Daily Papers

Can classical game-theoretic frameworks be extended to capture the bounded rationality and causal reasoning of AI agents? We investigate this question by extending Causal Normal Form Games (CNFGs) to sequential settings, introducing Sequential Causal Multi-Agent Systems (S-CMAS) that incorporate Pearl's Causal Hierarchy across leader-follower interactions. While theoretically elegant -- we prove PSPACE-completeness, develop equilibrium refinements, and establish connections to signaling theory -- our comprehensive empirical investigation reveals a critical limitation: S-CNE provides zero welfare improvement over classical Stackelberg equilibrium across all tested scenarios. Through 50+ Monte Carlo simulations and hand-crafted synthetic examples, we demonstrate that backward induction with rational best-response eliminates any strategic advantage from causal layer distinctions. We construct a theoretical example illustrating conditions where benefits could emerge (ε-rational satisficing followers), though implementation confirms that even relaxed rationality assumptions prove insufficient when good instincts align with optimal play. This negative result provides valuable insight: classical game-theoretic extensions grounded in rational choice are fundamentally incompatible with causal reasoning advantages, motivating new theoretical frameworks beyond standard Nash equilibrium for agentic AI.

Normal-form games (NFGs) are the fundamental model of strategic interaction. We study their representation using neural networks. We describe the inherent equivariance of NFGs -- any permutation of strategies describes an equivalent game -- as well as the challenges this poses for representation learning. We then propose the NfgTransformer architecture that leverages this equivariance, leading to state-of-the-art performance in a range of game-theoretic tasks including equilibrium-solving, deviation gain estimation and ranking, with a common approach to NFG representation. We show that the resulting model is interpretable and versatile, paving the way towards deep learning systems capable of game-theoretic reasoning when interacting with humans and with each other.

The computational study of equilibria involving constraints on players' strategies has been largely neglected. However, in real-world applications, players are usually subject to constraints ruling out the feasibility of some of their strategies, such as, e.g., safety requirements and budget caps. Computational studies on constrained versions of the Nash equilibrium have lead to some results under very stringent assumptions, while finding constrained versions of the correlated equilibrium (CE) is still unexplored. In this paper, we introduce and computationally characterize constrained Phi-equilibria -- a more general notion than constrained CEs -- in normal-form games. We show that computing such equilibria is in general computationally intractable, and also that the set of the equilibria may not be convex, providing a sharp divide with unconstrained CEs. Nevertheless, we provide a polynomial-time algorithm for computing a constrained (approximate) Phi-equilibrium maximizing a given linear function, when either the number of constraints or that of players' actions is fixed. Moreover, in the special case in which a player's constraints do not depend on other players' strategies, we show that an exact, function-maximizing equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time, while one (approximate) equilibrium can be found with an efficient decentralized no-regret learning algorithm.

We consider the problem of decentralized multi-agent reinforcement learning in Markov games. A fundamental question is whether there exist algorithms that, when adopted by all agents and run independently in a decentralized fashion, lead to no-regret for each player, analogous to celebrated convergence results in normal-form games. While recent work has shown that such algorithms exist for restricted settings (notably, when regret is defined with respect to deviations to Markovian policies), the question of whether independent no-regret learning can be achieved in the standard Markov game framework was open. We provide a decisive negative resolution this problem, both from a computational and statistical perspective. We show that: - Under the widely-believed assumption that PPAD-hard problems cannot be solved in polynomial time, there is no polynomial-time algorithm that attains no-regret in general-sum Markov games when executed independently by all players, even when the game is known to the algorithm designer and the number of players is a small constant. - When the game is unknown, no algorithm, regardless of computational efficiency, can achieve no-regret without observing a number of episodes that is exponential in the number of players. Perhaps surprisingly, our lower bounds hold even for seemingly easier setting in which all agents are controlled by a a centralized algorithm. They are proven via lower bounds for a simpler problem we refer to as SparseCCE, in which the goal is to compute a coarse correlated equilibrium that is sparse in the sense that it can be represented as a mixture of a small number of product policies. The crux of our approach is a novel application of aggregation techniques from online learning, whereby we show that any algorithm for the SparseCCE problem can be used to compute approximate Nash equilibria for non-zero sum normal-form games.

Recently, remarkable progress has been made by approximating Nash equilibrium (NE), correlated equilibrium (CE), and coarse correlated equilibrium (CCE) through function approximation that trains a neural network to predict equilibria from game representations. Furthermore, equivariant architectures are widely adopted in designing such equilibrium approximators in normal-form games. In this paper, we theoretically characterize benefits and limitations of equivariant equilibrium approximators. For the benefits, we show that they enjoy better generalizability than general ones and can achieve better approximations when the payoff distribution is permutation-invariant. For the limitations, we discuss their drawbacks in terms of equilibrium selection and social welfare. Together, our results help to understand the role of equivariance in equilibrium approximators.

We introduce the use of generative adversarial learning to compute equilibria in general game-theoretic settings, specifically the generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) in pseudo-games, and its specific instantiation as the competitive equilibrium (CE) in Arrow-Debreu competitive economies. Pseudo-games are a generalization of games in which players' actions affect not only the payoffs of other players but also their feasible action spaces. Although the computation of GNE and CE is intractable in the worst-case, i.e., PPAD-hard, in practice, many applications only require solutions with high accuracy in expectation over a distribution of problem instances. We introduce Generative Adversarial Equilibrium Solvers (GAES): a family of generative adversarial neural networks that can learn GNE and CE from only a sample of problem instances. We provide computational and sample complexity bounds, and apply the framework to finding Nash equilibria in normal-form games, CE in Arrow-Debreu competitive economies, and GNE in an environmental economic model of the Kyoto mechanism.

We propose the first loss function for approximate Nash equilibria of normal-form games that is amenable to unbiased Monte Carlo estimation. This construction allows us to deploy standard non-convex stochastic optimization techniques for approximating Nash equilibria, resulting in novel algorithms with provable guarantees. We complement our theoretical analysis with experiments demonstrating that stochastic gradient descent can outperform previous state-of-the-art approaches.

This paper generalises the treatment of compositional game theory as introduced by the second and third authors with Ghani and Winschel, where games are modelled as morphisms of a symmetric monoidal category. From an economic modelling perspective, the existing notion of an open game is not expressive enough for many applications. This includes stochastic environments, stochastic choices by players, as well as incomplete information regarding the game being played. The current paper addresses these three issue all at once. To achieve this we make significant use of category theory, especially the 'coend optics' of Riley.

We improve the framework of open games with agency by showing how the players' counterfactual analysis giving rise to Nash equilibria can be described in the dynamics of the game itself (hence diegetically), getting rid of devices such as equilibrium predicates. This new approach overlaps almost completely with the way gradient-based learners are specified and trained. Indeed, we show feedback propagation in games can be seen as a form of backpropagation, with a crucial difference explaining the distinctive character of the phenomenology of non-cooperative games. We outline a functorial construction of arena of games, show players form a subsystem over it, and prove that their 'fixpoint behaviours' are Nash equilibria.

In their seminal work, Nayyar et al. (2013) showed that imperfect information can be abstracted away from common-payoff games by having players publicly announce their policies as they play. This insight underpins sound solvers and decision-time planning algorithms for common-payoff games. Unfortunately, a naive application of the same insight to two-player zero-sum games fails because Nash equilibria of the game with public policy announcements may not correspond to Nash equilibria of the original game. As a consequence, existing sound decision-time planning algorithms require complicated additional mechanisms that have unappealing properties. The main contribution of this work is showing that certain regularized equilibria do not possess the aforementioned non-correspondence problem -- thus, computing them can be treated as perfect-information problems. Because these regularized equilibria can be made arbitrarily close to Nash equilibria, our result opens the door to a new perspective to solving two-player zero-sum games and yields a simplified framework for decision-time planning in two-player zero-sum games, void of the unappealing properties that plague existing decision-time planning approaches.

During 2023, two interesting results were proven about the limit behavior of game dynamics: First, it was shown that there is a game for which no dynamics converges to the Nash equilibria. Second, it was shown that the sink equilibria of a game adequately capture the limit behavior of natural game dynamics. These two results have created a need and opportunity to articulate a principled computational theory of the meaning of the game that is based on game dynamics. Given any game in normal form, and any prior distribution of play, we study the problem of computing the asymptotic behavior of a class of natural dynamics called the noisy replicator dynamics as a limit distribution over the sink equilibria of the game. When the prior distribution has pure strategy support, we prove this distribution can be computed efficiently, in near-linear time to the size of the best-response graph. When the distribution can be sampled -- for example, if it is the uniform distribution over all mixed strategy profiles -- we show through experiments that the limit distribution of reasonably large games can be estimated quite accurately through sampling and simulation.

In this paper, we present a conceptual model game to examine the dynamics of asymmetric interactions in games with imperfect information. The game involves two agents with starkly contrasting capabilities: one agent can take actions but has no information of the state of the game, whereas the other agent has perfect information of the state but cannot act or observe the other agent's actions. This duality manifests an extreme form of asymmetry, and how differing abilities influence the possibility of attaining common knowledge. Using Kripke structures and epistemic logic we demonstrate that, under these conditions, common knowledge of the current game state becomes unattainable. Our findings advance the discussion on the strategic limitations of knowledge in environments where information and action are unevenly distributed.

Two-player, constant-sum games are well studied in the literature, but there has been limited progress outside of this setting. We propose Joint Policy-Space Response Oracles (JPSRO), an algorithm for training agents in n-player, general-sum extensive form games, which provably converges to an equilibrium. We further suggest correlated equilibria (CE) as promising meta-solvers, and propose a novel solution concept Maximum Gini Correlated Equilibrium (MGCE), a principled and computationally efficient family of solutions for solving the correlated equilibrium selection problem. We conduct several experiments using CE meta-solvers for JPSRO and demonstrate convergence on n-player, general-sum games.

The origin of adversarial examples is still inexplicable in research fields, and it arouses arguments from various viewpoints, albeit comprehensive investigations. In this paper, we propose a way of delving into the unexpected vulnerability in adversarially trained networks from a causal perspective, namely adversarial instrumental variable (IV) regression. By deploying it, we estimate the causal relation of adversarial prediction under an unbiased environment dissociated from unknown confounders. Our approach aims to demystify inherent causal features on adversarial examples by leveraging a zero-sum optimization game between a casual feature estimator (i.e., hypothesis model) and worst-case counterfactuals (i.e., test function) disturbing to find causal features. Through extensive analyses, we demonstrate that the estimated causal features are highly related to the correct prediction for adversarial robustness, and the counterfactuals exhibit extreme features significantly deviating from the correct prediction. In addition, we present how to effectively inoculate CAusal FEatures (CAFE) into defense networks for improving adversarial robustness.

Mean-field games have been used as a theoretical tool to obtain an approximate Nash equilibrium for symmetric and anonymous N-player games. However, limiting applicability, existing theoretical results assume variations of a "population generative model", which allows arbitrary modifications of the population distribution by the learning algorithm. Moreover, learning algorithms typically work on abstract simulators with population instead of the N-player game. Instead, we show that N agents running policy mirror ascent converge to the Nash equilibrium of the regularized game within mathcal{O}(varepsilon^{-2}) samples from a single sample trajectory without a population generative model, up to a standard O(1{N}) error due to the mean field. Taking a divergent approach from the literature, instead of working with the best-response map we first show that a policy mirror ascent map can be used to construct a contractive operator having the Nash equilibrium as its fixed point. We analyze single-path TD learning for N-agent games, proving sample complexity guarantees by only using a sample path from the N-agent simulator without a population generative model. Furthermore, we demonstrate that our methodology allows for independent learning by N agents with finite sample guarantees.

We explore algorithms to select actions in the causal bandit setting where the learner can choose to intervene on a set of random variables related by a causal graph, and the learner sequentially chooses interventions and observes a sample from the interventional distribution. The learner's goal is to quickly find the intervention, among all interventions on observable variables, that maximizes the expectation of an outcome variable. We depart from previous literature by assuming no knowledge of the causal graph except that latent confounders between the outcome and its ancestors are not present. We first show that the unknown graph problem can be exponentially hard in the parents of the outcome. To remedy this, we adopt an additional additive assumption on the outcome which allows us to solve the problem by casting it as an additive combinatorial linear bandit problem with full-bandit feedback. We propose a novel action-elimination algorithm for this setting, show how to apply this algorithm to the causal bandit problem, provide sample complexity bounds, and empirically validate our findings on a suite of randomly generated causal models, effectively showing that one does not need to explicitly learn the parents of the outcome to identify the best intervention.

We investigate learning the equilibria in non-stationary multi-agent systems and address the challenges that differentiate multi-agent learning from single-agent learning. Specifically, we focus on games with bandit feedback, where testing an equilibrium can result in substantial regret even when the gap to be tested is small, and the existence of multiple optimal solutions (equilibria) in stationary games poses extra challenges. To overcome these obstacles, we propose a versatile black-box approach applicable to a broad spectrum of problems, such as general-sum games, potential games, and Markov games, when equipped with appropriate learning and testing oracles for stationary environments. Our algorithms can achieve Oleft(Delta^{1/4}T^{3/4}right) regret when the degree of nonstationarity, as measured by total variation Delta, is known, and Oleft(Delta^{1/5}T^{4/5}right) regret when Delta is unknown, where T is the number of rounds. Meanwhile, our algorithm inherits the favorable dependence on number of agents from the oracles. As a side contribution that may be independent of interest, we show how to test for various types of equilibria by a black-box reduction to single-agent learning, which includes Nash equilibria, correlated equilibria, and coarse correlated equilibria.

