical safety application: The model's latent harmfulness representation can serve as an intrinsic safeguard (Latent Guard) for detecting unsafe inputs and reducing over-refusals that is robust to finetuning attacks. For instance, our Latent Guard achieves performance comparable to or better than Llama Guard 3 8B, a dedicated finetuned safeguard model, across different jailbreak methods. Our findings suggest that LLMs' internal understanding of harmfulness is more robust than their refusal decision to diverse input instructions, offering a new perspective to study AI safety

Large language models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable capabilities but remain vulnerable to adversarial prompts known as jailbreaks, which can bypass safety alignment and elicit harmful outputs. Despite growing efforts in LLM safety research, existing evaluations are often fragmented, focused on isolated attack or defense techniques, and lack systematic, reproducible analysis. In this work, we introduce PandaGuard, a unified and modular framework that models LLM jailbreak safety as a multi-agent system comprising attackers, defenders, and judges. Our framework implements 19 attack methods and 12 defense mechanisms, along with multiple judgment strategies, all within a flexible plugin architecture supporting diverse LLM interfaces, multiple interaction modes, and configuration-driven experimentation that enhances reproducibility and practical deployment. Built on this framework, we develop PandaBench, a comprehensive benchmark that evaluates the interactions between these attack/defense methods across 49 LLMs and various judgment approaches, requiring over 3 billion tokens to execute. Our extensive evaluation reveals key insights into model vulnerabilities, defense cost-performance trade-offs, and judge consistency. We find that no single defense is optimal across all dimensions and that judge disagreement introduces nontrivial variance in safety assessments. We release the code, configurations, and evaluation results to support transparent and reproducible research in LLM safety.

The integration of large language models with external content has enabled applications such as Microsoft Copilot but also introduced vulnerabilities to indirect prompt injection attacks. In these attacks, malicious instructions embedded within external content can manipulate LLM outputs, causing deviations from user expectations. To address this critical yet under-explored issue, we introduce the first benchmark for indirect prompt injection attacks, named BIPIA, to assess the risk of such vulnerabilities. Using BIPIA, we evaluate existing LLMs and find them universally vulnerable. Our analysis identifies two key factors contributing to their success: LLMs' inability to distinguish between informational context and actionable instructions, and their lack of awareness in avoiding the execution of instructions within external content. Based on these findings, we propose two novel defense mechanisms-boundary awareness and explicit reminder-to address these vulnerabilities in both black-box and white-box settings. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our black-box defense provides substantial mitigation, while our white-box defense reduces the attack success rate to near-zero levels, all while preserving the output quality of LLMs. We hope this work inspires further research into securing LLM applications and fostering their safe and reliable use.

Recent methodologies in LLM self-training mostly rely on LLM generating responses and filtering those with correct output answers as training data. This approach often yields a low-quality fine-tuning training set (e.g., incorrect plans or intermediate reasoning). In this paper, we develop a reinforced self-training approach, called ReST-MCTS*, based on integrating process reward guidance with tree search MCTS* for collecting higher-quality reasoning traces as well as per-step value to train policy and reward models. ReST-MCTS* circumvents the per-step manual annotation typically used to train process rewards by tree-search-based reinforcement learning: Given oracle final correct answers, ReST-MCTS* is able to infer the correct process rewards by estimating the probability this step can help lead to the correct answer. These inferred rewards serve dual purposes: they act as value targets for further refining the process reward model and also facilitate the selection of high-quality traces for policy model self-training. We first show that the tree-search policy in ReST-MCTS* achieves higher accuracy compared with prior LLM reasoning baselines such as Best-of-N and Tree-of-Thought, within the same search budget. We then show that by using traces searched by this tree-search policy as training data, we can continuously enhance the three language models for multiple iterations, and outperform other self-training algorithms such as ReST^EM and Self-Rewarding LM.

Large Language Models (LLMs), like LLaMA, have exhibited remarkable performance across various tasks. Nevertheless, when deployed to specific domains such as law or medicine, the models still confront the challenge of a deficiency in domain-specific knowledge and an inadequate capability to leverage that knowledge to resolve domain-related problems. In this paper, we propose a new framework to adapt LLMs to specific domains and build Lawyer LLaMA, a legal domain LLM, based on this framework. Specifically, we inject domain knowledge during the continual training stage and teach the model to learn professional skills using properly designed supervised fine-tuning tasks. Moreover, to alleviate the hallucination problem during the model's generation, we add a retrieval module and extract relevant legal articles before the model answers any queries. When learning domain-specific skills, we find that experts' experience is much more useful than experiences distilled from ChatGPT, where hundreds of expert-written data outperform tens of thousands of ChatGPT-generated ones. We will release our model and data.

The emergence of Large Language Models (LLMs) has significantly influenced various aspects of software development activities. Despite their benefits, LLMs also pose notable risks, including the potential to generate harmful content and being abused by malicious developers to create malicious code. Several previous studies have focused on the ability of LLMs to resist the generation of harmful content that violates human ethical standards, such as biased or offensive content. However, there is no research evaluating the ability of LLMs to resist malicious code generation. To fill this gap, we propose RMCBench, the first benchmark comprising 473 prompts designed to assess the ability of LLMs to resist malicious code generation. This benchmark employs two scenarios: a text-to-code scenario, where LLMs are prompted with descriptions to generate code, and a code-to-code scenario, where LLMs translate or complete existing malicious code. Based on RMCBench, we conduct an empirical study on 11 representative LLMs to assess their ability to resist malicious code generation. Our findings indicate that current LLMs have a limited ability to resist malicious code generation with an average refusal rate of 40.36% in text-to-code scenario and 11.52% in code-to-code scenario. The average refusal rate of all LLMs in RMCBench is only 28.71%; ChatGPT-4 has a refusal rate of only 35.73%. We also analyze the factors that affect LLMs' ability to resist malicious code generation and provide implications for developers to enhance model robustness.