Recent advances in artificial intelligence reveal the limits of purely predictive systems and call for a shift toward causal and collaborative reasoning. Drawing inspiration from the revolution of Grothendieck in mathematics, we introduce the relativity of causal knowledge, which posits structural causal models (SCMs) are inherently imperfect, subjective representations embedded within networks of relationships. By leveraging category theory, we arrange SCMs into a functor category and show that their observational and interventional probability measures naturally form convex structures. This result allows us to encode non-intervened SCMs with convex spaces of probability measures. Next, using sheaf theory, we construct the network sheaf and cosheaf of causal knowledge. These structures enable the transfer of causal knowledge across the network while incorporating interventional consistency and the perspective of the subjects, ultimately leading to the formal, mathematical definition of relative causal knowledge.

Imperfect information games (IIG) are games in which each player only partially observes the current game state. We study how to learn epsilon-optimal strategies in a zero-sum IIG through self-play with trajectory feedback. We give a problem-independent lower bound mathcal{O}(H(A_{X}+B_{Y})/epsilon^2) on the required number of realizations to learn these strategies with high probability, where H is the length of the game, A_{X} and B_{Y} are the total number of actions for the two players. We also propose two Follow the Regularized leader (FTRL) algorithms for this setting: Balanced FTRL which matches this lower bound, but requires the knowledge of the information set structure beforehand to define the regularization; and Adaptive FTRL which needs mathcal{O}(H^2(A_{X}+B_{Y})/epsilon^2) realizations without this requirement by progressively adapting the regularization to the observations.

We address causal reasoning in multivariate time series data generated by stochastic processes. Existing approaches are largely restricted to static settings, ignoring the continuity and emission of variations across time. In contrast, we propose a learning paradigm that directly establishes causation between events in the course of time. We present two key lemmas to compute causal contributions and frame them as reinforcement learning problems. Our approach offers formal and computational tools for uncovering and quantifying causal relationships in diffusion processes, subsuming various important settings such as discrete-time Markov decision processes. Finally, in fairly intricate experiments and through sheer learning, our framework reveals and quantifies causal links, which otherwise seem inexplicable.

Learning the behavior of large agent populations is an important task for numerous research areas. Although the field of multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) has made significant progress towards solving these systems, solutions for many agents often remain computationally infeasible and lack theoretical guarantees. Mean Field Games (MFGs) address both of these issues and can be extended to Graphon MFGs (GMFGs) to include network structures between agents. Despite their merits, the real world applicability of GMFGs is limited by the fact that graphons only capture dense graphs. Since most empirically observed networks show some degree of sparsity, such as power law graphs, the GMFG framework is insufficient for capturing these network topologies. Thus, we introduce the novel concept of Graphex MFGs (GXMFGs) which builds on the graph theoretical concept of graphexes. Graphexes are the limiting objects to sparse graph sequences that also have other desirable features such as the small world property. Learning equilibria in these games is challenging due to the rich and sparse structure of the underlying graphs. To tackle these challenges, we design a new learning algorithm tailored to the GXMFG setup. This hybrid graphex learning approach leverages that the system mainly consists of a highly connected core and a sparse periphery. After defining the system and providing a theoretical analysis, we state our learning approach and demonstrate its learning capabilities on both synthetic graphs and real-world networks. This comparison shows that our GXMFG learning algorithm successfully extends MFGs to a highly relevant class of hard, realistic learning problems that are not accurately addressed by current MARL and MFG methods.

The categories of open learners (due to Fong, Spivak and Tuy\'eras) and open games (due to the present author, Ghani, Winschel and Zahn) bear a very striking and unexpected similarity. The purpose of this short note is to prove that there is a faithful symmetric monoidal functor from the former to the latter, which means that any supervised neural network (without feedback or other complicating features) can be seen as an open game in a canonical way. Roughly, each parameter is controlled by a different player, and the game's best response relation encodes the dynamics of gradient descent. We suggest paths for further work exploiting the link.

In causal bandit problems, the action set consists of interventions on variables of a causal graph. Several researchers have recently studied such bandit problems and pointed out their practical applications. However, all existing works rely on a restrictive and impractical assumption that the learner is given full knowledge of the causal graph structure upfront. In this paper, we develop novel causal bandit algorithms without knowing the causal graph. Our algorithms work well for causal trees, causal forests and a general class of causal graphs. The regret guarantees of our algorithms greatly improve upon those of standard multi-armed bandit (MAB) algorithms under mild conditions. Lastly, we prove our mild conditions are necessary: without them one cannot do better than standard MAB algorithms.

Randomized mechanisms can have good normative properties compared to their deterministic counterparts. However, randomized mechanisms are problematic in several ways such as in their verifiability. We propose here to derandomize such mechanisms by having agents play a game instead of tossing a coin. The game is designed so an agent's best action is to play randomly, and this play then injects ``randomness'' into the mechanism. This derandomization retains many of the good normative properties of the original randomized mechanism but gives a mechanism that is deterministic and easy, for instance, to audit. We consider three related methods to derandomize randomized mechanism in six different domains: voting, facility location, task allocation, school choice, peer selection, and resource allocation. We propose a number of novel derandomized mechanisms for these six domains with good normative properties. Each mechanism has a mixed Nash equilibrium in which agents play a modular arithmetic game with an uniform mixed strategy. In all but one mixed Nash equilibrium, agents report their preferences over the original problem sincerely. The derandomized methods are thus ``quasi-strategy proof''. In one domain, we additionally show that a new and desirable normative property emerges as a result of derandomization.

We study offline multi-agent reinforcement learning (RL) in Markov games, where the goal is to learn an approximate equilibrium -- such as Nash equilibrium and (Coarse) Correlated Equilibrium -- from an offline dataset pre-collected from the game. Existing works consider relatively restricted tabular or linear models and handle each equilibria separately. In this work, we provide the first framework for sample-efficient offline learning in Markov games under general function approximation, handling all 3 equilibria in a unified manner. By using Bellman-consistent pessimism, we obtain interval estimation for policies' returns, and use both the upper and the lower bounds to obtain a relaxation on the gap of a candidate policy, which becomes our optimization objective. Our results generalize prior works and provide several additional insights. Importantly, we require a data coverage condition that improves over the recently proposed "unilateral concentrability". Our condition allows selective coverage of deviation policies that optimally trade-off between their greediness (as approximate best responses) and coverage, and we show scenarios where this leads to significantly better guarantees. As a new connection, we also show how our algorithmic framework can subsume seemingly different solution concepts designed for the special case of two-player zero-sum games.

Behavior cloning is enjoying a resurgence in popularity as scaling both model and data sizes proves to provide a strong starting point for many tasks of interest. In this work, we introduce an open recipe for training a video game playing foundation model designed for inference in realtime on a consumer GPU. We release all data (8300+ hours of high quality human gameplay), training and inference code, and pretrained checkpoints under an open license. We show that our best model is capable of playing a variety of 3D video games at a level competitive with human play. We use this recipe to systematically examine the scaling laws of behavior cloning to understand how the model's performance and causal reasoning varies with model and data scale. We first show in a simple toy problem that, for some types of causal reasoning, increasing both the amount of training data and the depth of the network results in the model learning a more causal policy. We then systematically study how causality varies with the number of parameters (and depth) and training steps in scaled models of up to 1.2 billion parameters, and we find similar scaling results to what we observe in the toy problem.

Model-based methods have recently shown promising for offline reinforcement learning (RL), aiming to learn good policies from historical data without interacting with the environment. Previous model-based offline RL methods learn fully connected nets as world-models that map the states and actions to the next-step states. However, it is sensible that a world-model should adhere to the underlying causal effect such that it will support learning an effective policy generalizing well in unseen states. In this paper, We first provide theoretical results that causal world-models can outperform plain world-models for offline RL by incorporating the causal structure into the generalization error bound. We then propose a practical algorithm, oFfline mOdel-based reinforcement learning with CaUsal Structure (FOCUS), to illustrate the feasibility of learning and leveraging causal structure in offline RL. Experimental results on two benchmarks show that FOCUS reconstructs the underlying causal structure accurately and robustly. Consequently, it performs better than the plain model-based offline RL algorithms and other causal model-based RL algorithms.

In Causal Bayesian Optimization (CBO), an agent intervenes on an unknown structural causal model to maximize a downstream reward variable. In this paper, we consider the generalization where other agents or external events also intervene on the system, which is key for enabling adaptiveness to non-stationarities such as weather changes, market forces, or adversaries. We formalize this generalization of CBO as Adversarial Causal Bayesian Optimization (ACBO) and introduce the first algorithm for ACBO with bounded regret: Causal Bayesian Optimization with Multiplicative Weights (CBO-MW). Our approach combines a classical online learning strategy with causal modeling of the rewards. To achieve this, it computes optimistic counterfactual reward estimates by propagating uncertainty through the causal graph. We derive regret bounds for CBO-MW that naturally depend on graph-related quantities. We further propose a scalable implementation for the case of combinatorial interventions and submodular rewards. Empirically, CBO-MW outperforms non-causal and non-adversarial Bayesian optimization methods on synthetic environments and environments based on real-word data. Our experiments include a realistic demonstration of how CBO-MW can be used to learn users' demand patterns in a shared mobility system and reposition vehicles in strategic areas.

In order for agents in multi-agent systems (MAS) to be safe, they need to take into account the risks posed by the actions of other agents. However, the dominant paradigm in game theory (GT) assumes that agents are not affected by risk from other agents and only strive to maximise their expected utility. For example, in hybrid human-AI driving systems, it is necessary to limit large deviations in reward resulting from car crashes. Although there are equilibrium concepts in game theory that take into account risk aversion, they either assume that agents are risk-neutral with respect to the uncertainty caused by the actions of other agents, or they are not guaranteed to exist. We introduce a new GT-based Risk-Averse Equilibrium (RAE) that always produces a solution that minimises the potential variance in reward accounting for the strategy of other agents. Theoretically and empirically, we show RAE shares many properties with a Nash Equilibrium (NE), establishing convergence properties and generalising to risk-dominant NE in certain cases. To tackle large-scale problems, we extend RAE to the PSRO multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) framework. We empirically demonstrate the minimum reward variance benefits of RAE in matrix games with high-risk outcomes. Results on MARL experiments show RAE generalises to risk-dominant NE in a trust dilemma game and that it reduces instances of crashing by 7x in an autonomous driving setting versus the best performing baseline.

Card games are widely used to study sequential decision-making under uncertainty, with real-world analogues in negotiation, finance, and cybersecurity. These games typically fall into three categories based on the flow of control: strictly sequential (players alternate single actions), deterministic response (some actions trigger a fixed outcome), and unbounded reciprocal response (alternating counterplays are permitted). A less-explored but strategically rich structure is the bounded one-sided response, where a player's action briefly transfers control to the opponent, who must satisfy a fixed condition through one or more moves before the turn resolves. We term games featuring this mechanism Bounded One-Sided Response Games (BORGs). We introduce a modified version of Monopoly Deal as a benchmark environment that isolates this dynamic, where a Rent action forces the opponent to choose payment assets. The gold-standard algorithm, Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR), converges on effective strategies without novel algorithmic extensions. A lightweight full-stack research platform unifies the environment, a parallelized CFR runtime, and a human-playable web interface. The trained CFR agent and source code are available at https://monopolydeal.ai.

For a two-player imperfect-information extensive-form game (IIEFG) with K time steps and a player action space of size U, the game tree complexity is U^{2K}, causing existing IIEFG solvers to struggle with large or infinite (U,K), e.g., differential games with continuous action spaces. To partially address this scalability challenge, we focus on an important class of 2p0s games where the informed player (P1) knows the payoff while the uninformed player (P2) only has a belief over the set of I possible payoffs. Such games encompass a wide range of scenarios in sports, defense, cybersecurity, and finance. We prove that under mild conditions, P1's (resp. P2's) equilibrium strategy at any infostate concentrates on at most I (resp. I+1) action prototypes. When Ill U, this equilibrium structure causes the game tree complexity to collapse to I^K for P1 when P2 plays pure best responses, and (I+1)^K for P2 in a dual game where P1 plays pure best responses. We then show that exploiting this structure in standard learning modes, i.e., model-free multiagent reinforcement learning and model predictive control, is straightforward, leading to significant improvements in learning accuracy and efficiency from SOTA IIEFG solvers. Our demonstration solves a 22-player football game (K=10, U=infty) where the attacking team has to strategically conceal their intention until a critical moment in order to exploit information advantage. Code is available at https://github.com/ghimiremukesh/cams/tree/iclr

An abundance of recent impossibility results establish that regret minimization in Markov games with adversarial opponents is both statistically and computationally intractable. Nevertheless, none of these results preclude the possibility of regret minimization under the assumption that all parties adopt the same learning procedure. In this work, we present the first (to our knowledge) algorithm for learning in general-sum Markov games that provides sublinear regret guarantees when executed by all agents. The bounds we obtain are for swap regret, and thus, along the way, imply convergence to a correlated equilibrium. Our algorithm is decentralized, computationally efficient, and does not require any communication between agents. Our key observation is that online learning via policy optimization in Markov games essentially reduces to a form of weighted regret minimization, with unknown weights determined by the path length of the agents' policy sequence. Consequently, controlling the path length leads to weighted regret objectives for which sufficiently adaptive algorithms provide sublinear regret guarantees.

AI agents will be predictable in certain ways that traditional agents are not. Where and how can we leverage this predictability in order to improve social welfare? We study this question in a game-theoretic setting where one agent can pay a fixed cost to simulate the other in order to learn its mixed strategy. As a negative result, we prove that, in contrast to prior work on pure-strategy simulation, enabling mixed-strategy simulation may no longer lead to improved outcomes for both players in all so-called "generalised trust games". In fact, mixed-strategy simulation does not help in any game where the simulatee's action can depend on that of the simulator. We also show that, in general, deciding whether simulation introduces Pareto-improving Nash equilibria in a given game is NP-hard. As positive results, we establish that mixed-strategy simulation can improve social welfare if the simulator has the option to scale their level of trust, if the players face challenges with both trust and coordination, or if maintaining some level of privacy is essential for enabling cooperation.

When users can benefit from certain predictive outcomes, they may be prone to act to achieve those outcome, e.g., by strategically modifying their features. The goal in strategic classification is therefore to train predictive models that are robust to such behavior. However, the conventional framework assumes that changing features does not change actual outcomes, which depicts users as "gaming" the system. Here we remove this assumption, and study learning in a causal strategic setting where true outcomes do change. Focusing on accuracy as our primary objective, we show how strategic behavior and causal effects underlie two complementing forms of distribution shift. We characterize these shifts, and propose a learning algorithm that balances between these two forces and over time, and permits end-to-end training. Experiments on synthetic and semi-synthetic data demonstrate the utility of our approach.

We present a constraint-based algorithm for learning causal structures from observational time-series data, in the presence of latent confounders. We assume a discrete-time, stationary structural vector autoregressive process, with both temporal and contemporaneous causal relations. One may ask if temporal and contemporaneous relations should be treated differently. The presented algorithm gradually refines a causal graph by learning long-term temporal relations before short-term ones, where contemporaneous relations are learned last. This ordering of causal relations to be learnt leads to a reduction in the required number of statistical tests. We validate this reduction empirically and demonstrate that it leads to higher accuracy for synthetic data and more plausible causal graphs for real-world data compared to state-of-the-art algorithms.

Game theory, as an analytical tool, is frequently utilized to analyze human behavior in social science research. With the high alignment between the behavior of Large Language Models (LLMs) and humans, a promising research direction is to employ LLMs as substitutes for humans in game experiments, enabling social science research. However, despite numerous empirical researches on the combination of LLMs and game theory, the capability boundaries of LLMs in game theory remain unclear. In this research, we endeavor to systematically analyze LLMs in the context of game theory. Specifically, rationality, as the fundamental principle of game theory, serves as the metric for evaluating players' behavior -- building a clear desire, refining belief about uncertainty, and taking optimal actions. Accordingly, we select three classical games (dictator game, Rock-Paper-Scissors, and ring-network game) to analyze to what extent LLMs can achieve rationality in these three aspects. The experimental results indicate that even the current state-of-the-art LLM (GPT-4) exhibits substantial disparities compared to humans in game theory. For instance, LLMs struggle to build desires based on uncommon preferences, fail to refine belief from many simple patterns, and may overlook or modify refined belief when taking actions. Therefore, we consider that introducing LLMs into game experiments in the field of social science should be approached with greater caution.

In this paper, the causal bandit problem is investigated, in which the objective is to select an optimal sequence of interventions on nodes in a causal graph. It is assumed that the graph is governed by linear structural equations; it is further assumed that both the causal topology and the distribution of interventions are unknown. By exploiting the causal relationships between the nodes whose signals contribute to the reward, interventions are optimized. First, based on the difference between the two types of graph identification errors (false positives and negatives), a causal graph learning method is proposed, which strongly reduces sample complexity relative to the prior art by learning sub-graphs. Under the assumption of Gaussian exogenous inputs and minimum-mean squared error weight estimation, a new uncertainty bound tailored to the causal bandit problem is derived. This uncertainty bound drives an upper confidence bound based intervention selection to optimize the reward. To cope with non-stationary bandits, a sub-graph change detection mechanism is proposed, with high sample efficiency. Numerical results compare the new methodology to existing schemes and show a substantial performance improvement in both stationary and non-stationary settings. Compared to existing approaches, the proposed scheme takes 67% fewer samples to learn the causal structure and achieves an average reward gain of 85%.

Consider the problem of exploration in sparse-reward or reward-free environments, such as in Montezuma's Revenge. In the curiosity-driven paradigm, the agent is rewarded for how much each realized outcome differs from their predicted outcome. But using predictive error as intrinsic motivation is fragile in stochastic environments, as the agent may become trapped by high-entropy areas of the state-action space, such as a "noisy TV". In this work, we study a natural solution derived from structural causal models of the world: Our key idea is to learn representations of the future that capture precisely the unpredictable aspects of each outcome -- which we use as additional input for predictions, such that intrinsic rewards only reflect the predictable aspects of world dynamics. First, we propose incorporating such hindsight representations into models to disentangle "noise" from "novelty", yielding Curiosity in Hindsight: a simple and scalable generalization of curiosity that is robust to stochasticity. Second, we instantiate this framework for the recently introduced BYOL-Explore algorithm as our prime example, resulting in the noise-robust BYOL-Hindsight. Third, we illustrate its behavior under a variety of different stochasticities in a grid world, and find improvements over BYOL-Explore in hard-exploration Atari games with sticky actions. Notably, we show state-of-the-art results in exploring Montezuma's Revenge with sticky actions, while preserving performance in the non-sticky setting.

We initiate the study of Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (MARLHF), exploring both theoretical foundations and empirical validations. We define the task as identifying Nash equilibrium from a preference-only offline dataset in general-sum games, a problem marked by the challenge of sparse feedback signals. Our theory establishes the upper complexity bounds for Nash Equilibrium in effective MARLHF, demonstrating that single-policy coverage is inadequate and highlighting the importance of unilateral dataset coverage. These theoretical insights are verified through comprehensive experiments. To enhance the practical performance, we further introduce two algorithmic techniques. (1) We propose a Mean Squared Error (MSE) regularization along the time axis to achieve a more uniform reward distribution and improve reward learning outcomes. (2) We utilize imitation learning to approximate the reference policy, ensuring stability and effectiveness in training. Our findings underscore the multifaceted approach required for MARLHF, paving the way for effective preference-based multi-agent systems.

It has long been hypothesised that causal reasoning plays a fundamental role in robust and general intelligence. However, it is not known if agents must learn causal models in order to generalise to new domains, or if other inductive biases are sufficient. We answer this question, showing that any agent capable of satisfying a regret bound under a large set of distributional shifts must have learned an approximate causal model of the data generating process, which converges to the true causal model for optimal agents. We discuss the implications of this result for several research areas including transfer learning and causal inference.

We study how to learn ε-optimal strategies in zero-sum imperfect information games (IIG) with trajectory feedback. In this setting, players update their policies sequentially based on their observations over a fixed number of episodes, denoted by T. Existing procedures suffer from high variance due to the use of importance sampling over sequences of actions (Steinberger et al., 2020; McAleer et al., 2022). To reduce this variance, we consider a fixed sampling approach, where players still update their policies over time, but with observations obtained through a given fixed sampling policy. Our approach is based on an adaptive Online Mirror Descent (OMD) algorithm that applies OMD locally to each information set, using individually decreasing learning rates and a regularized loss. We show that this approach guarantees a convergence rate of mathcal{O}(T^{-1/2}) with high probability and has a near-optimal dependence on the game parameters when applied with the best theoretical choices of learning rates and sampling policies. To achieve these results, we generalize the notion of OMD stabilization, allowing for time-varying regularization with convex increments.

Playing games has a long history of describing intricate interactions in simplified forms. In this paper we explore if large language models (LLMs) can play games, investigating their capabilities for randomisation and strategic adaptation through both simultaneous and sequential game interactions. We focus on GPT-4o-Mini-2024-08-17 and test two games between LLMs: Rock Paper Scissors (RPS) and games of strategy (Prisoners Dilemma PD). LLMs are often described as stochastic parrots, and while they may indeed be parrots, our results suggest that they are not very stochastic in the sense that their outputs - when prompted to be random - are often very biased. Our research reveals that LLMs appear to develop loss aversion strategies in repeated games, with RPS converging to stalemate conditions while PD shows systematic shifts between cooperative and competitive outcomes based on prompt design. We detail programmatic tools for independent agent interactions and the Agentic AI challenges faced in implementation. We show that LLMs can indeed play games, just not very well. These results have implications for the use of LLMs in multi-agent LLM systems and showcase limitations in current approaches to model output for strategic decision-making.

Graphon games have been introduced to study games with many players who interact through a weighted graph of interaction. By passing to the limit, a game with a continuum of players is obtained, in which the interactions are through a graphon. In this paper, we focus on a graphon game for optimal investment under relative performance criteria, and we propose a deep learning method. The method builds upon two key ingredients: first, a characterization of Nash equilibria by forward-backward stochastic differential equations and, second, recent advances of machine learning algorithms for stochastic differential games. We provide numerical experiments on two different financial models. In each model, we compare the effect of several graphons, which correspond to different structures of interactions.

By incorporating regret minimization, double oracle methods have demonstrated rapid convergence to Nash Equilibrium (NE) in normal-form games and extensive-form games, through algorithms such as online double oracle (ODO) and extensive-form double oracle (XDO), respectively. In this study, we further examine the theoretical convergence rate and sample complexity of such regret minimization-based double oracle methods, utilizing a unified framework called Regret-Minimizing Double Oracle. Based on this framework, we extend ODO to extensive-form games and determine its sample complexity. Moreover, we demonstrate that the sample complexity of XDO can be exponential in the number of information sets |S|, owing to the exponentially decaying stopping threshold of restricted games. To solve this problem, we propose the Periodic Double Oracle (PDO) method, which has the lowest sample complexity among all existing double oracle methods, being only polynomial in |S|. Empirical evaluations on multiple poker and board games show that PDO achieves significantly faster convergence than previous double oracle algorithms and reaches a competitive level with state-of-the-art regret minimization methods.

In real-world scenarios, the application of reinforcement learning is significantly challenged by complex non-stationarity. Most existing methods attempt to model changes in the environment explicitly, often requiring impractical prior knowledge of environments. In this paper, we propose a new perspective, positing that non-stationarity can propagate and accumulate through complex causal relationships during state transitions, thereby compounding its sophistication and affecting policy learning. We believe that this challenge can be more effectively addressed by implicitly tracing the causal origin of non-stationarity. To this end, we introduce the Causal-Origin REPresentation (COREP) algorithm. COREP primarily employs a guided updating mechanism to learn a stable graph representation for the state, termed as causal-origin representation. By leveraging this representation, the learned policy exhibits impressive resilience to non-stationarity. We supplement our approach with a theoretical analysis grounded in the causal interpretation for non-stationary reinforcement learning, advocating for the validity of the causal-origin representation. Experimental results further demonstrate the superior performance of COREP over existing methods in tackling non-stationarity problems.

In open-world environments like Minecraft, existing agents face challenges in continuously learning structured knowledge, particularly causality. These challenges stem from the opacity inherent in black-box models and an excessive reliance on prior knowledge during training, which impair their interpretability and generalization capability. To this end, we introduce ADAM, An emboDied causal Agent in Minecraft, that can autonomously navigate the open world, perceive multimodal contexts, learn causal world knowledge, and tackle complex tasks through lifelong learning. ADAM is empowered by four key components: 1) an interaction module, enabling the agent to execute actions while documenting the interaction processes; 2) a causal model module, tasked with constructing an ever-growing causal graph from scratch, which enhances interpretability and diminishes reliance on prior knowledge; 3) a controller module, comprising a planner, an actor, and a memory pool, which uses the learned causal graph to accomplish tasks; 4) a perception module, powered by multimodal large language models, which enables ADAM to perceive like a human player. Extensive experiments show that ADAM constructs an almost perfect causal graph from scratch, enabling efficient task decomposition and execution with strong interpretability. Notably, in our modified Minecraft games where no prior knowledge is available, ADAM maintains its performance and shows remarkable robustness and generalization capability. ADAM pioneers a novel paradigm that integrates causal methods and embodied agents in a synergistic manner. Our project page is at https://opencausalab.github.io/ADAM.