Efficient red-teaming method to uncover vulnerabilities in Large Language Models (LLMs) is crucial. While recent attacks often use LLMs as optimizers, the discrete language space make gradient-based methods struggle. We introduce LARGO (Latent Adversarial Reflection through Gradient Optimization), a novel latent self-reflection attack that reasserts the power of gradient-based optimization for generating fluent jailbreaking prompts. By operating within the LLM's continuous latent space, LARGO first optimizes an adversarial latent vector and then recursively call the same LLM to decode the latent into natural language. This methodology yields a fast, effective, and transferable attack that produces fluent and stealthy prompts. On standard benchmarks like AdvBench and JailbreakBench, LARGO surpasses leading jailbreaking techniques, including AutoDAN, by 44 points in attack success rate. Our findings demonstrate a potent alternative to agentic LLM prompting, highlighting the efficacy of interpreting and attacking LLM internals through gradient optimization.

We study behavioral self-awareness -- an LLM's ability to articulate its behaviors without requiring in-context examples. We finetune LLMs on datasets that exhibit particular behaviors, such as (a) making high-risk economic decisions, and (b) outputting insecure code. Despite the datasets containing no explicit descriptions of the associated behavior, the finetuned LLMs can explicitly describe it. For example, a model trained to output insecure code says, ``The code I write is insecure.'' Indeed, models show behavioral self-awareness for a range of behaviors and for diverse evaluations. Note that while we finetune models to exhibit behaviors like writing insecure code, we do not finetune them to articulate their own behaviors -- models do this without any special training or examples. Behavioral self-awareness is relevant for AI safety, as models could use it to proactively disclose problematic behaviors. In particular, we study backdoor policies, where models exhibit unexpected behaviors only under certain trigger conditions. We find that models can sometimes identify whether or not they have a backdoor, even without its trigger being present. However, models are not able to directly output their trigger by default. Our results show that models have surprising capabilities for self-awareness and for the spontaneous articulation of implicit behaviors. Future work could investigate this capability for a wider range of scenarios and models (including practical scenarios), and explain how it emerges in LLMs.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated outstanding performance across various tasks, yet they still exhibit limitations such as hallucination, unfaithful reasoning, and toxic content. One potential approach to mitigate these issues is learning from human or external feedback (e.g. tools). In this paper, we introduce an intrinsic self-correct reasoning framework for LLMs that eliminates the need for human feedback, external tools, and handcraft prompts. The proposed framework, based on a multi-step reasoning paradigm Learning from Correctness (LeCo), improves reasoning performance without needing to learn from errors. This paradigm prioritizes learning from correct reasoning steps, and a unique method to measure confidence for each reasoning step based on generation logits. Experimental results across various multi-step reasoning tasks demonstrate the effectiveness of the framework in improving reasoning performance with reduced token consumption.

Large Language Models have gained considerable attention for their revolutionary capabilities. However, there is also growing concern on their safety implications, making a comprehensive safety evaluation for LLMs urgently needed before model deployment. In this work, we propose S-Eval, a new comprehensive, multi-dimensional and open-ended safety evaluation benchmark. At the core of S-Eval is a novel LLM-based automatic test prompt generation and selection framework, which trains an expert testing LLM Mt combined with a range of test selection strategies to automatically construct a high-quality test suite for the safety evaluation. The key to the automation of this process is a novel expert safety-critique LLM Mc able to quantify the riskiness score of a LLM's response, and additionally produce risk tags and explanations. Besides, the generation process is also guided by a carefully designed risk taxonomy with four different levels, covering comprehensive and multi-dimensional safety risks of concern. Based on these, we systematically construct a new and large-scale safety evaluation benchmark for LLMs consisting of 220,000 evaluation prompts, including 20,000 base risk prompts (10,000 in Chinese and 10,000 in English) and 200, 000 corresponding attack prompts derived from 10 popular adversarial instruction attacks against LLMs. Moreover, considering the rapid evolution of LLMs and accompanied safety threats, S-Eval can be flexibly configured and adapted to include new risks, attacks and models. S-Eval is extensively evaluated on 20 popular and representative LLMs. The results confirm that S-Eval can better reflect and inform the safety risks of LLMs compared to existing benchmarks. We also explore the impacts of parameter scales, language environments, and decoding parameters on the evaluation, providing a systematic methodology for evaluating the safety of LLMs.

Truly reliable AI requires more than simply scaling up knowledge; it demands the ability to know what it knows and when it does not. Yet recent research shows that even the best LLMs misjudge their own competence in more than one in five cases, making any response born of such internal uncertainty impossible to fully trust. Inspired by self-improvement reinforcement learning techniques that require minimal data, we present a simple but powerful framework KnowRL that strengthens a model's internal understanding of its own feasibility boundaries, enabling safer and more responsible behaviour. Our framework combines two components: (i) introspection, where the model generates and classifies tasks it judges feasible or infeasible, and (ii) consensus-based rewarding, where stability of self-knowledge assessment is reinforced through internal agreement. By using internally generated data, this design strengthens consistency in self-knowledge and entirely avoids costly external supervision. In experiments on LLaMA-3.1-8B and Qwen-2.5-7B, KnowRL steadily improved self-knowledge, validated by both intrinsic self-consistency and extrinsic benchmarking. With nothing more than a small seed set and no external supervision, our method drove gains as high as 28% in accuracy and 12% in F1, outperforming baselines in just a few iterations. Our framework essentially unlocks the untapped capacity of LLMs to self-improve their knowledge awareness, opening the door to reliable, more accountable AI and safer deployment in critical applications. Owing to its simplicity and independence from external effort, we encourage applying this reliability-enhancing process to all future models.

LLMs have made impressive progress, but their growing capabilities also expose them to highly flexible jailbreaking attacks designed to bypass safety alignment. While many existing defenses focus on known types of attacks, it is more critical to prepare LLMs for unseen attacks that may arise during deployment. To address this, we propose a lifelong safety alignment framework that enables LLMs to continuously adapt to new and evolving jailbreaking strategies. Our framework introduces a competitive setup between two components: a Meta-Attacker, trained to actively discover novel jailbreaking strategies, and a Defender, trained to resist them. To effectively warm up the Meta-Attacker, we first leverage the GPT-4o API to extract key insights from a large collection of jailbreak-related research papers. Through iterative training, the first iteration Meta-Attacker achieves a 73% attack success rate (ASR) on RR and a 57% transfer ASR on LAT using only single-turn attacks. Meanwhile, the Defender progressively improves its robustness and ultimately reduces the Meta-Attacker's success rate to just 7%, enabling safer and more reliable deployment of LLMs in open-ended environments. The code is available at https://github.com/sail-sg/LifelongSafetyAlignment.

In recent years, large language models (LLMs) have become increasingly capable and can now interact with tools (i.e., call functions), read documents, and recursively call themselves. As a result, these LLMs can now function autonomously as agents. With the rise in capabilities of these agents, recent work has speculated on how LLM agents would affect cybersecurity. However, not much is known about the offensive capabilities of LLM agents. In this work, we show that LLM agents can autonomously hack websites, performing tasks as complex as blind database schema extraction and SQL injections without human feedback. Importantly, the agent does not need to know the vulnerability beforehand. This capability is uniquely enabled by frontier models that are highly capable of tool use and leveraging extended context. Namely, we show that GPT-4 is capable of such hacks, but existing open-source models are not. Finally, we show that GPT-4 is capable of autonomously finding vulnerabilities in websites in the wild. Our findings raise questions about the widespread deployment of LLMs.

Large language models (LLMs) exhibit impressive emergent abilities in natural language processing, but their democratization is hindered due to huge computation requirements and closed-source nature. Recent research on advancing open-source smaller LMs by distilling knowledge from black-box LLMs has obtained promising results in the instruction-following ability. However, the reasoning ability which is more challenging to foster, is relatively rarely explored. In this paper, we propose a tailored learning approach to distill such reasoning ability to smaller LMs to facilitate the democratization of the exclusive reasoning ability. In contrast to merely employing LLM as a data annotator, we exploit the potential of LLM as a reasoning teacher by building an interactive multi-round learning paradigm. This paradigm enables the student to expose its deficiencies to the black-box teacher who then can provide customized training data in return. Further, to exploit the reasoning potential of the smaller LM, we propose self-reflection learning to motivate the student to learn from self-made mistakes. The learning from self-reflection and LLM are all tailored to the student's learning status, thanks to the seamless integration with the multi-round learning paradigm. Comprehensive experiments and analysis on mathematical and commonsense reasoning tasks demonstrate the effectiveness of our method. The code will be available at https://github.com/Raibows/Learn-to-Reason.

Refusal training on Large Language Models (LLMs) prevents harmful outputs, yet this defense remains vulnerable to both automated and human-crafted jailbreaks. We present a novel LLM-as-red-teamer approach in which a human jailbreaks a refusal-trained LLM to make it willing to jailbreak itself or other LLMs. We refer to the jailbroken LLMs as J_2 attackers, which can systematically evaluate target models using various red teaming strategies and improve its performance via in-context learning from the previous failures. Our experiments demonstrate that Sonnet 3.5 and Gemini 1.5 pro outperform other LLMs as J_2, achieving 93.0% and 91.0% attack success rates (ASRs) respectively against GPT-4o (and similar results across other capable LLMs) on Harmbench. Our work not only introduces a scalable approach to strategic red teaming, drawing inspiration from human red teamers, but also highlights jailbreaking-to-jailbreak as an overlooked failure mode of the safeguard. Specifically, an LLM can bypass its own safeguards by employing a jailbroken version of itself that is willing to assist in further jailbreaking. To prevent any direct misuse with J_2, while advancing research in AI safety, we publicly share our methodology while keeping specific prompting details private.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly used in a variety of important applications, yet their safety and reliability remain as major concerns. Various adversarial and jailbreak attacks have been proposed to bypass the safety alignment and cause the model to produce harmful responses. We introduce Self-supervised Prompt INjection (SPIN) which can detect and reverse these various attacks on LLMs. As our self-supervised prompt defense is done at inference-time, it is also compatible with existing alignment and adds an additional layer of safety for defense. Our benchmarks demonstrate that our system can reduce the attack success rate by up to 87.9%, while maintaining the performance on benign user requests. In addition, we discuss the situation of an adaptive attacker and show that our method is still resilient against attackers who are aware of our defense.