Motivated by equilibrium models of labor markets, we develop a formulation of causal strategic classification in which strategic agents can directly manipulate their outcomes. As an application, we compare employers that anticipate the strategic response of a labor force with employers that do not. We show through a combination of theory and experiment that employers with performatively optimal hiring policies improve employer reward, labor force skill level, and in some cases labor force equity. On the other hand, we demonstrate that performative employers harm labor force utility and fail to prevent discrimination in other cases.

Computing stable partitions in hedonic games is a challenging task because there exist games in which stable outcomes do not exist. Even more, these No-instances can often be leveraged to prove computational hardness results. We make this impression rigorous in a dynamic model of cardinal hedonic games by providing meta theorems. These imply hardness of deciding about the possible or necessary convergence of deviation dynamics based on the mere existence of No-instances. Our results hold for additively separable, fractional, and modified fractional hedonic games (ASHGs, FHGs, and MFHGs). Moreover, they encompass essentially all reasonable stability notions based on single-agent deviations. In addition, we propose dynamics as a method to find individually rational and contractually individual stable (CIS) partitions in ASHGs. In particular, we find that CIS dynamics from the singleton partition possibly converge after a linear number of deviations but may require an exponential number of deviations in the worst case.

We study experiment design for unique identification of the causal graph of a simple SCM, where the graph may contain cycles. The presence of cycles in the structure introduces major challenges for experiment design as, unlike acyclic graphs, learning the skeleton of causal graphs with cycles may not be possible from merely the observational distribution. Furthermore, intervening on a variable in such graphs does not necessarily lead to orienting all the edges incident to it. In this paper, we propose an experiment design approach that can learn both cyclic and acyclic graphs and hence, unifies the task of experiment design for both types of graphs. We provide a lower bound on the number of experiments required to guarantee the unique identification of the causal graph in the worst case, showing that the proposed approach is order-optimal in terms of the number of experiments up to an additive logarithmic term. Moreover, we extend our result to the setting where the size of each experiment is bounded by a constant. For this case, we show that our approach is optimal in terms of the size of the largest experiment required for uniquely identifying the causal graph in the worst case.

We formalize constraint-based structure learning of the "true" causal graph from observed data when unobserved variables are also existent. We provide conditions for a "natural" family of constraint-based structure-learning algorithms that output graphs that are Markov equivalent to the causal graph. Under the faithfulness assumption, this natural family contains all exact structure-learning algorithms. We also provide a set of assumptions, under which any natural structure-learning algorithm outputs Markov equivalent graphs to the causal graph. These assumptions can be thought of as a relaxation of faithfulness, and most of them can be directly tested from (the underlying distribution) of the data, particularly when one focuses on structural causal models. We specialize the definitions and results for structural causal models.

We study multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) for the general-sum Markov Games (MGs) under the general function approximation. In order to find the minimum assumption for sample-efficient learning, we introduce a novel complexity measure called the Multi-Agent Decoupling Coefficient (MADC) for general-sum MGs. Using this measure, we propose the first unified algorithmic framework that ensures sample efficiency in learning Nash Equilibrium, Coarse Correlated Equilibrium, and Correlated Equilibrium for both model-based and model-free MARL problems with low MADC. We also show that our algorithm provides comparable sublinear regret to the existing works. Moreover, our algorithm combines an equilibrium-solving oracle with a single objective optimization subprocedure that solves for the regularized payoff of each deterministic joint policy, which avoids solving constrained optimization problems within data-dependent constraints (Jin et al. 2020; Wang et al. 2023) or executing sampling procedures with complex multi-objective optimization problems (Foster et al. 2023), thus being more amenable to empirical implementation.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are transforming society and permeating into diverse applications. As a result, LLMs will frequently interact with us and other agents. It is, therefore, of great societal value to understand how LLMs behave in interactive social settings. Here, we propose to use behavioral game theory to study LLM's cooperation and coordination behavior. To do so, we let different LLMs (GPT-3, GPT-3.5, and GPT-4) play finitely repeated games with each other and with other, human-like strategies. Our results show that LLMs generally perform well in such tasks and also uncover persistent behavioral signatures. In a large set of two players-two strategies games, we find that LLMs are particularly good at games where valuing their own self-interest pays off, like the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma family. However, they behave sub-optimally in games that require coordination. We, therefore, further focus on two games from these distinct families. In the canonical iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, we find that GPT-4 acts particularly unforgivingly, always defecting after another agent has defected only once. In the Battle of the Sexes, we find that GPT-4 cannot match the behavior of the simple convention to alternate between options. We verify that these behavioral signatures are stable across robustness checks. Finally, we show how GPT-4's behavior can be modified by providing further information about the other player as well as by asking it to predict the other player's actions before making a choice. These results enrich our understanding of LLM's social behavior and pave the way for a behavioral game theory for machines.

Imitation learning suffers from causal confusion. This phenomenon occurs when learned policies attend to features that do not causally influence the expert actions but are instead spuriously correlated. Causally confused agents produce low open-loop supervised loss but poor closed-loop performance upon deployment. We consider the problem of masking observed confounders in a disentangled representation of the observation space. Our novel masking algorithm leverages the usual ability to intervene in the initial system state, avoiding any requirement involving expert querying, expert reward functions, or causal graph specification. Under certain assumptions, we theoretically prove that this algorithm is conservative in the sense that it does not incorrectly mask observations that causally influence the expert; furthermore, intervening on the initial state serves to strictly reduce excess conservatism. The masking algorithm is applied to behavior cloning for two illustrative control systems: CartPole and Reacher.

We examine the problem of regret minimization when the learner is involved in a continuous game with other optimizing agents: in this case, if all players follow a no-regret algorithm, it is possible to achieve significantly lower regret relative to fully adversarial environments. We study this problem in the context of variationally stable games (a class of continuous games which includes all convex-concave and monotone games), and when the players only have access to noisy estimates of their individual payoff gradients. If the noise is additive, the game-theoretic and purely adversarial settings enjoy similar regret guarantees; however, if the noise is multiplicative, we show that the learners can, in fact, achieve constant regret. We achieve this faster rate via an optimistic gradient scheme with learning rate separation -- that is, the method's extrapolation and update steps are tuned to different schedules, depending on the noise profile. Subsequently, to eliminate the need for delicate hyperparameter tuning, we propose a fully adaptive method that attains nearly the same guarantees as its non-adapted counterpart, while operating without knowledge of either the game or of the noise profile.

We study the problem of learning a Nash equilibrium (NE) in an imperfect information game (IIG) through self-play. Precisely, we focus on two-player, zero-sum, episodic, tabular IIG under the perfect-recall assumption where the only feedback is realizations of the game (bandit feedback). In particular, the dynamic of the IIG is not known -- we can only access it by sampling or interacting with a game simulator. For this learning setting, we provide the Implicit Exploration Online Mirror Descent (IXOMD) algorithm. It is a model-free algorithm with a high-probability bound on the convergence rate to the NE of order 1/T where T is the number of played games. Moreover, IXOMD is computationally efficient as it needs to perform the updates only along the sampled trajectory.

Finding the mixed Nash equilibria (MNE) of a two-player zero sum continuous game is an important and challenging problem in machine learning. A canonical algorithm to finding the MNE is the noisy gradient descent ascent method which in the infinite particle limit gives rise to the {\em Mean-Field Gradient Descent Ascent} (GDA) dynamics on the space of probability measures. In this paper, we first study the convergence of a two-scale Mean-Field GDA dynamics for finding the MNE of the entropy-regularized objective. More precisely we show that for each finite temperature (or regularization parameter), the two-scale Mean-Field GDA with a suitable {\em finite} scale ratio converges exponentially to the unique MNE without assuming the convexity or concavity of the interaction potential. The key ingredient of our proof lies in the construction of new Lyapunov functions that dissipate exponentially along the Mean-Field GDA. We further study the simulated annealing of the Mean-Field GDA dynamics. We show that with a temperature schedule that decays logarithmically in time the annealed Mean-Field GDA converges to the MNE of the original unregularized objective.

A faithful and interpretable explanation of an AI model's behavior and internal structure is a high-level explanation that is human-intelligible but also consistent with the known, but often opaque low-level causal details of the model. We argue that the theory of causal abstraction provides the mathematical foundations for the desired kinds of model explanations. In causal abstraction analysis, we use interventions on model-internal states to rigorously assess whether an interpretable high-level causal model is a faithful description of an AI model. Our contributions in this area are: (1) We generalize causal abstraction to cyclic causal structures and typed high-level variables. (2) We show how multi-source interchange interventions can be used to conduct causal abstraction analyses. (3) We define a notion of approximate causal abstraction that allows us to assess the degree to which a high-level causal model is a causal abstraction of a lower-level one. (4) We prove constructive causal abstraction can be decomposed into three operations we refer to as marginalization, variable-merge, and value-merge. (5) We formalize the XAI methods of LIME, causal effect estimation, causal mediation analysis, iterated nullspace projection, and circuit-based explanations as special cases of causal abstraction analysis.

This paper studies the sample-efficiency of learning in Partially Observable Markov Decision Processes (POMDPs), a challenging problem in reinforcement learning that is known to be exponentially hard in the worst-case. Motivated by real-world settings such as loading in game playing, we propose an enhanced feedback model called ``multiple observations in hindsight'', where after each episode of interaction with the POMDP, the learner may collect multiple additional observations emitted from the encountered latent states, but may not observe the latent states themselves. We show that sample-efficient learning under this feedback model is possible for two new subclasses of POMDPs: multi-observation revealing POMDPs and distinguishable POMDPs. Both subclasses generalize and substantially relax revealing POMDPs -- a widely studied subclass for which sample-efficient learning is possible under standard trajectory feedback. Notably, distinguishable POMDPs only require the emission distributions from different latent states to be different instead of linearly independent as required in revealing POMDPs.

We study mean field portfolio games under Epstein-Zin preferences, which naturally encompass the classical time-additive power utility as a special case. In a general non-Markovian framework, we establish a uniqueness result by proving a one-to-one correspondence between Nash equilibria and the solutions to a class of BSDEs. A key ingredient in our approach is a necessary stochastic maximum principle tailored to Epstein-Zin utility and a nonlinear transformation. In the deterministic setting, we further derive an explicit closed-form solution for the equilibrium investment and consumption policies.

We present a new type of game, the Liquidity Game. We draw inspiration from the UK government bond market and apply game theoretic approaches to its analysis. In Liquidity Games, market participants (agents) use non-cooperative games where the players' utility is directly defined by the liquidity of the game itself, offering a paradigm shift in our understanding of market dynamics. Each player's utility is intricately linked to the liquidity generated within the game, making the utility endogenous and dynamic. Players are not just passive recipients of utility based on external factors but active participants whose strategies and actions collectively shape and are shaped by the liquidity of the market. This reflexivity introduces a level of complexity and realism previously unattainable in conventional models. We apply Liquidity Game theoretic approaches to a simple UK bond market interaction and present results for market design and strategic behavior of participants. We tackle one of the largest issues within this mechanism, namely what strategy should market makers utilize when uncertain about the type of market maker they are interacting with, and what structure might regulators wish to see.

Policy optimization methods with function approximation are widely used in multi-agent reinforcement learning. However, it remains elusive how to design such algorithms with statistical guarantees. Leveraging a multi-agent performance difference lemma that characterizes the landscape of multi-agent policy optimization, we find that the localized action value function serves as an ideal descent direction for each local policy. Motivated by the observation, we present a multi-agent PPO algorithm in which the local policy of each agent is updated similarly to vanilla PPO. We prove that with standard regularity conditions on the Markov game and problem-dependent quantities, our algorithm converges to the globally optimal policy at a sublinear rate. We extend our algorithm to the off-policy setting and introduce pessimism to policy evaluation, which aligns with experiments. To our knowledge, this is the first provably convergent multi-agent PPO algorithm in cooperative Markov games.

We consider learning to play multiplayer imperfect-information games with simultaneous moves and large state-action spaces. Previous attempts to tackle such challenging games have largely focused on model-free learning methods, often requiring hundreds of years of experience to produce competitive agents. Our approach is based on model-based planning. We tackle the problem of partial observability by first building an (oracle) planner that has access to the full state of the environment and then distilling the knowledge of the oracle to a (follower) agent which is trained to play the imperfect-information game by imitating the oracle's choices. We experimentally show that planning with naive Monte Carlo tree search does not perform very well in large combinatorial action spaces. We therefore propose planning with a fixed-depth tree search and decoupled Thompson sampling for action selection. We show that the planner is able to discover efficient playing strategies in the games of Clash Royale and Pommerman and the follower policy successfully learns to implement them by training on a few hundred battles.

We propose and evaluate a number of solutions to the problem of calculating the cost to serve each location in a single-vehicle transport setting. Such cost to serve analysis has application both strategically and operationally in transportation. The problem is formally given by the traveling salesperson game (TSG), a cooperative total utility game in which agents correspond to locations in a traveling salesperson problem (TSP). The cost to serve a location is an allocated portion of the cost of an optimal tour. The Shapley value is one of the most important normative division schemes in cooperative games, giving a principled and fair allocation both for the TSG and more generally. We consider a number of direct and sampling-based procedures for calculating the Shapley value, and present the first proof that approximating the Shapley value of the TSG within a constant factor is NP-hard. Treating the Shapley value as an ideal baseline allocation, we then develop six proxies for that value which are relatively easy to compute. We perform an experimental evaluation using Synthetic Euclidean games as well as games derived from real-world tours calculated for fast-moving consumer goods scenarios. Our experiments show that several computationally tractable allocation techniques correspond to good proxies for the Shapley value.