With the rise of large language models (LLMs), researchers are increasingly exploring their applications in var ious vertical domains, such as software engineering. LLMs have achieved remarkable success in areas including code generation and vulnerability detection. However, they also exhibit numerous limitations and shortcomings. LLM-based agents, a novel tech nology with the potential for Artificial General Intelligence (AGI), combine LLMs as the core for decision-making and action-taking, addressing some of the inherent limitations of LLMs such as lack of autonomy and self-improvement. Despite numerous studies and surveys exploring the possibility of using LLMs in software engineering, it lacks a clear distinction between LLMs and LLM based agents. It is still in its early stage for a unified standard and benchmarking to qualify an LLM solution as an LLM-based agent in its domain. In this survey, we broadly investigate the current practice and solutions for LLMs and LLM-based agents for software engineering. In particular we summarise six key topics: requirement engineering, code generation, autonomous decision-making, software design, test generation, and software maintenance. We review and differentiate the work of LLMs and LLM-based agents from these six topics, examining their differences and similarities in tasks, benchmarks, and evaluation metrics. Finally, we discuss the models and benchmarks used, providing a comprehensive analysis of their applications and effectiveness in software engineering. We anticipate this work will shed some lights on pushing the boundaries of LLM-based agents in software engineering for future research.

In the quest for super-human performance, Large Language Models (LLMs) have traditionally been tethered to human-annotated datasets and predefined training objectives-a process that is both labor-intensive and inherently limited. This paper presents a transformative approach: Autonomous Learning for LLMs, a self-sufficient learning paradigm that frees models from the constraints of human supervision. This method endows LLMs with the ability to self-educate through direct interaction with text, akin to a human reading and comprehending literature. Our approach eliminates the reliance on annotated data, fostering an Autonomous Learning environment where the model independently identifies and reinforces its knowledge gaps. Empirical results from our comprehensive experiments, which utilized a diverse array of learning materials and were evaluated against standard public quizzes, reveal that Autonomous Learning outstrips the performance of both Pre-training and Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT), as well as retrieval-augmented methods. These findings underscore the potential of Autonomous Learning to not only enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of LLM training but also to pave the way for the development of more advanced, self-reliant AI systems.

Large language models (LLMs) increasingly demonstrate signs of conceptual understanding, yet much of their internal knowledge remains latent, loosely structured, and difficult to access or evaluate. We propose self-questioning as a lightweight and scalable strategy to improve LLMs' understanding, particularly in domains where success depends on fine-grained semantic distinctions. To evaluate this approach, we introduce a challenging new benchmark of 1.3 million post-2015 computer science patent pairs, characterized by dense technical jargon and strategically complex writing. The benchmark centers on a pairwise differentiation task: can a model distinguish between closely related but substantively different inventions? We show that prompting LLMs to generate and answer their own questions - targeting the background knowledge required for the task - significantly improves performance. These self-generated questions and answers activate otherwise underutilized internal knowledge. Allowing LLMs to retrieve answers from external scientific texts further enhances performance, suggesting that model knowledge is compressed and lacks the full richness of the training data. We also find that chain-of-thought prompting and self-questioning converge, though self-questioning remains more effective for improving understanding of technical concepts. Notably, we uncover an asymmetry in prompting: smaller models often generate more fundamental, more open-ended, better-aligned questions for mid-sized models than large models with better understanding do, revealing a new strategy for cross-model collaboration. Altogether, our findings establish self-questioning as both a practical mechanism for automatically improving LLM comprehension, especially in domains with sparse and underrepresented knowledge, and a diagnostic probe of how internal and external knowledge are organized.

Global healthcare providers are exploring use of large language models (LLMs) to provide medical advice to the public. LLMs now achieve nearly perfect scores on medical licensing exams, but this does not necessarily translate to accurate performance in real-world settings. We tested if LLMs can assist members of the public in identifying underlying conditions and choosing a course of action (disposition) in ten medical scenarios in a controlled study with 1,298 participants. Participants were randomly assigned to receive assistance from an LLM (GPT-4o, Llama 3, Command R+) or a source of their choice (control). Tested alone, LLMs complete the scenarios accurately, correctly identifying conditions in 94.9% of cases and disposition in 56.3% on average. However, participants using the same LLMs identified relevant conditions in less than 34.5% of cases and disposition in less than 44.2%, both no better than the control group. We identify user interactions as a challenge to the deployment of LLMs for medical advice. Standard benchmarks for medical knowledge and simulated patient interactions do not predict the failures we find with human participants. Moving forward, we recommend systematic human user testing to evaluate interactive capabilities prior to public deployments in healthcare.

Does GPT know you? The answer depends on your level of public recognition; however, if your information was available on a website, the answer is probably yes. All Large Language Models (LLMs) memorize training data to some extent. If an LLM training corpus includes personal data, it also memorizes personal data. Developing an LLM typically involves processing personal data, which falls directly within the scope of data protection laws. If a person is identified or identifiable, the implications are far-reaching: the AI system is subject to EU General Data Protection Regulation requirements even after the training phase is concluded. To back our arguments: (1.) We reiterate that LLMs output training data at inference time, be it verbatim or in generalized form. (2.) We show that some LLMs can thus be considered personal data on their own. This triggers a cascade of data protection implications such as data subject rights, including rights to access, rectification, or erasure. These rights extend to the information embedded with-in the AI model. (3.) This paper argues that machine learning researchers must acknowledge the legal implications of LLMs as personal data throughout the full ML development lifecycle, from data collection and curation to model provision on, e.g., GitHub or Hugging Face. (4.) We propose different ways for the ML research community to deal with these legal implications. Our paper serves as a starting point for improving the alignment between data protection law and the technical capabilities of LLMs. Our findings underscore the need for more interaction between the legal domain and the ML community.

Given the widespread adoption and usage of Large Language Models (LLMs), it is crucial to have flexible and interpretable evaluations of their instruction-following ability. Preference judgments between model outputs have become the de facto evaluation standard, despite distilling complex, multi-faceted preferences into a single ranking. Furthermore, as human annotation is slow and costly, LLMs are increasingly used to make these judgments, at the expense of reliability and interpretability. In this work, we propose TICK (Targeted Instruct-evaluation with ChecKlists), a fully automated, interpretable evaluation protocol that structures evaluations with LLM-generated, instruction-specific checklists. We first show that, given an instruction, LLMs can reliably produce high-quality, tailored evaluation checklists that decompose the instruction into a series of YES/NO questions. Each question asks whether a candidate response meets a specific requirement of the instruction. We demonstrate that using TICK leads to a significant increase (46.4% to 52.2%) in the frequency of exact agreements between LLM judgements and human preferences, as compared to having an LLM directly score an output. We then show that STICK (Self-TICK) can be used to improve generation quality across multiple benchmarks via self-refinement and Best-of-N selection. STICK self-refinement on LiveBench reasoning tasks leads to an absolute gain of +7.8%, whilst Best-of-N selection with STICK attains +6.3% absolute improvement on the real-world instruction dataset, WildBench. In light of this, structured, multi-faceted self-improvement is shown to be a promising way to further advance LLM capabilities. Finally, by providing LLM-generated checklists to human evaluators tasked with directly scoring LLM responses to WildBench instructions, we notably increase inter-annotator agreement (0.194 to 0.256).

We present ShieldGemma, a comprehensive suite of LLM-based safety content moderation models built upon Gemma2. These models provide robust, state-of-the-art predictions of safety risks across key harm types (sexually explicit, dangerous content, harassment, hate speech) in both user input and LLM-generated output. By evaluating on both public and internal benchmarks, we demonstrate superior performance compared to existing models, such as Llama Guard (+10.8\% AU-PRC on public benchmarks) and WildCard (+4.3\%). Additionally, we present a novel LLM-based data curation pipeline, adaptable to a variety of safety-related tasks and beyond. We have shown strong generalization performance for model trained mainly on synthetic data. By releasing ShieldGemma, we provide a valuable resource to the research community, advancing LLM safety and enabling the creation of more effective content moderation solutions for developers.

Current approaches to LLM safety fundamentally rely on a brittle cat-and-mouse game of identifying and blocking known threats via guardrails. We argue for a fresh approach: robust safety comes not from enumerating what is harmful, but from deeply understanding what is safe. We introduce Trust The Typical (T3), a framework that operationalizes this principle by treating safety as an out-of-distribution (OOD) detection problem. T3 learns the distribution of acceptable prompts in a semantic space and flags any significant deviation as a potential threat. Unlike prior methods, it requires no training on harmful examples, yet achieves state-of-the-art performance across 18 benchmarks spanning toxicity, hate speech, jailbreaking, multilingual harms, and over-refusal, reducing false positive rates by up to 40x relative to specialized safety models. A single model trained only on safe English text transfers effectively to diverse domains and over 14 languages without retraining. Finally, we demonstrate production readiness by integrating a GPU-optimized version into vLLM, enabling continuous guardrailing during token generation with less than 6% overhead even under dense evaluation intervals on large-scale workloads.

Current LLM safety defenses fail under decomposition attacks, where a malicious goal is decomposed into benign subtasks that circumvent refusals. The challenge lies in the existing shallow safety alignment techniques: they only detect harm in the immediate prompt and do not reason about long-range intent, leaving them blind to malicious intent that emerges over a sequence of seemingly benign instructions. We therefore propose adding an external monitor that observes the conversation at a higher granularity. To facilitate our study of monitoring decomposition attacks, we curate the largest and most diverse dataset to date, including question-answering, text-to-image, and agentic tasks. We verify our datasets by testing them on frontier LLMs and show an 87% attack success rate on average on GPT-4o. This confirms that decomposition attack is broadly effective. Additionally, we find that random tasks can be injected into the decomposed subtasks to further obfuscate malicious intents. To defend in real time, we propose a lightweight sequential monitoring framework that cumulatively evaluates each subtask. We show that a carefully prompt engineered lightweight monitor achieves a 93% defense success rate, beating reasoning models like o3 mini as a monitor. Moreover, it remains robust against random task injection and cuts cost by 90% and latency by 50%. Our findings suggest that lightweight sequential monitors are highly effective in mitigating decomposition attacks and are viable in deployment.

Current evaluations of defenses against prompt attacks in large language model (LLM) applications often overlook two critical factors: the dynamic nature of adversarial behavior and the usability penalties imposed on legitimate users by restrictive defenses. We propose D-SEC (Dynamic Security Utility Threat Model), which explicitly separates attackers from legitimate users, models multi-step interactions, and expresses the security-utility in an optimizable form. We further address the shortcomings in existing evaluations by introducing Gandalf, a crowd-sourced, gamified red-teaming platform designed to generate realistic, adaptive attack. Using Gandalf, we collect and release a dataset of 279k prompt attacks. Complemented by benign user data, our analysis reveals the interplay between security and utility, showing that defenses integrated in the LLM (e.g., system prompts) can degrade usability even without blocking requests. We demonstrate that restricted application domains, defense-in-depth, and adaptive defenses are effective strategies for building secure and useful LLM applications.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown remarkable advancements in specialized fields such as finance, law, and medicine. However, in cybersecurity, we have noticed a lack of open-source datasets, with a particular lack of high-quality cybersecurity pretraining corpora, even though much research indicates that LLMs acquire their knowledge during pretraining. To address this, we present a comprehensive suite of datasets covering all major training stages, including pretraining, instruction fine-tuning, and reasoning distillation with cybersecurity-specific self-reflection data. Extensive ablation studies demonstrate their effectiveness on public cybersecurity benchmarks. In particular, continual pre-training on our dataset yields a 15.88% improvement in the aggregate score, while reasoning distillation leads to a 10% gain in security certification (CISSP). We will release all datasets and trained cybersecurity LLMs under the ODC-BY and MIT licenses to encourage further research in the community. For access to all datasets and model weights, please refer to https://huggingface.co/collections/trendmicro-ailab/primus-67b1fd27052b802b4af9d243.