We study the Levine hat problem, a classic combinatorial puzzle introduced by Lionel Levine in 2010. This problem involves a game in which n geq 2 players, each seeing an infinite stack of hats on each of their teammates' heads but not on their own, must simultaneously guess the index of a black hat on their own stack. If one of the players fails to do so, the team loses collectively. The players must therefore come up with a good strategy before the game starts. While the optimal winning probability V_{n} remains unknown even for n=2, we make three key advances. First, we develop a novel geometric framework for representing strategies through measurable functions, providing a new expression of V_{n} and a unified treatment of the game for finite and for infinite stacks via integral formulations. Secondly, we construct a new strategy K_{5} that reaches the conjectured optimal probability of victory : 0.35. We also show that K_{5} is part of a larger class of strategies that allow us to improve current bounds and resolve conjectured inequalities. Finally, we introduce and entirely solve a continuous generalization of the problem, demonstrating that extending to uncountable hat stacks increases the optimal winning probability to exactly 1/2. This generalization naturally leads to a broader and smoother strategic framework, within which we also describe how to compute optimal responses to a range of strategies.

A major barrier to deploying current machine learning models lies in their non-reliability to dataset shifts. To resolve this problem, most existing studies attempted to transfer stable information to unseen environments. Particularly, independent causal mechanisms-based methods proposed to remove mutable causal mechanisms via the do-operator. Compared to previous methods, the obtained stable predictors are more effective in identifying stable information. However, a key question remains: which subset of this whole stable information should the model transfer, in order to achieve optimal generalization ability? To answer this question, we present a comprehensive minimax analysis from a causal perspective. Specifically, we first provide a graphical condition for the whole stable set to be optimal. When this condition fails, we surprisingly find with an example that this whole stable set, although can fully exploit stable information, is not the optimal one to transfer. To identify the optimal subset under this case, we propose to estimate the worst-case risk with a novel optimization scheme over the intervention functions on mutable causal mechanisms. We then propose an efficient algorithm to search for the subset with minimal worst-case risk, based on a newly defined equivalence relation between stable subsets. Compared to the exponential cost of exhaustively searching over all subsets, our searching strategy enjoys a polynomial complexity. The effectiveness and efficiency of our methods are demonstrated on synthetic data and the diagnosis of Alzheimer's disease.

This paper studies attack detection for discrete-time linear systems with stochastic process noise that produce both a vulnerable (i.e., attackable) linear measurement and a secured (i.e., unattackable) quadratic measurement. The motivating application of this model is a dynamic-game setting where the quadratic measurement is interpreted as a system-level utility or reward, and control inputs into the linear system are interpreted as control policies that, once applied, are known to all game participants and which steer the system towards a game-theoretic equilibrium (e.g., Nash equilibrium). To detect attacks on the linear channel, we develop a novel quadratic-utility-aware observer that leverages the secured quadratic output and enforces measurement consistency via a projection step. We establish three properties for this observer: feasibility of the true state, prox-regularity of the quadratic-constraint set, and a monotone error-reduction guarantee in the noise-free case. To detect adversarial manipulation, we compare linear and quadratic observer trajectories using a wild bootstrap maximum mean discrepancy (MMD) test that provides valid inference under temporal dependence. We validate our framework using numerical experiments of a pursuit-evasion game, where the quadratic observer preserves estimation accuracy under linear-sensor attacks, while the statistical test detects distributional divergence between the observers' trajectories.

Unlike perfect information games, where all elements are known to every player, imperfect information games emulate the real-world complexities of decision-making under uncertain or incomplete information. GPT-4, the recent breakthrough in large language models (LLMs) trained on massive passive data, is notable for its knowledge retrieval and reasoning abilities. This paper delves into the applicability of GPT-4's learned knowledge for imperfect information games. To achieve this, we introduce Suspicion-Agent, an innovative agent that leverages GPT-4's capabilities for performing in imperfect information games. With proper prompt engineering to achieve different functions, Suspicion-Agent based on GPT-4 demonstrates remarkable adaptability across a range of imperfect information card games. Importantly, GPT-4 displays a strong high-order theory of mind (ToM) capacity, meaning it can understand others and intentionally impact others' behavior. Leveraging this, we design a planning strategy that enables GPT-4 to competently play against different opponents, adapting its gameplay style as needed, while requiring only the game rules and descriptions of observations as input. In the experiments, we qualitatively showcase the capabilities of Suspicion-Agent across three different imperfect information games and then quantitatively evaluate it in Leduc Hold'em. The results show that Suspicion-Agent can potentially outperform traditional algorithms designed for imperfect information games, without any specialized training or examples. In order to encourage and foster deeper insights within the community, we make our game-related data publicly available.

Researchers in explainable artificial intelligence have developed numerous methods for helping users understand the predictions of complex supervised learning models. By contrast, explaining the uncertainty of model outputs has received relatively little attention. We adapt the popular Shapley value framework to explain various types of predictive uncertainty, quantifying each feature's contribution to the conditional entropy of individual model outputs. We consider games with modified characteristic functions and find deep connections between the resulting Shapley values and fundamental quantities from information theory and conditional independence testing. We outline inference procedures for finite sample error rate control with provable guarantees, and implement efficient algorithms that perform well in a range of experiments on real and simulated data. Our method has applications to covariate shift detection, active learning, feature selection, and active feature-value acquisition.

The Shapley value is arguably the most popular approach for assigning a meaningful contribution value to players in a cooperative game, which has recently been used intensively in explainable artificial intelligence. The meaningfulness is due to axiomatic properties that only the Shapley value satisfies, which, however, comes at the expense of an exact computation growing exponentially with the number of agents. Accordingly, a number of works are devoted to the efficient approximation of the Shapley values, most of them revolve around the notion of an agent's marginal contribution. In this paper, we propose with SVARM and Stratified SVARM two parameter-free and domain-independent approximation algorithms based on a representation of the Shapley value detached from the notion of marginal contributions. We prove unmatched theoretical guarantees regarding their approximation quality and provide empirical results including synthetic games as well as common explainability use cases comparing ourselves with state-of-the-art methods.

The deployment of ever-larger machine learning models reflects a growing consensus that the more expressive the modelx2013and the more data one has access tox2013the more one can improve performance. As models get deployed in a variety of real world scenarios, they inevitably face strategic environments. In this work, we consider the natural question of how the interplay of models and strategic interactions affects scaling laws. We find that strategic interactions can break the conventional view of scaling lawsx2013meaning that performance does not necessarily monotonically improve as models get larger and/ or more expressive (even with infinite data). We show the implications of this phenomenon in several contexts including strategic regression, strategic classification, and multi-agent reinforcement learning through examples of strategic environments in whichx2013by simply restricting the expressivity of one's model or policy classx2013one can achieve strictly better equilibrium outcomes. Motivated by these examples, we then propose a new paradigm for model-selection in games wherein an agent seeks to choose amongst different model classes to use as their action set in a game.

Energy markets exhibit complex causal relationships between weather patterns, generation technologies, and price formation, with regime changes occurring continuously rather than at discrete break points. Current approaches model electricity prices without explicit causal interpretation or counterfactual reasoning capabilities. We introduce Augmented Time Series Causal Models (ATSCM) for energy markets, extending counterfactual reasoning frameworks to multivariate temporal data with learned causal structure. Our approach models energy systems through interpretable factors (weather, generation mix, demand patterns), rich grid dynamics, and observable market variables. We integrate neural causal discovery to learn time-varying causal graphs without requiring ground truth DAGs. Applied to real-world electricity price data, ATSCM enables novel counterfactual queries such as "What would prices be under different renewable generation scenarios?".

We study the problem of convergence to a stationary point in zero-sum games. We propose competitive gradient optimization (CGO ), a gradient-based method that incorporates the interactions between the two players in zero-sum games for optimization updates. We provide continuous-time analysis of CGO and its convergence properties while showing that in the continuous limit, CGO predecessors degenerate to their gradient descent ascent (GDA) variants. We provide a rate of convergence to stationary points and further propose a generalized class of alpha-coherent function for which we provide convergence analysis. We show that for strictly alpha-coherent functions, our algorithm convergences to a saddle point. Moreover, we propose optimistic CGO (OCGO), an optimistic variant, for which we show convergence rate to saddle points in alpha-coherent class of functions.

We investigate the mechanism design problem faced by a principal who hires multiple agents to gather and report costly information. Then, the principal exploits the information to make an informed decision. We model this problem as a game, where the principal announces a mechanism consisting in action recommendations and a payment function, a.k.a. scoring rule. Then, each agent chooses an effort level and receives partial information about an underlying state of nature based on the effort. Finally, the agents report the information (possibly non-truthfully), the principal takes a decision based on this information, and the agents are paid according to the scoring rule. While previous work focuses on single-agent problems, we consider multi-agents settings. This poses the challenge of coordinating the agents' efforts and aggregating correlated information. Indeed, we show that optimal mechanisms must correlate agents' efforts, which introduces externalities among the agents, and hence complex incentive compatibility constraints and equilibrium selection problems. First, we design a polynomial-time algorithm to find an optimal incentive compatible mechanism. Then, we study an online problem, where the principal repeatedly interacts with a group of unknown agents. We design a no-regret algorithm that provides mathcal{O}(T^{2/3}) regret with respect to an optimal mechanism, matching the state-of-the-art bound for single-agent settings.

We study the problem of designing mechanisms for information acquisition scenarios. This setting models strategic interactions between an uniformed receiver and a set of informed senders. In our model the senders receive information about the underlying state of nature and communicate their observation (either truthfully or not) to the receiver, which, based on this information, selects an action. Our goal is to design mechanisms maximizing the receiver's utility while incentivizing the senders to report truthfully their information. First, we provide an algorithm that efficiently computes an optimal incentive compatible (IC) mechanism. Then, we focus on the online problem in which the receiver sequentially interacts in an unknown game, with the objective of minimizing the cumulative regret w.r.t. the optimal IC mechanism, and the cumulative violation of the incentive compatibility constraints. We investigate two different online scenarios, i.e., the full and bandit feedback settings. For the full feedback problem, we propose an algorithm that guarantees mathcal O(sqrt T) regret and violation, while for the bandit feedback setting we present an algorithm that attains mathcal O(T^{alpha}) regret and mathcal O(T^{1-alpha/2}) violation for any alphain[1/2, 1]. Finally, we complement our results providing a tight lower bound.

Useful social science theories predict behavior across settings. However, applying a theory to make predictions in new settings is challenging: rarely can it be done without ad hoc modifications to account for setting-specific factors. We argue that AI agents put in simulations of those novel settings offer an alternative for applying theory, requiring minimal or no modifications. We present an approach for building such "general" agents that use theory-grounded natural language instructions, existing empirical data, and knowledge acquired by the underlying AI during training. To demonstrate the approach in settings where no data from that data-generating process exists--as is often the case in applied prediction problems--we design a heterogeneous population of 883,320 novel games. AI agents are constructed using human data from a small set of conceptually related but structurally distinct "seed" games. In preregistered experiments, on average, agents predict initial human play in a random sample of 1,500 games from the population better than (i) a cognitive hierarchy model, (ii) game-theoretic equilibria, and (iii) out-of-the-box agents. For a small set of separate novel games, these simulations predict responses from a new sample of human subjects better even than the most plausibly relevant published human data.

We study counterfactual identifiability in causal models with bijective generation mechanisms (BGM), a class that generalizes several widely-used causal models in the literature. We establish their counterfactual identifiability for three common causal structures with unobserved confounding, and propose a practical learning method that casts learning a BGM as structured generative modeling. Learned BGMs enable efficient counterfactual estimation and can be obtained using a variety of deep conditional generative models. We evaluate our techniques in a visual task and demonstrate its application in a real-world video streaming simulation task.

We provide an optimization-based framework to perform counterfactual analysis in a dynamic model with hidden states. Our framework is grounded in the ``abduction, action, and prediction'' approach to answer counterfactual queries and handles two key challenges where (1) the states are hidden and (2) the model is dynamic. Recognizing the lack of knowledge on the underlying causal mechanism and the possibility of infinitely many such mechanisms, we optimize over this space and compute upper and lower bounds on the counterfactual quantity of interest. Our work brings together ideas from causality, state-space models, simulation, and optimization, and we apply it on a breast cancer case study. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to compute lower and upper bounds on a counterfactual query in a dynamic latent-state model.

We generalize gradient descent with momentum for optimization in differentiable games to have complex-valued momentum. We give theoretical motivation for our method by proving convergence on bilinear zero-sum games for simultaneous and alternating updates. Our method gives real-valued parameter updates, making it a drop-in replacement for standard optimizers. We empirically demonstrate that complex-valued momentum can improve convergence in realistic adversarial games - like generative adversarial networks - by showing we can find better solutions with an almost identical computational cost. We also show a practical generalization to a complex-valued Adam variant, which we use to train BigGAN to better inception scores on CIFAR-10.