With current state-of-the-art approaches aimed at enhancing the reasoning capabilities of Large Language Models(LLMs) through iterative preference learning inspired by AlphaZero, we propose to further enhance the step-wise reasoning capabilities through intrinsic self-correction to some extent. Our work leverages step-wise preference learning to enhance self-verification via reinforcement learning. We initially conduct our work through a two-stage training procedure. At the first stage, the self-correction reasoning ability of an LLM is enhanced through its own predictions, relying entirely on self-generated data within the intrinsic self-correction to some extent. At the second stage, the baseline step-wise preference learning is leveraged via the application of the enhanced self-correct policy achieved at the first stage. In the evaluation of arithmetic reasoning tasks, our approach outperforms OpenMath2-Llama3.1-8B, dart-math-mistral-7b-uniform on MATH with increases in accuracy to 71.34%(+4.18%) and 48.06%(+4.94%) and LLama-3.1-8B-Instruct, Mistral-7B-Instruct-v0.1 on GSM8K with increases in accuracy to 86.76%(+2.00%) and 38.06%(+2.28%).

Large Language Models (LLMs) are typically evaluated for safety under single-shot or low-budget adversarial prompting, which underestimates real-world risk. In practice, attackers can exploit large-scale parallel sampling to repeatedly probe a model until a harmful response is produced. While recent work shows that attack success increases with repeated sampling, principled methods for predicting large-scale adversarial risk remain limited. We propose a scaling-aware Best-of-N estimation of risk, SABER, for modeling jailbreak vulnerability under Best-of-N sampling. We model sample-level success probabilities using a Beta distribution, the conjugate prior of the Bernoulli distribution, and derive an analytic scaling law that enables reliable extrapolation of large-N attack success rates from small-budget measurements. Using only n=100 samples, our anchored estimator predicts ASR@1000 with a mean absolute error of 1.66, compared to 12.04 for the baseline, which is an 86.2% reduction in estimation error. Our results reveal heterogeneous risk scaling profiles and show that models appearing robust under standard evaluation can experience rapid nonlinear risk amplification under parallel adversarial pressure. This work provides a low-cost, scalable methodology for realistic LLM safety assessment. We will release our code and evaluation scripts upon publication to future research.

Prompt leakage poses a compelling security and privacy threat in LLM applications. Leakage of system prompts may compromise intellectual property, and act as adversarial reconnaissance for an attacker. A systematic evaluation of prompt leakage threats and mitigation strategies is lacking, especially for multi-turn LLM interactions. In this paper, we systematically investigate LLM vulnerabilities against prompt leakage for 10 closed- and open-source LLMs, across four domains. We design a unique threat model which leverages the LLM sycophancy effect and elevates the average attack success rate (ASR) from 17.7% to 86.2% in a multi-turn setting. Our standardized setup further allows dissecting leakage of specific prompt contents such as task instructions and knowledge documents. We measure the mitigation effect of 7 black-box defense strategies, along with finetuning an open-source model to defend against leakage attempts. We present different combination of defenses against our threat model, including a cost analysis. Our study highlights key takeaways for building secure LLM applications and provides directions for research in multi-turn LLM interactions

Advancing LLM reasoning skills has captivated wide interest. However, current post-training techniques rely heavily on supervisory signals, such as outcome supervision or auxiliary reward models, which face the problem of scalability and high annotation costs. This motivates us to enhance LLM reasoning without the need for external supervision. We introduce a generalizable and purely unsupervised self-training framework, named Genius. Without external auxiliary, Genius requires to seek the optimal response sequence in a stepwise manner and optimize the LLM. To explore the potential steps and exploit the optimal ones, Genius introduces a stepwise foresight re-sampling strategy to sample and estimate the step value by simulating future outcomes. Further, we recognize that the unsupervised setting inevitably induces the intrinsic noise and uncertainty. To provide a robust optimization, we propose an advantage-calibrated optimization (ACO) loss function to mitigate estimation inconsistencies. Combining these techniques together, Genius provides an advanced initial step towards self-improve LLM reasoning with general queries and without supervision, revolutionizing reasoning scaling laws given the vast availability of general queries. The code will be released at https://github.com/xufangzhi/Genius.

StarCraft II is a challenging benchmark for AI agents due to the necessity of both precise micro level operations and strategic macro awareness. Previous works, such as Alphastar and SCC, achieve impressive performance on tackling StarCraft II , however, still exhibit deficiencies in long term strategic planning and strategy interpretability. Emerging large language model (LLM) agents, such as Voyage and MetaGPT, presents the immense potential in solving intricate tasks. Motivated by this, we aim to validate the capabilities of LLMs on StarCraft II, a highly complex RTS game.To conveniently take full advantage of LLMs` reasoning abilities, we first develop textual StratCraft II environment, called TextStarCraft II, which LLM agent can interact. Secondly, we propose a Chain of Summarization method, including single frame summarization for processing raw observations and multi frame summarization for analyzing game information, providing command recommendations, and generating strategic decisions. Our experiment consists of two parts: first, an evaluation by human experts, which includes assessing the LLMs`s mastery of StarCraft II knowledge and the performance of LLM agents in the game; second, the in game performance of LLM agents, encompassing aspects like win rate and the impact of Chain of Summarization.Experiment results demonstrate that: 1. LLMs possess the relevant knowledge and complex planning abilities needed to address StarCraft II scenarios; 2. Human experts consider the performance of LLM agents to be close to that of an average player who has played StarCraft II for eight years; 3. LLM agents are capable of defeating the built in AI at the Harder(Lv5) difficulty level. We have open sourced the code and released demo videos of LLM agent playing StarCraft II.