We investigate causal computations taking sequences of inputs to sequences of outputs where the nth output depends on the first n inputs only. We model these in category theory via a construction taking a Cartesian category C to another category St(C) with a novel trace-like operation called "delayed trace", which misses yanking and dinaturality axioms of the usual trace. The delayed trace operation provides a feedback mechanism in St(C) with an implicit guardedness guarantee. When C is equipped with a Cartesian differential operator, we construct a differential operator for St(C) using an abstract version of backpropagation through time, a technique from machine learning based on unrolling of functions. This obtains a swath of properties for backpropagation through time, including a chain rule and Schwartz theorem. Our differential operator is also able to compute the derivative of a stateful network without requiring the network to be unrolled.

Real-world reinforcement learning (RL) is often severely limited since typical RL algorithms heavily rely on the reset mechanism to sample proper initial states. In practice, the reset mechanism is expensive to implement due to the need for human intervention or heavily engineered environments. To make learning more practical, we propose a generic no-regret reduction to systematically design reset-free RL algorithms. Our reduction turns reset-free RL into a two-player game. We show that achieving sublinear regret in this two-player game would imply learning a policy that has both sublinear performance regret and sublinear total number of resets in the original RL problem. This means that the agent eventually learns to perform optimally and avoid resets. By this reduction, we design an instantiation for linear Markov decision processes, which is the first provably correct reset-free RL algorithm to our knowledge.

Answering counterfactual queries has many important applications such as knowledge discovery and explainability, but is challenging when causal variables are unobserved and we only see a projection onto an observation space, for instance, image pixels. One approach is to recover the latent Structural Causal Model (SCM), but this typically needs unrealistic assumptions, such as linearity of the causal mechanisms. Another approach is to use na\"ive ML approximations, such as generative models, to generate counterfactual samples; however, these lack guarantees of accuracy. In this work, we strive to strike a balance between practicality and theoretical guarantees by focusing on a specific type of causal query called domain counterfactuals, which hypothesizes what a sample would have looked like if it had been generated in a different domain (or environment). Concretely, by only assuming invertibility, sparse domain interventions and access to observational data from different domains, we aim to improve domain counterfactual estimation both theoretically and practically with less restrictive assumptions. We define domain counterfactually equivalent models and prove necessary and sufficient properties for equivalent models that provide a tight characterization of the domain counterfactual equivalence classes. Building upon this result, we prove that every equivalence class contains a model where all intervened variables are at the end when topologically sorted by the causal DAG. This surprising result suggests that a model design that only allows intervention in the last k latent variables may improve model estimation for counterfactuals. We then test this model design on extensive simulated and image-based experiments which show the sparse canonical model indeed improves counterfactual estimation over baseline non-sparse models.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable success across various domains. However, a fundamental question remains: Can LLMs effectively utilize causal knowledge for prediction and generation? Through empirical studies, we find that LLMs trained directly on large-scale data often capture spurious correlations rather than true causal relationships, leading to suboptimal performance, especially in out-of-distribution (OOD) scenarios. To address this challenge, we propose Causal Attention Tuning (CAT), a novel approach that injects fine-grained causal knowledge into the attention mechanism. We propose an automated pipeline that leverages human priors to automatically generate token-level causal signals and introduce the Re-Attention mechanism to guide training, helping the model focus on causal structures while mitigating noise and biases in attention scores. Experimental results on our proposed Spurious Token Game (STG) benchmark and multiple downstream tasks demonstrate that our approach effectively leverages causal knowledge for prediction and remains robust in OOD scenarios. Implementation details can be found at https://github.com/Kairong-Han/CAT.

We introduce an Implicit Game-Theoretic MPC (IGT-MPC), a decentralized algorithm for two-agent motion planning that uses a learned value function that predicts the game-theoretic interaction outcomes as the terminal cost-to-go function in a model predictive control (MPC) framework, guiding agents to implicitly account for interactions with other agents and maximize their reward. This approach applies to competitive and cooperative multi-agent motion planning problems which we formulate as constrained dynamic games. Given a constrained dynamic game, we randomly sample initial conditions and solve for the generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) to generate a dataset of GNE solutions, computing the reward outcome of each game-theoretic interaction from the GNE. The data is used to train a simple neural network to predict the reward outcome, which we use as the terminal cost-to-go function in an MPC scheme. We showcase emerging competitive and coordinated behaviors using IGT-MPC in scenarios such as two-vehicle head-to-head racing and un-signalized intersection navigation. IGT-MPC offers a novel method integrating machine learning and game-theoretic reasoning into model-based decentralized multi-agent motion planning.

We present a general causal generative modelling framework for accurate estimation of high fidelity image counterfactuals with deep structural causal models. Estimation of interventional and counterfactual queries for high-dimensional structured variables, such as images, remains a challenging task. We leverage ideas from causal mediation analysis and advances in generative modelling to design new deep causal mechanisms for structured variables in causal models. Our experiments demonstrate that our proposed mechanisms are capable of accurate abduction and estimation of direct, indirect and total effects as measured by axiomatic soundness of counterfactuals.

For reinforcement learning systems to be widely adopted, their users must understand and trust them. We present a theoretical analysis of explaining reinforcement learning using Shapley values, following a principled approach from game theory for identifying the contribution of individual players to the outcome of a cooperative game. We call this general framework Shapley Values for Explaining Reinforcement Learning (SVERL). Our analysis exposes the limitations of earlier uses of Shapley values in reinforcement learning. We then develop an approach that uses Shapley values to explain agent performance. In a variety of domains, SVERL produces meaningful explanations that match and supplement human intuition.

The process of revising (or constructing) a policy at execution time -- known as decision-time planning -- has been key to achieving superhuman performance in perfect-information games like chess and Go. A recent line of work has extended decision-time planning to imperfect-information games, leading to superhuman performance in poker. However, these methods involve solving subgames whose sizes grow quickly in the amount of non-public information, making them unhelpful when the amount of non-public information is large. Motivated by this issue, we introduce an alternative framework for decision-time planning that is not based on solving subgames, but rather on update equivalence. In this update-equivalence framework, decision-time planning algorithms replicate the updates of last-iterate algorithms, which need not rely on public information. This facilitates scalability to games with large amounts of non-public information. Using this framework, we derive a provably sound search algorithm for fully cooperative games based on mirror descent and a search algorithm for adversarial games based on magnetic mirror descent. We validate the performance of these algorithms in cooperative and adversarial domains, notably in Hanabi, the standard benchmark for search in fully cooperative imperfect-information games. Here, our mirror descent approach exceeds or matches the performance of public information-based search while using two orders of magnitude less search time. This is the first instance of a non-public-information-based algorithm outperforming public-information-based approaches in a domain they have historically dominated.

Machine learning approaches relying on such criteria as adversarial robustness or multi-agent settings have raised the need for solving game-theoretic equilibrium problems. Of particular relevance to these applications are methods targeting finite-sum structure, which generically arises in empirical variants of learning problems in these contexts. Further, methods with computable approximation errors are highly desirable, as they provide verifiable exit criteria. Motivated by these applications, we study finite-sum monotone inclusion problems, which model broad classes of equilibrium problems. Our main contributions are variants of the classical Halpern iteration that employ variance reduction to obtain improved complexity guarantees in which n component operators in the finite sum are ``on average'' either cocoercive or Lipschitz continuous and monotone, with parameter L. The resulting oracle complexity of our methods, which provide guarantees for the last iterate and for a (computable) operator norm residual, is mathcal{O}( n + nLvarepsilon^{-1}), which improves upon existing methods by a factor up to n. This constitutes the first variance reduction-type result for general finite-sum monotone inclusions and for more specific problems such as convex-concave optimization when operator norm residual is the optimality measure. We further argue that, up to poly-logarithmic factors, this complexity is unimprovable in the monotone Lipschitz setting; i.e., the provided result is near-optimal.

In many real-world multi-agent cooperative tasks, due to high cost and risk, agents cannot continuously interact with the environment and collect experiences during learning, but have to learn from offline datasets. However, the transition dynamics in the dataset of each agent can be much different from the ones induced by the learned policies of other agents in execution, creating large errors in value estimates. Consequently, agents learn uncoordinated low-performing policies. In this paper, we propose a framework for offline decentralized multi-agent reinforcement learning, which exploits value deviation and transition normalization to deliberately modify the transition probabilities. Value deviation optimistically increases the transition probabilities of high-value next states, and transition normalization normalizes the transition probabilities of next states. They together enable agents to learn high-performing and coordinated policies. Theoretically, we prove the convergence of Q-learning under the altered non-stationary transition dynamics. Empirically, we show that the framework can be easily built on many existing offline reinforcement learning algorithms and achieve substantial improvement in a variety of multi-agent tasks.

We study an online learning problem in general-sum Stackelberg games, where players act in a decentralized and strategic manner. We study two settings depending on the type of information for the follower: (1) the limited information setting where the follower only observes its own reward, and (2) the side information setting where the follower has extra side information about the leader's reward. We show that for the follower, myopically best responding to the leader's action is the best strategy for the limited information setting, but not necessarily so for the side information setting -- the follower can manipulate the leader's reward signals with strategic actions, and hence induce the leader's strategy to converge to an equilibrium that is better off for itself. Based on these insights, we study decentralized online learning for both players in the two settings. Our main contribution is to derive last-iterate convergence and sample complexity results in both settings. Notably, we design a new manipulation strategy for the follower in the latter setting, and show that it has an intrinsic advantage against the best response strategy. Our theories are also supported by empirical results.

Learning from off-policy data is essential for sample-efficient reinforcement learning. In the present work, we build on the insight that the advantage function can be understood as the causal effect of an action on the return, and show that this allows us to decompose the return of a trajectory into parts caused by the agent's actions (skill) and parts outside of the agent's control (luck). Furthermore, this decomposition enables us to naturally extend Direct Advantage Estimation (DAE) to off-policy settings (Off-policy DAE). The resulting method can learn from off-policy trajectories without relying on importance sampling techniques or truncating off-policy actions. We draw connections between Off-policy DAE and previous methods to demonstrate how it can speed up learning and when the proposed off-policy corrections are important. Finally, we use the MinAtar environments to illustrate how ignoring off-policy corrections can lead to suboptimal policy optimization performance.

Planning safe robot motions in the presence of humans requires reliable forecasts of future human motion. However, simply predicting the most likely motion from prior interactions does not guarantee safety. Such forecasts fail to model the long tail of possible events, which are rarely observed in limited datasets. On the other hand, planning for worst-case motions leads to overtly conservative behavior and a "frozen robot". Instead, we aim to learn forecasts that predict counterfactuals that humans guard against. We propose a novel game-theoretic framework for joint planning and forecasting with the payoff being the performance of the planner against the demonstrator, and present practical algorithms to train models in an end-to-end fashion. We demonstrate that our proposed algorithm results in safer plans in a crowd navigation simulator and real-world datasets of pedestrian motion. We release our code at https://github.com/portal-cornell/Game-Theoretic-Forecasting-Planning.

We present Self-Play Preference Optimization (SPO), an algorithm for reinforcement learning from human feedback. Our approach is minimalist in that it does not require training a reward model nor unstable adversarial training and is therefore rather simple to implement. Our approach is maximalist in that it provably handles non-Markovian, intransitive, and stochastic preferences while being robust to the compounding errors that plague offline approaches to sequential prediction. To achieve the preceding qualities, we build upon the concept of a Minimax Winner (MW), a notion of preference aggregation from the social choice theory literature that frames learning from preferences as a zero-sum game between two policies. By leveraging the symmetry of this game, we prove that rather than using the traditional technique of dueling two policies to compute the MW, we can simply have a single agent play against itself while maintaining strong convergence guarantees. Practically, this corresponds to sampling multiple trajectories from a policy, asking a rater or preference model to compare them, and then using the proportion of wins as the reward for a particular trajectory. We demonstrate that on a suite of continuous control tasks, we are able to learn significantly more efficiently than reward-model based approaches while maintaining robustness to the intransitive and stochastic preferences that frequently occur in practice when aggregating human judgments.

A variety of recent papers discuss the application of Shapley values, a concept for explaining coalitional games, for feature attribution in machine learning. However, the correct way to connect a machine learning model to a coalitional game has been a source of controversy. The two main approaches that have been proposed differ in the way that they condition on known features, using either (1) an interventional or (2) an observational conditional expectation. While previous work has argued that one of the two approaches is preferable in general, we argue that the choice is application dependent. Furthermore, we argue that the choice comes down to whether it is desirable to be true to the model or true to the data. We use linear models to investigate this choice. After deriving an efficient method for calculating observational conditional expectation Shapley values for linear models, we investigate how correlation in simulated data impacts the convergence of observational conditional expectation Shapley values. Finally, we present two real data examples that we consider to be representative of possible use cases for feature attribution -- (1) credit risk modeling and (2) biological discovery. We show how a different choice of value function performs better in each scenario, and how possible attributions are impacted by modeling choices.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) integrate into our social and economic interactions, we need to deepen our understanding of how humans respond to LLMs opponents in strategic settings. We present the results of the first controlled monetarily-incentivised laboratory experiment looking at differences in human behaviour in a multi-player p-beauty contest against other humans and LLMs. We use a within-subject design in order to compare behaviour at the individual level. We show that, in this environment, human subjects choose significantly lower numbers when playing against LLMs than humans, which is mainly driven by the increased prevalence of `zero' Nash-equilibrium choices. This shift is mainly driven by subjects with high strategic reasoning ability. Subjects who play the zero Nash-equilibrium choice motivate their strategy by appealing to perceived LLM's reasoning ability and, unexpectedly, propensity towards cooperation. Our findings provide foundational insights into the multi-player human-LLM interaction in simultaneous choice games, uncover heterogeneities in both subjects' behaviour and beliefs about LLM's play when playing against them, and suggest important implications for mechanism design in mixed human-LLM systems.

Learning causal structure from observational data often assumes that we observe independent and identically distributed (i.\,i.\,d) data. The traditional approach aims to find a graphical representation that encodes the same set of conditional independence relationships as those present in the observed distribution. It is known that under i.\,i.\,d assumption, even with infinite data, there is a limit to how fine-grained a causal structure we can identify. To overcome this limitation, recent work has explored using data originating from different, related environments to learn richer causal structure. These approaches implicitly rely on the independent causal mechanisms (ICM) principle, which postulates that the mechanism giving rise to an effect given its causes and the mechanism which generates the causes do not inform or influence each other. Thus, components of the causal model can independently change from environment to environment. Despite its wide application in machine learning and causal inference, there is a lack of statistical formalization of the ICM principle and how it enables identification of richer causal structures from grouped data. Here we present new causal de Finetti theorems which offer a first statistical formalization of ICM principle and show how causal structure identification is possible from exchangeable data. Our work provides theoretical justification for a broad range of techniques leveraging multi-environment data to learn causal structure.

Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated significant progress in performing complex tasks. While Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) has been effective in aligning LLMs with human preferences, it is susceptible to spurious correlations in reward modeling. Consequently, it often introduces biases-such as length bias, sycophancy, conceptual bias, and discrimination that hinder the model's ability to capture true causal relationships. To address this, we propose a novel causal reward modeling approach that integrates causal inference to mitigate these spurious correlations. Our method enforces counterfactual invariance, ensuring reward predictions remain consistent when irrelevant variables are altered. Through experiments on both synthetic and real-world datasets, we show that our approach mitigates various types of spurious correlations effectively, resulting in more reliable and fair alignment of LLMs with human preferences. As a drop-in enhancement to the existing RLHF workflow, our causal reward modeling provides a practical way to improve the trustworthiness and fairness of LLM finetuning.

We propose a game-based formulation for learning dimensionality-reducing representations of feature vectors, when only a prior knowledge on future prediction tasks is available. In this game, the first player chooses a representation, and then the second player adversarially chooses a prediction task from a given class, representing the prior knowledge. The first player aims is to minimize, and the second player to maximize, the regret: The minimal prediction loss using the representation, compared to the same loss using the original features. For the canonical setting in which the representation, the response to predict and the predictors are all linear functions, and under the mean squared error loss function, we derive the theoretically optimal representation in pure strategies, which shows the effectiveness of the prior knowledge, and the optimal regret in mixed strategies, which shows the usefulness of randomizing the representation. For general representations and loss functions, we propose an efficient algorithm to optimize a randomized representation. The algorithm only requires the gradients of the loss function, and is based on incrementally adding a representation rule to a mixture of such rules.

We study the class of location-scale or heteroscedastic noise models (LSNMs), in which the effect Y can be written as a function of the cause X and a noise source N independent of X, which may be scaled by a positive function g over the cause, i.e., Y = f(X) + g(X)N. Despite the generality of the model class, we show the causal direction is identifiable up to some pathological cases. To empirically validate these theoretical findings, we propose two estimators for LSNMs: an estimator based on (non-linear) feature maps, and one based on neural networks. Both model the conditional distribution of Y given X as a Gaussian parameterized by its natural parameters. When the feature maps are correctly specified, we prove that our estimator is jointly concave, and a consistent estimator for the cause-effect identification task. Although the the neural network does not inherit those guarantees, it can fit functions of arbitrary complexity, and reaches state-of-the-art performance across benchmarks.

We study the problem of modeling a population of agents pursuing unknown goals subject to unknown computational constraints. In standard models of bounded rationality, sub-optimal decision-making is simulated by adding homoscedastic noise to optimal decisions rather than explicitly simulating constrained inference. In this work, we introduce a latent inference budget model (L-IBM) that models agents' computational constraints explicitly, via a latent variable (inferred jointly with a model of agents' goals) that controls the runtime of an iterative inference algorithm. L-IBMs make it possible to learn agent models using data from diverse populations of suboptimal actors. In three modeling tasks -- inferring navigation goals from routes, inferring communicative intents from human utterances, and predicting next moves in human chess games -- we show that L-IBMs match or outperform Boltzmann models of decision-making under uncertainty. Inferred inference budgets are themselves meaningful, efficient to compute, and correlated with measures of player skill, partner skill and task difficulty.

For text-based AI systems to interact in the real world, causal reasoning is an essential skill. Since interventional data is costly to generate, we study to what extent an agent can learn causal reasoning from passive data. Specifically, we consider an axiomatic training setup where an agent learns from multiple demonstrations of a causal axiom (or rule), rather than incorporating the axiom as an inductive bias or inferring it from data values. A key question is whether the agent would learn to generalize from the axiom demonstrations to new scenarios. For example, if a transformer model is trained on demonstrations of the causal transitivity axiom over small graphs, would it generalize to applying the transitivity axiom over large graphs? Our results, based on a novel axiomatic training scheme, indicate that such generalization is possible. We consider the task of inferring whether a variable causes another variable, given a causal graph structure. We find that a 67 million parameter transformer model, when trained on linear causal chains (along with some noisy variations) can generalize well to new kinds of graphs, including longer causal chains, causal chains with reversed order, and graphs with branching; even when it is not explicitly trained for such settings. Our model performs at par (or even better) than many larger language models such as GPT-4, Gemini Pro, and Phi-3. Overall, our axiomatic training framework provides a new paradigm of learning causal reasoning from passive data that can be used to learn arbitrary axioms, as long as sufficient demonstrations can be generated.

Proximal causal learning is a promising framework for identifying the causal effect under the existence of unmeasured confounders. Within this framework, the doubly robust (DR) estimator was derived and has shown its effectiveness in estimation, especially when the model assumption is violated. However, the current form of the DR estimator is restricted to binary treatments, while the treatment can be continuous in many real-world applications. The primary obstacle to continuous treatments resides in the delta function present in the original DR estimator, making it infeasible in causal effect estimation and introducing a heavy computational burden in nuisance function estimation. To address these challenges, we propose a kernel-based DR estimator that can well handle continuous treatments. Equipped with its smoothness, we show that its oracle form is a consistent approximation of the influence function. Further, we propose a new approach to efficiently solve the nuisance functions. We then provide a comprehensive convergence analysis in terms of the mean square error. We demonstrate the utility of our estimator on synthetic datasets and real-world applications.

Algorithms increasingly serve as information mediators--from social media feeds and targeted advertising to the increasing ubiquity of LLMs. This engenders a joint process where agents combine private, algorithmically-mediated signals with learning from peers to arrive at decisions. To study such settings, we introduce a model of controlled sequential social learning in which an information-mediating planner (e.g. an LLM) controls the information structure of agents while they also learn from the decisions of earlier agents. The planner may seek to improve social welfare (altruistic planner) or to induce a specific action the planner prefers (biased planner). Our framework presents a new optimization problem for social learning that combines dynamic programming with decentralized action choices and Bayesian belief updates. We prove the convexity of the value function and characterize the optimal policies of altruistic and biased planners, which attain desired tradeoffs between the costs they incur and the payoffs they earn from induced agent choices. Notably, in some regimes the biased planner intentionally obfuscates the agents' signals. Even under stringent transparency constraints--information parity with individuals, no lying or cherry-picking, and full observability--we show that information mediation can substantially shift social welfare in either direction. We complement our theory with simulations in which LLMs act as both planner and agents. Notably, the LLM planner in our simulations exhibits emergent strategic behavior in steering public opinion that broadly mirrors the trends predicted, though key deviations suggest the influence of non-Bayesian reasoning consistent with the cognitive patterns of both humans and LLMs trained on human-like data. Together, we establish our framework as a tractable basis for studying the impact and regulation of LLM information mediators.

Neural network pruning is widely used to reduce model size and computational cost. Yet, most existing methods treat sparsity as an externally imposed constraint, enforced through heuristic importance scores or training-time regularization. In this work, we propose a fundamentally different perspective: pruning as an equilibrium outcome of strategic interaction among model components. We model parameter groups such as weights, neurons, or filters as players in a continuous non-cooperative game, where each player selects its level of participation in the network to balance contribution against redundancy and competition. Within this formulation, sparsity emerges naturally when continued participation becomes a dominated strategy at equilibrium. We analyze the resulting game and show that dominated players collapse to zero participation under mild conditions, providing a principled explanation for pruning behavior. Building on this insight, we derive a simple equilibrium-driven pruning algorithm that jointly updates network parameters and participation variables without relying on explicit importance scores. This work focuses on establishing a principled formulation and empirical validation of pruning as an equilibrium phenomenon, rather than exhaustive architectural or large-scale benchmarking. Experiments on standard benchmarks demonstrate that the proposed approach achieves competitive sparsity-accuracy trade-offs while offering an interpretable, theory-grounded alternative to existing pruning methods.

Classical convergence guarantees for gradient-based learning in games require the pseudo-gradient to be (strongly) monotone in Euclidean geometry as shown by rosen(1965), a condition that often fails even in simple games with strong cross-player couplings. We introduce Small-Gain Nash (SGN), a block small-gain condition in a custom block-weighted geometry. SGN converts local curvature and cross-player Lipschitz coupling bounds into a tractable certificate of contraction. It constructs a weighted block metric in which the pseudo-gradient becomes strongly monotone on any region where these bounds hold, even when it is non-monotone in the Euclidean sense. The continuous flow is exponentially contracting in this designed geometry, and projected Euler and RK4 discretizations converge under explicit step-size bounds derived from the SGN margin and a local Lipschitz constant. Our analysis reveals a certified ``timescale band'', a non-asymptotic, metric-based certificate that plays a TTUR-like role: rather than forcing asymptotic timescale separation via vanishing, unequal step sizes, SGN identifies a finite band of relative metric weights for which a single-step-size dynamics is provably contractive. We validate the framework on quadratic games where Euclidean monotonicity analysis fails to predict convergence, but SGN successfully certifies it, and extend the construction to mirror/Fisher geometries for entropy-regularized policy gradient in Markov games. The result is an offline certification pipeline that estimates curvature, coupling, and Lipschitz parameters on compact regions, optimizes block weights to enlarge the SGN margin, and returns a structural, computable convergence certificate consisting of a metric, contraction rate, and safe step-sizes for non-monotone games.

When deploying artificial agents in real-world environments where they interact with humans, it is crucial that their behavior is aligned with the values, social norms or other requirements of that environment. However, many environments have implicit constraints that are difficult to specify and transfer to a learning agent. To address this challenge, we propose a novel method that utilizes the principle of maximum causal entropy to learn constraints and an optimal policy that adheres to these constraints, using demonstrations of agents that abide by the constraints. We prove convergence in a tabular setting and provide an approximation which scales to complex environments. We evaluate the effectiveness of the learned policy by assessing the reward received and the number of constraint violations, and we evaluate the learned cost function based on its transferability to other agents. Our method has been shown to outperform state-of-the-art approaches across a variety of tasks and environments, and it is able to handle problems with stochastic dynamics and a continuous state-action space.

Inferring causal structure poses a combinatorial search problem that typically involves evaluating structures with a score or independence test. The resulting search is costly, and designing suitable scores or tests that capture prior knowledge is difficult. In this work, we propose to amortize causal structure learning. Rather than searching over structures, we train a variational inference model to directly predict the causal structure from observational or interventional data. This allows our inference model to acquire domain-specific inductive biases for causal discovery solely from data generated by a simulator, bypassing both the hand-engineering of suitable score functions and the search over graphs. The architecture of our inference model emulates permutation invariances that are crucial for statistical efficiency in structure learning, which facilitates generalization to significantly larger problem instances than seen during training. On synthetic data and semisynthetic gene expression data, our models exhibit robust generalization capabilities when subject to substantial distribution shifts and significantly outperform existing algorithms, especially in the challenging genomics domain. Our code and models are publicly available at: https://github.com/larslorch/avici.