Training Large Language Models (LLMs) to follow user instructions has been shown to supply the LLM with ample capacity to converse fluently while being aligned with humans. Yet, it is not completely clear how an LLM can lead a plan-grounded conversation in mixed-initiative settings where instructions flow in both directions of the conversation, i.e. both the LLM and the user provide instructions to one another. In this paper, we tackle a dual goal mixed-initiative conversational setting where the LLM not only grounds the conversation on an arbitrary plan but also seeks to satisfy both a procedural plan and user instructions. The LLM is then responsible for guiding the user through the plan and, at the same time, adapting to new circumstances, answering questions, and activating safety guardrails when needed. We propose a novel LLM that grounds the dialogue on a procedural plan, can take the dialogue initiative, and enforces guardrails on the system's behavior, while also improving the LLM's responses to unexpected user behavior. Experiments in controlled settings and with real users show that the best-performing model, which we call PlanLLM, achieves a 2.1x improvement over a strong baseline. Moreover, experiments also show good generalization to unseen domains.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated potential in cybersecurity applications but have also caused lower confidence due to problems like hallucinations and a lack of truthfulness. Existing benchmarks provide general evaluations but do not sufficiently address the practical and applied aspects of LLM performance in cybersecurity-specific tasks. To address this gap, we introduce the SECURE (Security Extraction, Understanding \& Reasoning Evaluation), a benchmark designed to assess LLMs performance in realistic cybersecurity scenarios. SECURE includes six datasets focussed on the Industrial Control System sector to evaluate knowledge extraction, understanding, and reasoning based on industry-standard sources. Our study evaluates seven state-of-the-art models on these tasks, providing insights into their strengths and weaknesses in cybersecurity contexts, and offer recommendations for improving LLMs reliability as cyber advisory tools.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are rapidly surpassing human knowledge in many domains. While improving these models traditionally relies on costly human data, recent self-rewarding mechanisms (Yuan et al., 2024) have shown that LLMs can improve by judging their own responses instead of relying on human labelers. However, existing methods have primarily focused on improving model responses rather than judgment capabilities, resulting in rapid saturation during iterative training. To address this issue, we introduce a novel Meta-Rewarding step to the self-improvement process, where the model judges its own judgements and uses that feedback to refine its judgment skills. Surprisingly, this unsupervised approach improves the model's ability to judge {\em and} follow instructions, as demonstrated by a win rate improvement of Llama-3-8B-Instruct from 22.9% to 39.4% on AlpacaEval 2, and 20.6% to 29.1% on Arena-Hard. These results strongly suggest the potential for self-improving models without human supervision.

Large Language Model (LLM) safety guardrail models have emerged as a primary defense mechanism against harmful content generation, yet their robustness against sophisticated adversarial attacks remains poorly characterized. This study evaluated ten publicly available guardrail models from Meta, Google, IBM, NVIDIA, Alibaba, and Allen AI across 1,445 test prompts spanning 21 attack categories. While Qwen3Guard-8B achieved the highest overall accuracy (85.3%, 95% CI: 83.4-87.1%), a critical finding emerged when separating public benchmark prompts from novel attacks: all models showed substantial performance degradation on unseen prompts, with Qwen3Guard dropping from 91.0% to 33.8% (a 57.2 percentage point gap). In contrast, Granite-Guardian-3.2-5B showed the best generalization with only a 6.5% gap. A "helpful mode" jailbreak was also discovered where two guardrail models (Nemotron-Safety-8B, Granite-Guardian-3.2-5B) generated harmful content instead of blocking it, representing a novel failure mode. These findings suggest that benchmark performance may be misleading due to training data contamination, and that generalization ability, not overall accuracy, should be the primary metric for guardrail evaluation.

The prevalence and strong capability of large language models (LLMs) present significant safety and ethical risks if exploited by malicious users. To prevent the potentially deceptive usage of LLMs, recent works have proposed algorithms to detect LLM-generated text and protect LLMs. In this paper, we investigate the robustness and reliability of these LLM detectors under adversarial attacks. We study two types of attack strategies: 1) replacing certain words in an LLM's output with their synonyms given the context; 2) automatically searching for an instructional prompt to alter the writing style of the generation. In both strategies, we leverage an auxiliary LLM to generate the word replacements or the instructional prompt. Different from previous works, we consider a challenging setting where the auxiliary LLM can also be protected by a detector. Experiments reveal that our attacks effectively compromise the performance of all detectors in the study with plausible generations, underscoring the urgent need to improve the robustness of LLM-generated text detection systems.

Large language models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable progress in linguistic tasks, necessitating robust evaluation frameworks to understand their capabilities and limitations. Inspired by Feynman's principle of understanding through creation, we introduce a self-knowledge evaluation framework that is easy to implement, evaluating models on their ability to comprehend and respond to self-generated questions. Our findings, based on testing multiple models across diverse tasks, reveal significant gaps in the model's self-knowledge ability. Further analysis indicates these gaps may be due to misalignment with human attention mechanisms. Additionally, fine-tuning on self-generated math task may enhance the model's math performance, highlighting the potential of the framework for efficient and insightful model evaluation and may also contribute to the improvement of LLMs.