This paper investigates the evaluation of learned multiagent strategies in the incomplete information setting, which plays a critical role in ranking and training of agents. Traditionally, researchers have relied on Elo ratings for this purpose, with recent works also using methods based on Nash equilibria. Unfortunately, Elo is unable to handle intransitive agent interactions, and other techniques are restricted to zero-sum, two-player settings or are limited by the fact that the Nash equilibrium is intractable to compute. Recently, a ranking method called α-Rank, relying on a new graph-based game-theoretic solution concept, was shown to tractably apply to general games. However, evaluations based on Elo or α-Rank typically assume noise-free game outcomes, despite the data often being collected from noisy simulations, making this assumption unrealistic in practice. This paper investigates multiagent evaluation in the incomplete information regime, involving general-sum many-player games with noisy outcomes. We derive sample complexity guarantees required to confidently rank agents in this setting. We propose adaptive algorithms for accurate ranking, provide correctness and sample complexity guarantees, then introduce a means of connecting uncertainties in noisy match outcomes to uncertainties in rankings. We evaluate the performance of these approaches in several domains, including Bernoulli games, a soccer meta-game, and Kuhn poker.

Coordinating multiple large language models (LLMs) to solve complex tasks collaboratively poses a fundamental trade-off between the computation costs and collective performance compared with individual model. We introduce a novel, game-theoretically grounded reinforcement learning (RL) framework, the Multi-Agent Cooperation Sequential Public Goods Game (MAC-SPGG), to systematically incentivize cooperation in multi-LLM ensembles. In MAC-SPGG, LLM agents move in sequence, observing predecessors' outputs and updating beliefs to condition their own contributions. By redesigning the public-goods reward, effortful contributions become the unique Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE), which eliminates free-riding under traditional SPGG or PGG. Its sequential protocol replaces costly round-based information exchanges with a streamlined decision flow, cutting communication overhead while retaining strategic depth. We prove the existence and uniqueness of the SPNE under realistic parameters, and empirically show that MAC-SPGG-trained ensembles outperform single-agent baselines, chain-of-thought prompting, and other cooperative methods, even achieving comparable performance to large-scale models across reasoning, math, code generation, and NLP tasks. Our results highlight the power of structured, incentive-aligned MAC-SPGG cooperation for scalable and robust multi-agent language generation.

Understanding and analyzing markets is crucial, yet analytical equilibrium solutions remain largely infeasible. Recent breakthroughs in equilibrium computation rely on zeroth-order policy gradient estimation. These approaches commonly suffer from high variance and are computationally expensive. The use of fully differentiable simulators would enable more efficient gradient estimation. However, the discrete allocation of goods in economic simulations is a non-differentiable operation. This renders the first-order Monte Carlo gradient estimator inapplicable and the learning feedback systematically misleading. We propose a novel smoothing technique that creates a surrogate market game, in which first-order methods can be applied. We provide theoretical bounds on the resulting bias which justifies solving the smoothed game instead. These bounds also allow choosing the smoothing strength a priori such that the resulting estimate has low variance. Furthermore, we validate our approach via numerous empirical experiments. Our method theoretically and empirically outperforms zeroth-order methods in approximation quality and computational efficiency.

Large Language Models (LLMs) show significant potential in economic and strategic interactions, where communication via natural language is often prevalent. This raises key questions: Do LLMs behave rationally? Can they mimic human behavior? Do they tend to reach an efficient and fair outcome? What is the role of natural language in the strategic interaction? How do characteristics of the economic environment influence these dynamics? These questions become crucial concerning the economic and societal implications of integrating LLM-based agents into real-world data-driven systems, such as online retail platforms and recommender systems. While the ML community has been exploring the potential of LLMs in such multi-agent setups, varying assumptions, design choices and evaluation criteria across studies make it difficult to draw robust and meaningful conclusions. To address this, we introduce a benchmark for standardizing research on two-player, sequential, language-based games. Inspired by the economic literature, we define three base families of games with consistent parameterization, degrees of freedom and economic measures to evaluate agents' performance (self-gain), as well as the game outcome (efficiency and fairness). We develop an open-source framework for interaction simulation and analysis, and utilize it to collect a dataset of LLM vs. LLM interactions across numerous game configurations and an additional dataset of human vs. LLM interactions. Through extensive experimentation, we demonstrate how our framework and dataset can be used to: (i) compare the behavior of LLM-based agents to human players in various economic contexts; (ii) evaluate agents in both individual and collective performance measures; and (iii) quantify the effect of the economic characteristics of the environments on the behavior of agents.

We introduce the problem of active causal structure learning with advice. In the typical well-studied setting, the learning algorithm is given the essential graph for the observational distribution and is asked to recover the underlying causal directed acyclic graph (DAG) G^* while minimizing the number of interventions made. In our setting, we are additionally given side information about G^* as advice, e.g. a DAG G purported to be G^*. We ask whether the learning algorithm can benefit from the advice when it is close to being correct, while still having worst-case guarantees even when the advice is arbitrarily bad. Our work is in the same space as the growing body of research on algorithms with predictions. When the advice is a DAG G, we design an adaptive search algorithm to recover G^* whose intervention cost is at most O(max{1, log psi}) times the cost for verifying G^*; here, psi is a distance measure between G and G^* that is upper bounded by the number of variables n, and is exactly 0 when G=G^*. Our approximation factor matches the state-of-the-art for the advice-less setting.

Market generators using deep generative models have shown promise for synthetic financial data generation, but existing approaches lack causal reasoning capabilities essential for counterfactual analysis and risk assessment. We propose a Time-series Neural Causal Model VAE (TNCM-VAE) that combines variational autoencoders with structural causal models to generate counterfactual financial time series while preserving both temporal dependencies and causal relationships. Our approach enforces causal constraints through directed acyclic graphs in the decoder architecture and employs the causal Wasserstein distance for training. We validate our method on synthetic autoregressive models inspired by the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process, demonstrating superior performance in counterfactual probability estimation with L1 distances as low as 0.03-0.10 compared to ground truth. The model enables financial stress testing, scenario analysis, and enhanced backtesting by generating plausible counterfactual market trajectories that respect underlying causal mechanisms.

Open-world survival games pose significant challenges for AI algorithms due to their multi-tasking, deep exploration, and goal prioritization requirements. Despite reinforcement learning (RL) being popular for solving games, its high sample complexity limits its effectiveness in complex open-world games like Crafter or Minecraft. We propose a novel approach, SPRING, to read the game's original academic paper and use the knowledge learned to reason and play the game through a large language model (LLM). Prompted with the LaTeX source as game context and a description of the agent's current observation, our SPRING framework employs a directed acyclic graph (DAG) with game-related questions as nodes and dependencies as edges. We identify the optimal action to take in the environment by traversing the DAG and calculating LLM responses for each node in topological order, with the LLM's answer to final node directly translating to environment actions. In our experiments, we study the quality of in-context "reasoning" induced by different forms of prompts under the setting of the Crafter open-world environment. Our experiments suggest that LLMs, when prompted with consistent chain-of-thought, have great potential in completing sophisticated high-level trajectories. Quantitatively, SPRING with GPT-4 outperforms all state-of-the-art RL baselines, trained for 1M steps, without any training. Finally, we show the potential of games as a test bed for LLMs.

In many sports, it is commonly believed that the home team has an advantage over the visiting team, known as the home field advantage. Yet its causal effect on team performance is largely unknown. In this paper, we propose a novel causal inference approach to study the causal effect of home field advantage in English Premier League. We develop a hierarchical causal model and show that both league level and team level causal effects are identifiable and can be conveniently estimated. We further develop an inference procedure for the proposed estimators and demonstrate its excellent numerical performance via simulation studies. We implement our method on the 2020-21 English Premier League data and assess the causal effect of home advantage on eleven summary statistics that measure the offensive and defensive performance and referee bias. We find that the home field advantage resides more heavily in offensive statistics than it does in defensive or referee statistics. We also find evidence that teams that had lower rankings retain a higher home field advantage.

Users like sharing personal photos with others through social media. At the same time, they might want to make automatic identification in such photos difficult or even impossible. Classic obfuscation methods such as blurring are not only unpleasant but also not as effective as one would expect. Recent studies on adversarial image perturbations (AIP) suggest that it is possible to confuse recognition systems effectively without unpleasant artifacts. However, in the presence of counter measures against AIPs, it is unclear how effective AIP would be in particular when the choice of counter measure is unknown. Game theory provides tools for studying the interaction between agents with uncertainties in the strategies. We introduce a general game theoretical framework for the user-recogniser dynamics, and present a case study that involves current state of the art AIP and person recognition techniques. We derive the optimal strategy for the user that assures an upper bound on the recognition rate independent of the recogniser's counter measure. Code is available at https://goo.gl/hgvbNK.

Causal discovery, i.e., inferring underlying cause-effect relationships from observations of a scene or system, is an inherent mechanism in human cognition, but has been shown to be highly challenging to automate. The majority of approaches in the literature aiming for this task consider constrained scenarios with fully observed variables or data from stationary time-series. In this work we aim for causal discovery in a more general class of scenarios, scenes with non-stationary behavior over time. For our purposes we here regard a scene as a composition objects interacting with each other over time. Non-stationarity is modeled as stationarity conditioned on an underlying variable, a state, which can be of varying dimension, more or less hidden given observations of the scene, and also depend more or less directly on these observations. We propose a probabilistic deep learning approach called State-Dependent Causal Inference (SDCI) for causal discovery in such conditionally stationary time-series data. Results in two different synthetic scenarios show that this method is able to recover the underlying causal dependencies with high accuracy even in cases with hidden states.

In a recent work, Laforgue et al. introduce the model of last switch dependent (LSD) bandits, in an attempt to capture nonstationary phenomena induced by the interaction between the player and the environment. Examples include satiation, where consecutive plays of the same action lead to decreased performance, or deprivation, where the payoff of an action increases after an interval of inactivity. In this work, we take a step towards understanding the approximability of planning LSD bandits, namely, the (NP-hard) problem of computing an optimal arm-pulling strategy under complete knowledge of the model. In particular, we design the first efficient constant approximation algorithm for the problem and show that, under a natural monotonicity assumption on the payoffs, its approximation guarantee (almost) matches the state-of-the-art for the special and well-studied class of recharging bandits (also known as delay-dependent). In this attempt, we develop new tools and insights for this class of problems, including a novel higher-dimensional relaxation and the technique of mirroring the evolution of virtual states. We believe that these novel elements could potentially be used for approaching richer classes of action-induced nonstationary bandits (e.g., special instances of restless bandits). In the case where the model parameters are initially unknown, we develop an online learning adaptation of our algorithm for which we provide sublinear regret guarantees against its full-information counterpart.

Fair machine learning aims to prevent discrimination against individuals or sub-populations based on sensitive attributes such as gender and race. In recent years, causal inference methods have been increasingly used in fair machine learning to measure unfairness by causal effects. However, current methods assume that the true causal graph is given, which is often not true in real-world applications. To address this limitation, this paper proposes a framework for achieving causal fairness based on the notion of interventions when the true causal graph is partially known. The proposed approach involves modeling fair prediction using a Partially Directed Acyclic Graph (PDAG), specifically, a class of causal DAGs that can be learned from observational data combined with domain knowledge. The PDAG is used to measure causal fairness, and a constrained optimization problem is formulated to balance between fairness and accuracy. Results on both simulated and real-world datasets demonstrate the effectiveness of this method.

Robust reinforcement learning (RL) seeks to train policies that can perform well under environment perturbations or adversarial attacks. Existing approaches typically assume that the space of possible perturbations remains the same across timesteps. However, in many settings, the space of possible perturbations at a given timestep depends on past perturbations. We formally introduce temporally-coupled perturbations, presenting a novel challenge for existing robust RL methods. To tackle this challenge, we propose GRAD, a novel game-theoretic approach that treats the temporally-coupled robust RL problem as a partially-observable two-player zero-sum game. By finding an approximate equilibrium in this game, GRAD ensures the agent's robustness against temporally-coupled perturbations. Empirical experiments on a variety of continuous control tasks demonstrate that our proposed approach exhibits significant robustness advantages compared to baselines against both standard and temporally-coupled attacks, in both state and action spaces.

Traditional Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) often relies on reward models, frequently assuming preference structures like the Bradley-Terry model, which may not accurately capture the complexities of real human preferences (e.g., intransitivity). Nash Learning from Human Feedback (NLHF) offers a more direct alternative by framing the problem as finding a Nash equilibrium of a game defined by these preferences. In this work, we introduce Nash Mirror Prox (Nash-MP), an online NLHF algorithm that leverages the Mirror Prox optimization scheme to achieve fast and stable convergence to the Nash equilibrium. Our theoretical analysis establishes that Nash-MP exhibits last-iterate linear convergence towards the beta-regularized Nash equilibrium. Specifically, we prove that the KL-divergence to the optimal policy decreases at a rate of order (1+2beta)^{-N/2}, where N is a number of preference queries. We further demonstrate last-iterate linear convergence for the exploitability gap and uniformly for the span semi-norm of log-probabilities, with all these rates being independent of the size of the action space. Furthermore, we propose and analyze an approximate version of Nash-MP where proximal steps are estimated using stochastic policy gradients, making the algorithm closer to applications. Finally, we detail a practical implementation strategy for fine-tuning large language models and present experiments that demonstrate its competitive performance and compatibility with existing methods.