Large language models (LLMs) have become increasingly sophisticated, leading to widespread deployment in sensitive applications where safety and reliability are paramount. However, LLMs have inherent risks accompanying them, including bias, potential for unsafe actions, dataset poisoning, lack of explainability, hallucinations, and non-reproducibility. These risks necessitate the development of "guardrails" to align LLMs with desired behaviors and mitigate potential harm. This work explores the risks associated with deploying LLMs and evaluates current approaches to implementing guardrails and model alignment techniques. We examine intrinsic and extrinsic bias evaluation methods and discuss the importance of fairness metrics for responsible AI development. The safety and reliability of agentic LLMs (those capable of real-world actions) are explored, emphasizing the need for testability, fail-safes, and situational awareness. Technical strategies for securing LLMs are presented, including a layered protection model operating at external, secondary, and internal levels. System prompts, Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) architectures, and techniques to minimize bias and protect privacy are highlighted. Effective guardrail design requires a deep understanding of the LLM's intended use case, relevant regulations, and ethical considerations. Striking a balance between competing requirements, such as accuracy and privacy, remains an ongoing challenge. This work underscores the importance of continuous research and development to ensure the safe and responsible use of LLMs in real-world applications.

Self-improvement is a mechanism in Large Language Model (LLM) pre-training, post-training and test-time inference. We explore a framework where the model verifies its own outputs, filters or reweights data based on this verification, and distills the filtered data. Despite several empirical successes, a fundamental understanding is still lacking. In this work, we initiate a comprehensive, modular and controlled study on LLM self-improvement. We provide a mathematical formulation for self-improvement, which is largely governed by a quantity which we formalize as the generation-verification gap. Through experiments with various model families and tasks, we discover a scaling phenomenon of self-improvement -- a variant of the generation-verification gap scales monotonically with the model pre-training flops. We also examine when self-improvement is possible, an iterative self-improvement procedure, and ways to improve its performance. Our findings not only advance understanding of LLM self-improvement with practical implications, but also open numerous avenues for future research into its capabilities and boundaries.

We propose DISC-LawLLM, an intelligent legal system utilizing large language models (LLMs) to provide a wide range of legal services. We adopt legal syllogism prompting strategies to construct supervised fine-tuning datasets in the Chinese Judicial domain and fine-tune LLMs with legal reasoning capability. We augment LLMs with a retrieval module to enhance models' ability to access and utilize external legal knowledge. A comprehensive legal benchmark, DISC-Law-Eval, is presented to evaluate intelligent legal systems from both objective and subjective dimensions. Quantitative and qualitative results on DISC-Law-Eval demonstrate the effectiveness of our system in serving various users across diverse legal scenarios. The detailed resources are available at https://github.com/FudanDISC/DISC-LawLLM.

As large language models (LLMs) continue to advance in capability and influence, ensuring their security and preventing harmful outputs has become crucial. A promising approach to address these concerns involves training models to automatically generate adversarial prompts for red teaming. However, the evolving subtlety of vulnerabilities in LLMs challenges the effectiveness of current adversarial methods, which struggle to specifically target and explore the weaknesses of these models. To tackle these challenges, we introduce the Self-Evolving Adversarial Safety (SEAS) optimization framework, which enhances security by leveraging data generated by the model itself. SEAS operates through three iterative stages: Initialization, Attack, and Adversarial Optimization, refining both the Red Team and Target models to improve robustness and safety. This framework reduces reliance on manual testing and significantly enhances the security capabilities of LLMs. Our contributions include a novel adversarial framework, a comprehensive safety dataset, and after three iterations, the Target model achieves a security level comparable to GPT-4, while the Red Team model shows a marked increase in attack success rate (ASR) against advanced models.

Large language models (LLMs) have a wealth of knowledge that allows them to excel in various Natural Language Processing (NLP) tasks. Current research focuses on enhancing their performance within their existing knowledge. Despite their vast knowledge, LLMs are still limited by the amount of information they can accommodate and comprehend. Therefore, the ability to understand their own limitations on the unknows, referred to as self-knowledge, is of paramount importance. This study aims to evaluate LLMs' self-knowledge by assessing their ability to identify unanswerable or unknowable questions. We introduce an automated methodology to detect uncertainty in the responses of these models, providing a novel measure of their self-knowledge. We further introduce a unique dataset, SelfAware, consisting of unanswerable questions from five diverse categories and their answerable counterparts. Our extensive analysis, involving 20 LLMs including GPT-3, InstructGPT, and LLaMA, discovering an intrinsic capacity for self-knowledge within these models. Moreover, we demonstrate that in-context learning and instruction tuning can further enhance this self-knowledge. Despite this promising insight, our findings also highlight a considerable gap between the capabilities of these models and human proficiency in recognizing the limits of their knowledge.

Self-correction is a novel method that can stimulate the potential reasoning abilities of large language models (LLMs). It involves detecting and correcting errors during the inference process when LLMs solve reasoning problems. However, recent works do not regard self-correction as a spontaneous and intrinsic capability of LLMs. Instead, such correction is achieved through post-hoc generation, external knowledge introduction, multi-model collaboration, and similar techniques. In this paper, we propose a series of mathematical LLMs called S^3c-Math, which are able to perform Spontaneous Step-level Self-correction for Mathematical reasoning. This capability helps LLMs to recognize whether their ongoing inference tends to contain errors and simultaneously correct these errors to produce a more reliable response. We proposed a method, which employs a step-level sampling approach to construct step-wise self-correction data for achieving such ability. Additionally, we implement a training strategy that uses above constructed data to equip LLMs with spontaneous step-level self-correction capacities. Our data and methods have been demonstrated to be effective across various foundation LLMs, consistently showing significant progress in evaluations on GSM8K, MATH, and other mathematical benchmarks. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to introduce the spontaneous step-level self-correction ability of LLMs in mathematical reasoning.